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Abstract
Aristotle appears to indicate in various passages in the De Anima that imagination is a kind of
thought, and my thesis attempts to make some sense out of this claim. I examine three possible
interpretations of the claim that imagination is a kind of thought and eliminate two of them.
The first states that Aristotle only calls imagination a kind of thought in a superficial “in name
only” sense. The second, more radical interpretation, identifies images as the most basic kind of
thoughts. My final chapter defends a more moderate position—inspired by Avempace and the
early Averroes—which steers between the superficial and radical interpretations, by construing
the formal content of images as a sort of quasi-corporeal substrate for the generation of
learned thoughts.
Keywords: Agent Intellect, Alexander, Aristotle, Avempace, Averroes, De Anima, Ibn Bajjah,
Imagination, Material Intellect, Perception, Phantasia, Spiritual Forms.

Summary for Lay Audience
My first chapter underscores a tension in Aristotle’s account of the imaginative faculty. On the
one hand, the bulk of the textual evidence suggests that Aristotle regarded the imagination as
something akin to perception, with images just being residual after-effects of perceptual acts.
On the other hand, there are several troublesome passages which liken the imagination to a
kind of thinking. But whereas other commentators have attempted to explain these
troublesome passages away, my thesis seriously considers whether (and in what sense)
Aristotelian imagination might be regarded as a kind of thinking. My second chapter briefly
examines the possibility that Aristotle was only speaking colloquially when he described the
imagination as a kind of thought. After rejecting this hypothesis, my third chapter turns to the
much more radical hypothesis that Aristotelian images just are thoughts. If confirmed, this
would require us to seriously rethink Aristotle’s understanding of humanity’s place relative to
non-human animals, as it would imply that many non-human animals (i.e., those with
imagination) share with us a capacity for thought. But while this hypothesis does withstand
many of the objections that have been raised against it, it still proves untenable because images
reside within the bodily organs, whereas thought-acts, on Aristotle’s view, are very famously
unblended with the body. My fourth chapter defends the more moderate claim that images,
while not identical with thoughts, nevertheless contribute to their generation, by providing the
raw “material” from which they are derived. In order to unpack this in a manner which does not
imply that thoughts are blended with the bodily, I invoke the interpretive work of the twelfth
century Islamic commentator Ibn Bajjah, who’d posited that images contain “spiritual forms,”
which possess a limited degree of independence from the body that enables them to undergo
changes in their own right. In addition to resolving the tension in Aristotle’s account of the
imagination, this theory also offers a gradualist account of the intellect’s emergence, thereby
providing an answer to the notoriously difficult question of how the intellect can be at once
unblended with the body, but also, ultimately, derived from it.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. A Thinking-Model of Imagination in DA 3.3?
There exists a strange tension within Aristotle’s description of the faculty of imagination, in DA
3.3. On the one hand, the chapter contains what is commonly regarded as Aristotle’s canonical
account of the imagination, as expressed in the following pair of passages.
(a) But since when one thing has been set in motion another thing may be moved by it, and
imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, i.e. to
occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its content what can be perceived,
and since movement may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is
necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this movement cannot exist apart
from sensation or in creatures that do not perceive, and its possessor does and
undergoes many things in virtue of it, and it is true and false (428b10-17).
(b) If then imagination presents no other features than those enumerated and is what we
have described, then imagination must be a movement resulting from an actual exercise
of a power of sense (428b29-a3).
According to passage (a), imagination possesses at least the following characteristics: For
starters, it seems to be a passive affection in the soul, caused indirectly by perceptible objects.
Such, at least, appears to be the thrust of Aristotle’s talk of a transference of motion, at the
beginning of the passage; his point appears to be that it is the perceptual power which is set in
motion by the impingement of a perceptible object, and which then goes on to set the
imaginative power in motion.1 The upshot of this is that while the indirect cause of the
activation of the imaginative faculty is an external perceptible object, the direct cause of its
activation is the already activated perceptual power. Hence, going forward, I will refer to the
imaginative faculty as being “sensory-induced.”
Secondly, the activated imaginative faculty has the same intentional content as the activated
perceptual faculty,2 as indicated by Aristotle’s claim that imagination “has for its content what
can be perceived.” And, if we subscribe to a physiological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of
1

A helpful analogy here might be the “automatic puppets,” from GA 2.1, whose parts are said to “…have a
sort of potentiality of motion in them, [such that] when any external force puts the first
of them in motion, immediately the next is moved in actuality” 734b8.
2
i.e., Perceptible qualities.

perception, according to which the organ of sense literally takes on the formal quality of a
perceptible object,3 then we can link this rather conveniently with Aristotle’s additional claim
that imagination is “similar in character to the sensation itself.”
Thirdly, the activated imaginative faculty induces the creatures which possess it (i.e. animals)4
to “do and “undergo” many things, meaning that it induces them to action.5 And finally,
passage (a) seems to indicate that the intentional content conveyed by the imaginative faculty
has some sort of truth-value.6
Passage (b) seems to be mainly reiterative. Although it does not explicitly repeat passage (a)’s
points about an animal “doing and undergoing many things” in virtue of imagination, or about
imagination being “true and false,” it does seem to hark back to these points implicitly. The
explicit focus of the passage seems to be to underscore passage (a)’s point about imagination
being caused directly by the activated perceptual faculty.
But although the content of passage (b) appears to be mostly summary, there is one additional
component, which warrants special attention: namely, its apparent suggestion that the list of
features attributed to the faculty of imagination in passage (a) constitutes an exhaustive list of
the imaginative power’s features (i.e. “If then imagination presents no other features7 than
those enumerated…”).
This is a rather strange suggestion, given the presence of at least four other passages in the
DA—two of which also occur in DA 3.3—which seem to flirt with the notion of attributing an
additional property to the imagination, which is not mentioned in passages (a) or (b). Namely,
that imagination is a species of thought:
(c) Thinking [to noiein] seems to be the most probable exception; but if this too proves to
be a form of imagination8 or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a
body as a condition of its existence (403a8-10).

3

This has been a matter of some dispute. In my master’s thesis, I sided with Richard Sorabji, John Sisko and S.M.
Cohen, against Myles Burnyeat’s claim that, “…no physiological change is needed for the eye or the organ of touch
to become aware of the appropriate perceptible objects,” but that “…the effect on the organ is the awareness, no
more and no less” (Nussbaum & Rorty, pg. 22).
4
Although Aristotle does not believe that all animals possess imagination, it is clear from his claim in passage (a)
that he thinks only animals possess it. Imagination is predicated on perception and perception is the defining
feature of animals.
5
As we will see in subsequent chapters of my discussion, the faculty of imagination figures heavily in Aristotle’s
theory of animal action, as it applies both to non-human animals and human beings.
6
Which is to say that it can be either true or false.
7
“Features” does not actually appear in the Greek. More literally, the passage entertains the notion that phantasia
presents “nothing other than (mêthen allo) what we have stated.”
8
My italics.
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(d) That this activity is not the same kind of thinking [noesis]9 as judgment is obvious. For
imagination lies within our power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture, as in
the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images), but in forming opinions we are
not free: we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth (427b14-20).
(e) Thinking [noein] is different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination,10 in
part judgment (427b28).
(f) These two at all events appear to be sources of movement: appetite and thought (if one
may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking [noesin]11; for many men follow
their imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in all animals other than man there is no
thinking or calculation but only imagination) (433a9-12).
Passage (c) is one of the more hesitant of these four passages, in that it does not directly
confirm that imagination is a kind of thought, but merely entertains a proposition which would
have very similar consequences: namely, that thought might be a kind of imagination. Granted,
this is only presented as a hypothetical,12 but if it were the case that thought is a kind of
imagination, it would follow that images are at least sometimes thoughts. Which is really just a
softened version of the conclusion that would follow from the more direct proposition that
imagination is a kind of thought—namely, that images are always thoughts. And so it seems to
me that passage (c) can be counted as evidence that Aristotle was at least considering the
proposition that imagination is sometimes a kind of thinking.
Passage (d) makes a much bolder claim. Its primary purpose is to press the point that
imagination is not judgment, but Aristotle’s phrasing plainly implies that imagination is
nevertheless some kind of thinking. Which supports the stronger of the two conclusions noted
just above, that images are always thoughts.
As for passage (e), a straightforward reading would seem to indicate that thoughts are divisible
into two component parts, judgments and images. If this is right, then the passage does seem
to provide us with grounds for thinking that, at least under certain circumstances, images can
be said to take on some degree of noetic status.13
Coming finally to passage (f), we find that Aristotle is, again, merely entertaining a hypothetical
proposition. But this time, he is entertaining the proposition that imagination is a kind of

9

My italics.
My italics.
11
My italics.
12
That is why I say that Aristotle is merely entertaining the notion.
13
Though, admittedly, this will not amount to a one-to-one correspondence between images and thoughts.
10
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thinking, rather than the reverse. This would yield the stronger of the two conclusions listed
above, that images are always thoughts.
And so, of the four passages just listed, three of them entertain the notion that images are
either sometimes or always a kind of thought, and one of them confirms that imagination is
always a kind of thought. Thus, if passage (b) is to be understood as asserting that imagination
possesses no other features than the ones listed in passage (a), we have a clear selfcontradiction on our hands. Of course, Aristotle does not definitively commit himself in passage
(b) to the position that imagination has no other features than the ones listed in passage (a). He
puts this forward as a conditional statement too, and his final verdict is unclear. This opens a
window for us to take seriously the proposition that the property “being a kind of thought”
might be coherently added to the list of properties attributed to the faculty of imagination, in
passage (a). The resulting picture of the imagination—which I will henceforth refer to as the
“Thinking-Model of Imagination”—would state that the imaginative faculty is a passive
affection in the soul caused directly by the activated perceptual faculty,14 which has the same
intentional content as the activated perceptual faculty, whose intentional content has truthvalue, which induces an animal to action, and which is also (at least in some sense) a kind of
thinking.
The purpose of my thesis will be to explore the plausibility of attributing to Aristotle a belief in
some form of the Thinking-Model of Imagination.

1.2. Three Possible Variants of the Thinking-Model
Before proceeding to a discussion of my methodology, I should pause to delineate a number of
different forms that a Thinking-Model of Imagination might take. As we saw above, the
passages from the DA in which Aristotle appears to be entertaining a Thinking-Model of
Imagination are divisible into two categories, one of which supports a stronger claim than the
other. Corresponding to these two categories are two distinct iterations of a Thinking-Model of
Imagination, which one might take up and defend.
The first is a strong version of the Thinking Model, according to which imagination is always a
form of thought. Phrased another way, we might say that this model treats images as being
essentially noetic in character, or as being identical with a certain form of thought.15 This
version is supported by passages (d) and (f).
The second is a more modest version, which states that imagination is sometimes a form of
thought. Phrased another way, we might say that although this version does not treat images
as being essentially noetic in character or as being identical with any kind of thought, it
14
15

And indirectly by the perceptible object.
Presumably the most basic kind.
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nevertheless allows that images are capable, under certain circumstances, of acquiring noetic
character. This version is supported by passages (c) and (e).
In addition to the two interpretations just listed, there is a third way of understanding the
Thinking-Model of Imagination, which does not strike me as being directly supported by any of
the aforementioned passages, but which it would still be wise to consider, as some rather
important commentators have defended it. According to this iteration, Aristotle applies the
terms like noesis and noiein to the imagination in a non-literal sense. As we shall see in the next
chapter, this reading is often advanced by commentators who regard the material intellect of
DA 3.4 as an incorruptible substance.

1.3. Methodology
As I have mentioned above, the purpose of my dissertation will be to explore the possibility of
deriving a Thinking-Model of Imagination from the third book of Aristotle’s DA. And, as I have
also mentioned above, there are three distinct variants of a Thinking-Model, which could
potentially be derived from DA 3.3. Firstly, there is a strong version, which regards images as
being intrinsically noetic. Secondly, there is a more moderate version, which treats images as
being sometimes noetic. And thirdly, there is a superficial version, according to which Aristotle
applies noetic terminology to the imagination only in a non-literal sense. The ramifications of
this third version will admittedly be less interesting than those of the former two, but it still
seems appropriate to classify it as a variant of the Thinking-Model. This is because—unlike
some influential critiques of the Thinking-Model—it does at least acknowledge that passages (c)
through (f) say what they appear, prima facie, to be saying about the imagination.
Given, then, that there are three possible variants of the Thinking-Model of Imagination, it
seems that the soundest methodology for ascertaining the overall plausibility of the ThinkingModel will be to conduct a systematic examination of each individual variant. The remainder of
my thesis will therefore be divided into three main chapters, each one dealing with a single
variant of the Thinking-Model of Imagination.
My methodology will be systematic in that it will subject each individual variant of the ThinkingModel to the same form of analysis: each chapter will begin with an overview of some of the
historical commentators who have defended the variant under consideration, and their reasons
for doing so. Next, each chapter will unpack the ramifications of the variant under
consideration and discuss the extent to which we should find those ramifications acceptable.
Next, each chapter will address some of the independent objections which might be raised
against the variant under consideration and make the strongest possible attempt to answer
those objections. Next, each chapter will attempt to offer up some independent reasons for
adopting the variant under consideration. And finally, taking all of the above into account, each
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chapter will attempt to arrive at some definitive conclusion as to whether the relevant variant
of the Thinking-Model of Imagination is ultimately defensible, and whether we can therefore
help ourselves to its ramifications.
Although the superficial version of the Thinking-Model will receive more or less the same
formal treatment as the strong and moderate versions, I should acknowledge from the outset
that I am far more interested in the strong and moderate versions, as they seem to me to have
far more stimulating ramifications.

1.4. Contemporary Reactions to a Thinking-Model of Imagination
Prior to commencing the project outlined just above, I should pause to note that although all
three variants of the Thinking-Model have enjoyed at least some historical support,
commentators in our time have generally not been friendly to the idea that Aristotelian
imagination might be a kind of thinking. They generally have not even observed the distinctions
that I have drawn above, between the three possible variants of the Thinking-Model of
Imagination.

1.4.1. Michael Wedin (1988)
For example, Michael Wedin, the most vocal critic of the Thinking-Model of Imagination, really
only addresses the strong version’s claim that images are inherently noetic in character. He
attacks this proposition by attempting to establish that images possess a number of intertwined
properties which are incompatible with those possessed by even the most basic kinds of
thoughts.
The first of these is “functional incompleteness.” Functional-completeness, for Wedin, refers to
a faculty’s ability to proceed from first to second-order actuality. Wedin’s claim is that, unlike
the faculty of thought (and that of perception), the faculty of imagination does not possess the
capacity to proceed from first to second-order actuality. To elaborate, this means that, “…there
is no complete act that counts as imagining something…One cannot, as it were, simply
represent something” (Wedin, 55).16 Rather, Wedin thinks that images occur only within the
context of complete acts performed by the other, fully-fledged faculties. In the case of
perceptual acts, this manifests as a sort of residual accompaniment; images arise and persist as
a representational side-effect of the perceptual faculty having been activated by a sensible
16

In support of this position, Wedin cites the difference in the wording of Aristotle’s introduction of imagination,
as compared with the wording of his introductions of the full faculties of perception and thought. Whereas the
descriptions of perception and thought take the form, “that in virtue of which X Ys”—thereby suggesting that
perception and thought enable the soul or the entire system to do something—the description of imagination
takes the form, “that in virtue of which Y occurs in X.”
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object. In the case of intellectual acts, the situation is somewhat more complicated. In order to
communicate the manner in which images manifest within the context of thought acts, Wedin
employs the following linguistic analogy: “I cannot refer to Jones apart from uttering some
sentence about Jones. Referring simply cannot be done on its own” (Wedin, 55). Here,
imagination is analogous to the referring, and the entire propositional speech act would be
analogous to the complete thought-act which provides the context within which the reference
occurs.
This turns out to be more than just an analogy for Wedin, as it actually ties in directly to the
second property which he thinks distinguishes images from thoughts: On Wedin’s view, even
the most basic thought-acts actually are propositional linguistic complexes. On Wedin’s reading,
one cannot be said to know or to have learned a thing, until one has expressed it to oneself as a
term in a proposition: “…I think of daffodils only insofar as the noema daffodil occurs in a
proposition-like complex [i.e. “daffodils are bulbous herbs”]” (Wedin, 131). And as we have
seen above, Wedin regards Aristotle as having believed that images occur only within the
context of functionally complete acts. Which, in the case of thought-acts, would seem to
require that the image itself is (or represents) a simple term which appears in the propositional
complex of a thought-act. But if this is the case, then it follows that the image itself cannot be a
propositional complex. Hence, we have Wedin’s second objection to the idea that images are
thoughts: All thought-acts are, for Aristotle, propositional linguistic complexes, whereas images
are (or signify) non-propositional terms which appear in such complexes. Wedin refers to this as
a kind of “subservience” relationship between images and thought acts.
Of course, the implication that images are non-propositional terms which appear in the
propositional complexes expressed by thought acts generates a problem for Wedin, as it could
be perceived as blurring the distinction between images and noemata. Recall Wedin’s claim
that one has not truly learned the noema ‘daffodil’ until one has expressed it as a term in a
proposition. The thought-act is identical to the internal utterance of the proposition, not the
noema as such. The noema is a simple term which occurs within the thought-act. But noemata
seem to share this status with images—which means that both are, in themselves, nonpropositional terms which occur in a propositional complex. Absent some further argument
specifying the qualitative difference between images and noemata—or at least specifying the
unique roles played by each within the proposition—the discerning reader might reasonably
begin to wonder why we mightn’t just identify images with noemata.17
Wedin anticipates this problem and offers the following resolution: images are distinct from
noemata in that, “…[primary] thoughts [i.e. noemata] are universal” (Wedin, 134).18 That is,

17

In which case, we’d have a strong Thinking-Model of Imagination.
Hence, Wedin has opted to differentiate noemata from images qualitatively. We’ll learn more about their
respective functions in the third and fourth chapters of my discussion.
18

7

they denote common, sharable concepts,19 which are not themselves the objects of perception.
Images, by contrast, do not even denote particular sensible substances, on Wedin’s view.20
Hence, we have Wedin’s third distinction between images and thoughts: For Aristotle, even the
most basic noetic components of thought-acts denote universals, whereas images barely
represent particulars.
This is, as I had mentioned above, all by way of dismantling the strong version of the ThinkingModel of Imagination. Wedin does not consider the more moderate proposition that images
might be capable of acquiring noetic character, say by undergoing some sort of formal
alteration or via combination with judgement. And it is not at all obvious that his objections to
the strong Thinking-Model would rule any of this out.21 I’ll return to this in my final chapter.
Neither is Wedin particularly sensitive to the possibility that Aristotle might be applying noetic
terminology to the imagination in a non-literal sense, as per the superficial version of the
Thinking-Model. Although this model would offer a convenient (if somewhat speculative)
strategy for dealing with the apparent implications of passages (c) through (f), Wedin opts
instead to argue that this is all that these implications really are: apparent.
Regarding passage (c), he stresses that although the passage does allude to the idea that
“[thought] is a form of imagination,” it only suggests it as the first of two possible sets of
circumstances under which it would be impossible for the mind to exist apart from the body,
then reminds us that in the lines that follow, “…only the second [of these two possible sets of
circumstances] even receives serious consideration” (Wedin, 72).
As for passage (d), Wedin argues that the impression this passage gives of suggesting that
imagination is a kind of thought is really due to a mistranslation on Hamlyn’s part. On Wedin’s
view, Hamlyn’s rendering of the passage as reading “imagination is not the same kind of
thought as judgment” is an awkward attempt to incorporate a reference to “noesis,” which—
although it does indeed appear in several of the Greek manuscripts—ought really to be
bracketed, if we wish to make any sense of the passage in context. This is because, in the lines
immediately preceding passage (d), Aristotle had just finished explaining that imagination is
distinct from perception and from thought. Hence, any translation of the remark which retains
the “noesis” would involve Aristotle in a self-contradiction. Instead, Wedin recommends
dropping the noesis, and simply rendering the passage to read, “imagination is not the same as
judgment.” This translation would, in Wedin’s view, not only harmonize the remark with the
lines which preceded it, but would also allow the remark to sit more comfortably ahead of the
19

Wedin does allow room for the mind’s apprehension of particular substances but argues that these are not the
proper objects of the mind’s receptivity. In this, he may be following Aquinas’ lead. More on this in the final
chapter of my discussion.
20

Wedin says that there are no images of sensible substance, but only of proper and common sensibles.
Actually, his claim that images function as terms in propositional complexes would seem to align quite
conveniently with passage (e).
21
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lines immediately following (which offer an explanation as to why imagination is distinct from
judgment)
As for passage (e)—which held thought to be, “in part imagination and in part judgment”—
Wedin argues that to interpret this claim as indicating that images, along with judgments, are
component parts of thoughts would be needlessly radical. He offers an alternative reading,
according to which the passage is simply telling us that images and judgments are both involved
in thought-acts.
Coming finally to passage (f), Wedin argues that Aristotle’s venture of regarding imagination as
a kind of thought is just a provisional move that he makes, within the specific context of DA
3.10, in order to preserve, “…the [main] thesis [of the chapter,] that there are two main
components in any action [namely desire, the object of which stimulates movement by serving
as an end for the sake of which the animal will or will not move; and intellect, which
apprehends the object of desire, and deliberates about whether and by what means it will
pursue that end22]” (Wedin 72).
This main thesis of the chapter is threatened by Aristotle’s subsequent acknowledgement that
imagination is also capable of apprehending the objects of desire, and of serving as the final
determinant of actions undertaken for the sake of those objects.23 And so, rather than setting
down imagination as a third component of action (effectively abandoning the chapter’s main
thesis that there are only two components in any action), Aristotle opts to lump the
imagination in with intellect. However, on Wedin’s view, this should not be understood as a
literal ascription of noetic character to the imagination. It is simply an acknowledgement that
“…imagination plays the [same] role in certain action contexts that intellect plays in other
action contexts” (Wedin, 73).

1.4.2. Malcolm Schofield (1992)
Malcolm Schofield is no more receptive to a Thinking-Model of Imagination than Wedin is, and
he seems to take much of Wedin’s case for the theoretical incompatibility of thoughts and
images for granted.
That said, his treatment differs from Wedin’s in that he does not follow Wedin in arguing that
passages (d) through (f)24 only appear to be suggesting that imagination might be a kind of
thinking. Neither, however, does he avail himself of the superficial Thinking-Model’s claim that
Aristotle refers to the imagination as a kind of thinking, only in a non-literal sense. Rather, he
22

The conclusion of its deliberation just is the action.
As in the case of non-human animals, and human beings whose intellectual faculties have been impeded by
feeling or disease or sleep.
24
He does not address passage (c)
23
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resolves the tension between these suggestive passages and the canonical account of
imagination expressed between passages (a) and (b) by proposing that Aristotle simply changed
his mind mid-text.
In the case of passages (d) and (e)—which are internal to Aristotle’s central discussion of the
imaginative faculty, in DA 3.3—this requires Schofield to reject Wedin’s assumption that the
chapter really purports to be offering a single, finished account of the imagination. Rather, on
Schofield’s view, what DA 3.3 offers is an exploratory reflection on the nature of the
imaginative faculty, which entertains a variety of perspectives on this question, but which
ultimately discards some of these perspectives in favor of others. On Schofield’s view, the
Thinking-Model suggested by passages (d) and (e) is one such perspective, entertained briefly
at the beginning of the chapter, but ultimately discarded in favor of passage (a)’s more
perceptually-based canonical model: “…having begun by treating phantasia as a form of
thinking, he ends by taking sense-perception to be the key to its nature” (Nussbaum & Rorty,
275).
Now, I should say that I find this solution to be prima facie implausible, given that the ThinkingModel resurfaces later on, in passage (f).25 However, Schofield reapplies the exact same
solution to passage (f). In “Phantasia in the De Motu Animalium” (2011), he acknowledges that
passage (f) does indeed seem to regard imagination as, “…analogous to or [even] (in the end) a
kind of practical thinking or calculation” (Pakaluk & Pearson, 121). But he also points out that
the passage occurs at the very outset of DA 3.10 and that Aristotle seems to have changed his
mind by the end of the chapter. Aristotle concludes the chapter by drawing a distinction
between “sensitive-imagination” and “calculative-imagination,” and Schofield opines that this is
likely intended as a corrective on his earlier remark about venturing to regard imagination as a
kind of thought, motivated by his, “…recognition that for a general theory of animal movement,
which will work for non-rational as well as rational animals, expressions like “thinking” (noesis)
and ‘intellect’ (nous) are in the end not the most appropriate” (Pakaluk & Pearson, 122).
The idea here seems to be that, when Aristotle commenced his account of the process by which
animals translate desire into action (i.e., DA 3.10), he had the human animal at the forefront of
his mind, which led him to paint an overly narrow picture of animal action as resulting from the
mediation of desire by the rational faculty, which, through various forms of practical reasoning,
decides if and by what means a given object of desire is to be pursued. As a second thought—
being vaguely aware that this account would not be applicable to the actions undertaken by
non-human animals, and requiring a quick solution to this oversight—he classified the
mediating principle of non-human animal action (i.e., imagination) as “analogous to (or in the
end) a kind of practical thinking.”26
25

My intuition being that if, by the end of DA 3.3, the thinking-model of imagination has already been definitively
replaced by the perceptual model, then we should hardly expect it to still be on the table as late in the text as DA
3.10.
26
So far this is consistent with Wedin’s analysis of the passage.
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This solution would prove inadequate, however, as Aristotle would soon come to appreciate
that the imagination holds something of a default position as the guiding principle of action,
even in human beings.27 Having grasped the primacy of the imagination as the mediating
principle of animal action, Aristotle would realize that his original account of animal action as
resulting from the mediation of desire by practical thought needed to be revised entirely. His
revised account would describe animal action as resulting from the facilitation of desire by the
imagination. Of course, this account would still require some means of distinguishing between
non-human and (fully functional) human action, and this is what Aristotle’s “sensitive” vs
“calculative-imagination”28 dichotomy is intended to provide.

27

As evidenced by the fact that humans are guided by the imagination in contexts in which their intellectual
capacities are dulled or muted by feeling, sleep, disease.
28
The latter of which is only possessed by human animals.
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Chapter 2: The Superficial Thinking-Model
This chapter will discuss historical commentators who have the defended the superficial
Thinking-Model of Imagination, their reasons for doing so, the ramifications of this model, and
the considerations which speak for and against it.

2.1. Context for Understanding the Superficial Thinking-Model
Before I discuss the historical proponents of the superficial Thinking-Model, it will be necessary
to unpack the context in which this interpretation arose. As we shall see, those who have held
that Aristotle applies noetic terminology to the imagination only in a superficial sense have
tended to do so as a means of resolving a perceived contradiction in Aristotle’s discussion of
the human intellect.

2.1.1. A Contradiction in Aristotle’s Account of the Passive Intellect
In DA 3.4, after laying out the mechanism by which the material intellect operates, Aristotle
puts forward a number of arguments leading to the conclusion that it corresponds to no bodily
organ, and that therefore its activity—or its manner of being acted upon—is proper to the
faculty itself, rather than to the compound of the soul and the body.29 Which satisfies a
conditional statement from DA 1.1, stating that if there exists any faculty whose “way of acting
or being acted upon” is proper to itself, then this faculty will be incorruptible and separable
from the body. When read in conjunction with this conditional, the arguments presented in DA
3.4 for the absence of an intellectual organ seem to suggest that the material intellect of DA 3.4
is incorruptible and separable from the body.

29

On the surface, this might seem like an outright self-contradiction on Aristotle’s part—for how could anything
called the material intellect be incorporeal? Well, in this context, Aristotle is using hylē not so much to signify
physical stuff as to signify potentiality (dunamei), as he clarifies immediately after naming the material intellect in
DA 3.5. And by potentiality, he intends the ability to receive the forms of objects without their matter. True, this
description is carried over from his earlier description of the perceptual faculty, which itself is undeniably
embodied. However, Aristotle is careful to distinguish the perceptual faculty from the magnitude (megethos) of
the sensory organ, and to stress that it is not itself extended. The question, then, is not whether an incorporeal
“material intellect” is an inherently self-contradictory concept, but rather, whether one can properly motivate the
idea that the material intellect is disanalogous to the perceptual faculty, with respect to its lack of a bodily organ.
As we will see, the dispositional readings of the material intellect advanced by Alexander (and Avempace) are
attempts to bring this off.
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It comes as a bit of a surprise, then, to find Aristotle apparently contrasting the eternal agent
intellect with a perishable, passive intellect, in DA 3.5.
(g) When separated it is alone just what it is, and this above is immortal and eternal (we do
not remember because, while this is impossible, passive thought [pathetikos nous] is
perishable); and without this nothing thinks (430a20-26).
We therefore have a prima facie contradiction on our hands, and there are two possible
strategies for resolving it. The first would be to deny that the arguments put forward by
Aristotle in DA 3.4 really require that the material intellect be imperishable. And the second
would be to challenge the supposition that the passive intellect referenced in passage (g) is the
same intellect described in DA 3.4.

2.1.2 Alexander’s Solution
The first of these solutions is more popular today than it has been historically. However, it did
have some very early proponents. Most notable among these is Alexander of Aphrodisias.
Alexander does accept Aristotle’s claim that the activity of the material intellect is proper to the
soul itself, and that it does not involve any alteration in a bodily organ:
[Material] intellect, however, does not make use of the body when it apprehends beings
[which are its object], since as a power it belongs to no body, and is not itself a subject
that is acted on [when it cognizes]…Its whole reality is to exist as a power belonging to
an actuality of a special kind, that is, the soul, a power that can receive [pure] forms and
concepts [noemata] (Fotinis, 139).
On the other hand, Alexander is steadfast in his belief that the material intellect is inseparable
from the other psychic faculties, and, therefore, from the body as well. He arrives at this
position by way of the following argumentative line, which pivots on the arguably Aristotelian
principle that the soul is not composed of divisible parts but must instead be numerically one.
His argument begins from the premise that the nutritive power has a precise bodily locus in the
torso, in the area surrounding the heart.30 From here, he then reasons that, “It is…simply
impossible that the sensory soul should exist in separation from the nutritive” (Fotinis, 129).
This should come as no surprise to us, as Alexander is here invoking the definitively Aristotelian
30

Alexander justifies this premise by pointing out that the heart is responsible for the digestive process, as
evidenced by the fact that moisture and heat (the material elements involved in digestion) are concentrated
around the heart.
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principle that, although a more primitive psychic power is capable of existing independently of
the next highest power,31 the higher psychic powers are incapable of existing independently of
the lower ones.32 But Alexander is not simply invoking this principle as a matter of dogma; he
also offers detailed explanations as to why each psychic power should be dependent upon the
next lowest one. In the case of the sensory soul, he notes that, “…nothing can perform sensory
acts without being nourished[.]” (Fotinis, 129)33 And of course, the faculty of imagination bears
a similar (though not identical) relation to the perceptual soul. Alexander explains this
dependence-relation by noting that, “…the imaginative faculty has as the object of its activity
and function residual impressions produced by sensible objects” (Fotinis, 130). 34
But the really pressing question is whether the Aristotelian principle that each psychic faculty
depends upon the next lowest one extends all the way to the highest psychic faculty—i.e., the
intellect—or whether this might be an exception to the rule. On the one hand, Aristotle gives us
some reasons for thinking that thought is dependent upon images in a manner analogous to
that in which the imaginative faculty is dependent on the perceptual faculty. For example, in DA
3.7,35 he states that the soul never thinks without an image. On the other hand, in DA 2.2, he
muses that thought seems to be an entirely different kind of soul, “differing as what is eternal
from what is perishable,” and “capable of being separated.” Alexander appeals to the
aforementioned unified-subject principle, in order to settle the question. Because Alexander
reads Aristotle as having believed that, “…the entire soul exists in a subject that is numerically
one” (Fotinis, 135),36 he concludes that the intellect cannot be separable from the other psychic
faculties, nor therefore from the body. His rationale is that, “…if it were possible for the rational
power in general to exist by itself—separated, that is, from the nutritive, sensory, and
imaginative, and appetitive powers that we have just reviewed—then the rational power
[would]…have [viz. be] its own subject [of inherence]” (Fotinis, 134).37 However, he finds this
conclusion to be unacceptable, “…because it forces us to assert [in contravention of the unified31

In the sense that there are kinds of organism which possess the lower one, but not the higher one.
In that the organisms which possess the higher ones never fail to have the lower ones.
33
This can be fleshed out in a number of ways: One might be that, if an animal is not nourished, it will die, which
will put an end to its capacity for performing sensory acts. Another might be that the sensory organs themselves
require nourishment in order function optimally.
34
The relation between the imaginative soul and the perceptual soul is similar to the relation between the
perceptual soul and the nutritive soul, in that both are dependence relations. However, the imagination does not
depend upon the perceptual power in quite the same way that the perceptual power depends upon the nutritive
power. The imaginative power depends upon the perceptual power in the sense that each discrete imaginative act
is caused and informed by a discrete perceptual act. However, it is not the case that each discrete perceptual act is
causally preceded by a discrete nutritive act. Rather, the perceptual power depends upon the nutritive power in
the sense that the organism (or sensory organ) requires nutrition in general in order to perform perceptual acts. I
refer to these as strong and weak “subservience” relations, respectively. I’ll discuss this distinction in more detail
in my fourth chapter.
35
I’ll discuss this in more detail in the third and fourth chapters.
36
Strong support can be found for this reading in DA 1.5. I will discuss these arguments in more detail in the third
chapter, since they figure more prominently in that stage of my discussion.
37
i.e. It would be a substance in itself, as opposed to a mere disposition.
32
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subject principle] that there is a plurality of souls [in man], so that each man would be in fact
many animate beings” (Fotinis, 134).
Of course, Aristotle does argue, in DA 3.4, that intelligible forms must be potentially within the
mind, “…just as characters may be said to be [potentially] on a writing-table on which as yet
nothing actually stands written” (429b30-430a1). And a straightforward reading of this passage
seems to suggest that, contra Alexander, the mind is a subject unto itself, which is acted upon
when it cognizes intelligible objects. How, then, does Alexander deal with the writing-tablet
analogy? Well, in accordance with his view of the intellect as being not a subject but rather “a
power38 belonging to an actuality of a special kind,” he reads the analogy not as likening the
mind to the tablet itself, but rather, to the tablet’s disposition for being written upon.39
And so, if the intellect described in DA 3.4 is inseparable from the body for the reasons given by
Alexander, then there will in this case be no contradiction in supposing it to be the same
perishable intellect referenced in passage (g). That said, this interpretive strategy imposes upon
Alexander the implication that there are two incommensurate intellects referenced in passage
(g), one of which (the passive intellect) is perishable, and one of which (the agent intellect) is
immortal. Which raises a difficult question as to how each of these two intellects relates to the
individual human being. Alexander had famously answered that it is only the passive intellect
which belongs to the human soul,40 whereas the agent intellect is the divine intellect of the
Metaphysics:
This intellect that makes [the material intellect to be a knowing intellect] is called “an
intellect that comes from outside.” It is no part nor power of our own soul…this intellect
is itself an immaterial form; it never existed in union with matter…this intellect is most
probably separable from us because of the kind of being that it is: one, sc., that does not
come to be an intellect in the act of its being known by us, but is by its own nature both
intellect and intelligible in act. And a form of this sort, a subsistent reality, totally
independent of matter, is not subject to corruption. Since then the productive intellect
is an intellect in act, has its origin outside us, and is a pure intelligible form, Aristotle
rightly calls it “immortal”” (Fotinis, 141).

38

Viz. a disposition for receiving intelligible forms.
That is, with the contingent fact that nothing has yet been written on it.
40
Which, given that Alexander regarded the passive intellect as being dependent upon the body, effectively means
that he understood Aristotle to be saying that human beings are mortal.
39
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2.1.3. Problems with Alexander’s Solution
Although one might well be persuaded by Alexander’s case for the inseparability of the material
intellect, one might still wonder whether he can coherently deny that it makes use of the body
when it apprehends intelligible forms. After all, Alexander likens the material intellect to a
tablet’s disposition for being written upon, and while this disposition may not itself be a
physical thing, the tablet most certainly is. And so, if the analogy holds, then it would seem—
prima facie anyway—that the material intellect is a disposition of the body for undergoing some
sort of change, and whose fulfillment must therefore involve a change in one or more bodily
organs.
Granted, Alexander does specify that the “special kind of actuality” to which the intellectual
disposition belongs refers to the soul itself—his point apparently being that it is the soul, rather
than the body as such that corresponds to the tablet. However, given Alexander’s conviction
that the “entire soul exists in a subject that is numerically one,” and given that this subject is
unmistakably bodily, this doesn’t seem to be sufficient to enable him to avoid the conclusion
that the intellect’s actualization involves a change in a bodily organ.41
How, then, does Alexander attempt to harmonize his commitment to the mind’s inseparability
from the body with the premise that its activity does not make use of the body? He attempts to
do so by appealing to the notion that a formal power may possess a measure of independence
from matter—let’s call it “functional independence,” as distinguished from ontological
independence—by virtue of having emerged from the coalescence of other, simpler formal
powers.42 The idea here is that, when simpler material substrates are combined and blended to
form more complex material substrates, the lower-order formal powers which supervene on
those simpler substrates coalesce to generate higher-order forms. These superior forms—
which Alexander calls “common forms”—possess a higher degree of perfection and a greater
variability of motion than the lower forms from which they were derived, and are,
“…consequently…to some extent [i.e., functionally, not ontologically] independent of matter”
(Fotinis, 190).
And it is important to note that this notion of “common forms” is more than just an ad hoc
remedy for the difficulty presented by the intellect. It is actually a central feature of Alexander’s
metaphysics, intended to aid him in explaining how increasingly complex substances—including
living beings—can arise out of the most basic material components. The process begins with
the combination of the primary bodies,43 whose underlying substrate is the elusive “prime
matter,” and each of whose simple formal natures is, “…the cause of a single, simple movement
41

We’ve seen that Alexander assigned to the nutritive faculty a precise bodily locus in the area surrounding the
heart. When combined with the aforementioned “unified subject” principle, this seems to entail that the other
psychic faculties, including the intellect, also have ties to the area surrounding the heart (at least in some sense).
42
So that, in effect, it is tied to the material substrate only indirectly, by way of these other, simpler forms.
43
i.e. The four elements.
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in [each of] them”44 (Fotinis, 8). When these primary bodies are combined to form a more
complex substrate, “…the nature of each of these [primary] bodies making up its substrate adds
its own distinctive characteristic to the form that is above all these [inferior] forms” (Fotinis, 9).
These are the first-order “common forms,” which characterise natural composite bodies. Such
bodies, owing to the greater complexity and perfection of their overarching formal nature,
possess the capacity for a greater variability of motion than the simple bodies do, including
motions which constitute the foundational psychic activity of plants.

“Simple bodies have indeed an intrinsic principle of movement, but in one direction
only, whereas every plant is endowed with a principle whereby it nourishes itself and
thus, by growing, moves over many different dimensions” (Fotinis, 11).
And when these natural composite bodies are themselves combined to form an even more
complex substrate, the nature of each of these natural composite bodies making up its
substrate adds its own distinctive characteristic to a common form characterizing an animal
body, which—owing to the greater perfection of its overarching formal nature, is endowed with
an even greater range of motion than that possessed by plants, which includes the additional
psychic power of perception. From here, incremental increases in the complexity of the
underlying substrate yields incrementally more complex combinations of “inferior” forms,
whose coalescence yields common forms with an even greater degree of perfection, and which
characterise animal bodies possessing an even broader range of motion, including the
additional psychic powers of imagination and ultimately, even thought.
Thus, Alexander’s solution to the tension between the intellect’s ontological dependence upon
the body and the premise that its cognitive activity does not make use of the body, appears to
be as follows: the material intellect can be described as a disposition inhering in the soul, in the
sense that it emerges from the coalescence of all the other, lower psychic faculties. Inasmuch
as these lower faculties are themselves formal powers, the intellect’s emergence from their
coalescence qualifies it as a “common form,” which, being higher and more perfect than they
are, and possessing a broader range of motion, grants it a certain (functional) independence
from the matter of the body.
The problem with this solution is that, according to Alexander’s understanding of
hylomorphism, all formal powers (save those of the primary bodies) result from the
coalescence of other, simpler formal powers, and this includes the formal powers by which an
organism nourishes itself, perceives, and retains or conjures up images. It follows that the
nutritive, perceptual, and imaginative psychic powers, whose coalescence gives rise to the
intellect, are themselves “common forms.” And if the greater perfection and mobility possessed
44

Fire, for example, moves upward. And earth moves downward.
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by a common form entails a certain degree of functional independence from matter, then it will
follow that these psychic powers are also “to some extent” functionally independent of the
matter of the body, by the same token that the intellect is (albeit to a lesser extent). This is
troublesome for a number of reasons. Firstly, because the rational faculty’s functional
independence from matter is supposed to be what distinguishes it from the lower psychic
faculties. Secondly, given that the activity of each of the other faculties clearly involves an
alteration in one or more bodily organs, it just isn’t clear what it would mean to say that they
are functionally independent of matter “to an extent,” since each still seems to be directly
undergirded by some change in a bodily organ. Finally, even if this second problem could be
resolved, it still isn’t clear why the activity of the intellect should be unique in being wholly
independent of any bodily organ, while the activity of the other psychic powers is only partially
independent. Existing as it apparently does on a spectrum of formal powers with gradationally
increasing degrees of functional independence from matter, there seems to be something
rather arbitrary about designating the intellectual power as the cut-off point at which total
functional independence is achieved. And appeals to its “greater perfection” don’t offer us a
very informative explanation.
None of this is to say that Alexander’s solution doesn’t make a certain formal sense; the notion
of a partially independent “common form” isn’t inherently self-contradictory, and so insofar as
it is a feature of Alexander’s broader understanding of hylomorphism, my objection doesn’t
give us any a priori reason for thinking that the intellect couldn’t be at once functionally
independent of any particular bodily alteration, yet also tied indirectly to the body by way of
other, simpler forms. Alexander’s solution is undermined primarily by the overbroad
applicability of the concept of partially separable “common forms,” combined with Aristotle’s
explicit stipulation that the lower psychic faculties are directly undergirded by a bodily
substrate. Thus, although my objection doesn’t illustrate that Alexander’s solution is formally
incoherent, it does illustrate its inadequacy to the task of explaining the supposed uniqueness
of the intellectual faculty, as being functionally (if not ontologically) independent of the body.
I’ll offer an alternative solution in the final chapter of my discussion.

2.2. Historical Proponents of the Superficial Thinking-Model
As I mentioned above, the Alexandrian approach did not gain a great deal of traction until
relatively recently. Throughout much of the DA’s interpretive history, it was regarded as quite
unpalatable, because interpreters were often committed to the imperishability of DA 3.4’s
passive intellect. In some cases, this was because, having accepted the premise that the passive
intellect is a component of each individual human soul, they sought to read the DA in such a
way as to harmonize it with their own religious commitments to human immortality. In other
cases, it was because they sought to understand the passive intellect of DA 3.4 as transcending
each individual human being, elevating it to a kind of quasi-divine status.
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In any case, those interpreters who were committed to the incorruptibility of DA 3.4’s passive
intellect had only one remaining strategy at their disposal for dealing with the apparent
contradiction between this premise, and Aristotle’s reference to a perishable passive intellect in
DA 3.5. They needed to argue that the latter was referring to something other than the passive
intellect described in DA 3.4. Of course, this prompts the question of just what else it could
have been referring to, and the answer typically given by these commentators was that it refers
to the imaginative faculty. I will discuss three such commentators, below:

2.2.1. Aquinas
Thomas Aquinas argued that the receptive intellect of DA 3.4 and the agent intellect of DA 3.5
represent complementary facets of the intellectual part of each individual human soul.45 If true,
this would mean that whatever differences obtain between these two facets of the human
intellect, they cannot be so drastic as to render one perishable and the other imperishable, as
Alexander would have it. Since they both belong to the same part of the human soul, they must
therefore both either be perishable, or imperishable.46 And the weight of the evidence suggests
the latter.47 Hence, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Aquinas writes that Aristotle’s
claim about the immortality of the intellect (expressed in general terms in DA 2.2), “…must be
understood, not as regards agent intellect or possible intellect alone, but as regards both…so it
is clear that he is speaking here of the whole intellective part, which is called separated, of
course, because it has its operation without a corporeal organ” (Pasnau, 369).
This, of course, requires Aquinas to wrestle with the tension between the imperishability of DA
3.4’s passive intellect, and Aristotle’s reference to a perishable nous pathetikos, in passage (g).
And, given that he has rejected the only other available means of resolving this tension,48 his
only remaining recourse is to argue that passage (g)’s nous pathetikos refers to something other
than the passive intellect of DA 3.4. His solution can be inferred from the following statement:
“Without this perishable part of soul, however, our intellect intellectively cognizes nothing,
45

Meaning that, on Aquinas’ view, the agent intellect of DA 3.5 (contra Alexander) does not refer to the Deity.
If one were perishable and the other imperishable, then it could not be the case that they belong to the same
part of the soul, as this would entail that one of them is capable of existing independently of the other. This is
especially true if we consider that, on Aquinas’ reading of Aristotle, the soul is not composed of discrete parts at
all, but is rather a unity. Although he does at times speak of ‘parts’ of the soul, this really only refers to the logical
distinctions between the soul’s various faculties; Aquinas does in fact commit himself to the view that it is with the
whole soul that we live, and with the whole soul that we perceive and with the whole soul that we think.
47
Aristotle seems quite unambiguous in his assertion that the agent intellect is immortal. And while one could
make a case that he is somewhat less forthright about whether the receptive intellect is immortal (as Alexander
did, when he introduced the possibility of an emergentist reading), there is, on Aquinas’ supposition that they both
belong to the same part of the soul, no strong incentive for doing so. If the receptive intellect belongs to the same
part of the soul as the agent intellect, and if we know the agent intellect to be immortal, then the receptive
intellect must be immortal also.
48
i.e. Alexander’s emergentist view of DA 3.4’s passive intellect, and his accompanying claim that the agent
intellect refers to God.
46
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because it does not intellectively cognize anything without a phantasm” (Pasnau, 370). The
notion that thought is dependent upon the presence of images should be familiar to us from DA
3.7, and Aquinas’ suggestion that passage (g)’s nous pathetikos is responsible for supplying the
requisite images confirms that he understands it as a reference to the imaginative faculty.

2.2.2. Averroes (later works)

In his Long Commentary on the De Anima, Averroes rejects the notion that the material intellect
is a component of each individual human soul. He does this because he believes that the
material intellect is receptive not of “individual and particular forms,” but rather, of “universal
forms,” and he takes this to entail that the material intellect itself must “not [be] a determinate
particular” (Taylor, 304). 49 In other words, he doesn’t think the material intellect is individuated
by matter; rather, he regards it as a species unto itself, of which it is the only instantiation.50
On the other hand, Averroes is very clear that the material intellect is still involved in each
individual human’s acts of conceptualization, and this raises a puzzle: if there is only one
material intellect to account for the conceptual acts of all human beings, then it would seem
(prima facie) that all human beings must think in unison.51 But since this is clearly not the case,
it cannot be the case that there is only one material intellect for all human beings.
Averroes addresses this problem by offering the following elaboration on the nature of the
relationship between the material intellect, and each individual human being: The material
intellect serves as an eternal repository for (universal) intelligible forms52 and makes these
available to all individual human beings. Hence, when Averroes says that there is one material
intellect for all humans, what he means is that we all gain access to the same intelligible
content, from the same eternal reservoir. However, our access to this eternal reservoir of
intelligible forms is not instantaneous, and it does not come solely from the top-down
(otherwise we all would think in unison). It is still—crucially—a matter of abstraction from our
awareness of concrete particulars, and the material intellect does not contain within itself the
particularized representations from which this process must necessarily begin. These are
provided by the imaginative faculty, which is informed by the perceptual faculty, and which—
like the perceptual faculty—is blended with, and individuated by, the body.
Hence, despite the fact that all human beings grasp at the same intelligible content housed
within the same eternal reservoir (i.e. the material intellect), a given person’s thought-acts can
49

This appears to be an elaboration on Aristotle’s argument, from DA 3.4, that, “…in so far as the realities it knows
are capable of being separated from their matter, so it is also with the powers of thought” (429b20-21). Averroes is
here interpreting “separability from matter” as implying some manner of universality.
50
Aquinas makes a similar claim about the angels, in On Being and Essence.
51
Such that if I apprehend an intelligible form, then you must apprehend that same form simultaneously, and vice
versa.
52
It receives these forms from the agent intellect.
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still be private to that individual and independent of the thought acts of all other people,
because each person’s connection to the material intellect is mediated by representations of
particular objects, which result from the activation of their individuated perceptual and
imaginative faculties, and which are therefore private to that individual.53
Since it was explained among the doubts mentioned earlier that it is impossible for the
intelligible to be united with each human being and be numbered in virtue of the
number of these by way of the part which belongs to it as matter, namely, the material
intellect [i.e. since the material intellect itself does not admit of individuation], then it
remains that the conjoining of intelligibles with us human beings is through the
conjoining of the intelligible intention with us (these are the imagined intentions)
(Taylor, 320). 54
Moreover, since the imaginative faculty’s integration with the matter of the body entails that it
will itself be destroyed when the body is destroyed, it follows that the private and
particularized connection that it affords each human being to the material intellect—by virtue
of which each human being becomes a properly individuated knower of intelligible forms—will
also be destroyed along with the body. Hence, Averroes writes that
“…the disposition for intelligibles which is in the imaginative power [i.e. the potential
intelligibility of images, which, as the privatized starting point for acts of abstraction,
grants a person the potential for being a particularized knower] is generated through
the generation of an individual, [and] corrupted through its corruption, [in addition to
being] generally numbered through its numbering” (Taylor, 320).
The net result of all of this is that, unlike Aquinas,55 Averroes is unable to affirm the immortality
of the individual human being. Although we each enjoy a personal connection to the eternal
reservoir of intelligible forms, this connection is severed at the moment of bodily death, which
means that we are, qua individuated knowers, corruptible. But despite this radical discrepancy
between Averroes’ interpretation of the DA and the interpretation championed by Aquinas, he
is nevertheless in agreement with Aquinas, at least insofar as he regards DA 3.4’s passive
intellect as being (contra Alexander) independent of each individual human body, and
immortal. And for this reason, he is faced with the same problem that Aquinas faced, with
respect to the tension between the immortality of the receptive intellect of DA 3.4, and
53

This is owing to their roots in individual perceptual experiences.
In placing the imaginative faculty at the heart of each individual’s relation with the material intellect, Averroes is
recalling Aristotle’s claim, from DA 3.7, that the soul never thinks without an image.
55
Who had regarded the immortality of the material intellect as confirming the immortality of each individual
human soul, since he’d regarded the material intellect itself as being particularized in each individual human being.
54
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Aristotle’s reference, in passage (g), to a perishable passive intellect. And he offers the same
solution: “He [Aristotle] means by the passive intellect [of passage (g)] the imaginative power,
as he will later explain” (Taylor, 325).

2.2.3. Brentano (1867)
The Thomistic picture has enjoyed a long shelf-life and has influenced many prominent
interpreters. Franz Brentano (1867) also rejected Alexander’s idea that the agent intellect of DA
3.5 refers to the Deity of the Metaphysics, and regarded it instead as a facet of each individual
human soul. And, like Thomas, he even specified that it, “…belong[s] to the same part of the
soul to which the receptive intellect also belongs” (Brentano, 118).56 Which, as he spells out at
length, means that the receptive and agent intellects must be, for the most part, qualitatively
similar—especially as regards imperishability.57 Hence, Brentano concludes that the agent
intellect, must be, “…indestructible for the same reason that the receptive intellect is”
(Brentano, 118).
As in the case of Thomas, this approach left Brentano in need of some method of resolving the
tension between the evident imperishability of DA 3.4’s passive intellect, and Aristotle’s
reference to a perishable passive intellect, in passage (g). His solution is the same as Thomas’:
he denies that the nous pathetikos of passage (g) refers to the intellect described in DA 3.4, and
argues, instead, that, “It [refers to] the imagination which, as a sensory faculty according to
chapter 4 does not partake in the impassibility [apatheia] of the receptive intellect” (Brentano,
141).

2.3. On the Superficiality of this Thinking-Model
We have seen three rather influential commentators arguing that Aristotle used the term nous
in reference to the imaginative faculty in passage (g). However, it seems improbable that any of
these commentators believed that Aristotle intended to signify that the imagination is really
noetic in any robust sense.

56

i.e. The intellective part.
There is one point of dissimilarity between the receptive and agent intellects, which might seem, on the surface,
to upset this symmetry: namely, that one is by its nature pure potentiality whereas the other is by its nature pure
actuality. However, Brentano maintains that the pure potentiality of the receptive intellect on the one hand, and
the pure actuality of the active intellect on the other hand, can both be understood—for slightly different
reasons—as indicators of the mind’s unmixed quality: “Just as pure potentiality can be called unmixed since it does
not have actuality in it, so can pure actuality be called unmixed, since it has not been received into any
potentiality” (Brentano, 119). And, of course, it is by virtue of its unmixed nature that Aristotle credits it with
separability from the body.
57
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After speculating that the nous pathetikos of DA 3.5 refers to the imagination, Aquinas tempers
his conclusion with the following qualification: “This [passive] part of soul [which “pertains to
the sensory part”] is nevertheless called intellect, as it is also called rational, [only] insofar as it
to a certain extent participates in reason by obeying reason and following its movement, as is
said in Ethics 1 [1102b13-1103a3]” (Pasnau, 370).
And, in his notes to Averroes’ Long Commentary, Richard C. Taylor cautions that although
Averroes’ interpretation of passage (g) does entail that the imagination, “…is a kind of reason
which is bound up with the body for Averroes,” this is the case, “…thanks only to its connection
to the material intellect” (Taylor, 325).
Brentano, for his part, takes great pains to link passage (g) back to passages (d) and (f), hoping
thereby to illustrate that it was actually not uncommon for Aristotle to use noetic terminology
in reference to the imagination.58 That said, he also points out that, “In the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle once called sensation (aisthesis) itself nous” (Brentano, 141), which seems like an
attempt to downplay the significance of Aristotle’s applications of noetic terminology to the
imagination. The idea here would be that because Aristotle’s application of the term nous to
perception can hardly have been intended literally, and because the imagination is in
Brentano’s own words "a sensory faculty” according to Aristotle, there should be a strong
presumption that Aristotle wasn’t speaking literally when he applied noetic terminology to the
imagination, either.
It would seem, then, that while all three of the aforementioned commentators would
acknowledge that Aristotle sometimes had occasion to apply noetic terminology to the
imagination, none would allow that he intended it literally. The ramifications of the superficial
Thinking-Model are therefore (as the name should suggest) not especially interesting. It does
not imply that images really possess any robustly noetic qualities as a part of their intrinsic
nature, nor that they are capable of acquiring such qualities. It therefore would not require us
to rethink any orthodox positions concerning the nature of Aristotelian imagination or its
relation to perception or thought. Nor would it offer us any insights which might help to resolve
any longstanding disputes surrounding these issues. It simply entails that Aristotle sometimes
had occasion to apply terms like nous, noesis, or noiein to the imagination in a non-literal sense.
I therefore classify this hypothesis as a variant on the Thinking-Model of Imagination—and
devote an entire chapter to it—only by way of paying respect to the fact that some rather
prominent historical commentators have subscribed to it, and also because, for all its triviality,
it is still a far stronger claim than some opponents of the Thinking-Model (particularly Wedin)
would be willing to accept.59

58

“…imagination he [Aristotle] often counts with thinking [noein], as, for example, in chapter 3 of De Anima 3, and
calls it nous and a kind of knowledge [noesis], as, for example in chapter 10 of the same book” (Brentano, 141).
59
Recall that Wedin was unwilling even to acknowledge that any of passages (c) through (f) seriously proposed
that imagination might be a kind of thinking.
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We will find, in the coming chapters, that the strong and moderate thinking-models have far
more interesting implications, with respect to the metaphysical status of images, and man’s
place within the cosmos.

2.4. Pros and Cons
We have seen above that Aquinas, the late Averroes and Brentano had all interpreted passage
(g)’s nous pathetikos as a superficial reference to the imagination, and that this interpretation
was necessitated by their prior commitment to the view that the receptive mind described in
DA 3.4 is incorruptible. But one needn’t necessarily take this view of the receptive intellect. As
we have also seen above, Alexander had very famously construed it as a disposition emerging
from the coalescence of the various other, more firmly embodied formal powers. I have,
admittedly, pointed out a serious difficulty with Alexander’s emergentist reading, on the basis
of which I have ultimately rejected it. But this is not to say that the project of advancing a
naturalistic reading of Aristotle’s account of the receptive intellect is entirely unsalvageable; as I
will explain at more length in the final chapter of my discussion, this project has enjoyed an
enthusiastic revival in recent decades. And in fact, my final chapter will defend a subtle
variation on Alexander’s view, which (as I hope to illustrate) avoids the difficulties that I’ve
noted with his approach.
At any rate, since I am not committed to the incorruptibility of DA 3.4’s receptive intellect,
there is—in my view—no special difficulty in supposing it to be the referent of passage (g)’s
nous pathetikos. This being the case, I see no reason to suppose that passage (g) applies the
term nous to the imaginative faculty at all, let alone in the superficial sense proposed by
Aquinas, Averroes and Brentano. And since passage (g) does not give us a clear-cut example of
Aristotle using superficially noetic terminology to describe the imaginative faculty, it can hardly
serve as evidence for the assumption that he is doing likewise in passages (c) through (f).
That said, as I have mentioned already, Brentano does allude to another passage, from EN 6.11,
which might be thought to provide indirect evidence in favor of a superficial Thinking-Model.
Here, Brentano tells us, Aristotle, “called sensation (aisthesis) itself nous” (Brentano, 141). His
point seems to have been that this cannot have been intended in a literal sense, as Aristotle is
very adamant in DA 3.3 that perception and thought are distinct, owing to the latter’s fallibility
and the former’s unbiquitousness throughout the animal world. The more plausible alternative
would be that Aristotle only intended to underscore an analogy which holds between the two
faculties in spite of the aforementioned distinctions between them. For instance, his point

24

might simply be to underscore that (as he notes at the outset of DA 3.3), “…in the one as well as
the other the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something which is” (427a20-22)60.
On Brentano’s view, then, we have here a clear precedent, if not for the superficial application
of noetic terminology specifically to the imagination, then at least for the superficial application
of such terminology in general. In light of this precedent—and especially in light of the close
association between the perceptual and imaginative faculties—one might be tempted to
assume that Aristotle was using the terms noesis and noein in a similar manner when he
applied them to the imaginative faculty in passages (c) through (f). That is, he was using them
to convey the idea that imagination (like perception) is merely analogous to thought, perhaps
in that it is a faculty by virtue of which the soul becomes “cognizant of something which is.”
But this strikes me as inappropriately hasty. It does not follow, simply because Aristotle might
have had occasion to apply superficially noetic terminology to the perceptual faculty, that he
must therefore have been doing the same thing with the imaginative faculty in passages (c)
through (f). Moreover, even if we could point to an uncontested example of Aristotle applying
superficially noetic terminology to the imagination, it would still require a careful case-by-case
analysis to determine whether he is doing the same thing in passages (c) through (f). Of each
passage, then, we must ask whether we have good contextual reasons for thinking that
Aristotle is only applying the terms noesis or noiein to the imagination superficially, as a way of
underscoring some sense in which it is analogous to thought. And I see no compelling
contextual reasons for supposing that any of these passages are making such weak a claim
about the imagination.
Let’s begin with passage (c). Here, Aristotle entertains two possible scenarios under which
thought will be inseparable from the body in spite of its not being blended with a bodily organ:
These are: (1) if thought turns out to be a form of imagination, and (2) if thought turns out to be
dependent upon imagination. And while Wedin stresses that Aristotle only seems to explicitly
follow up on the latter of these two scenarios, the fact remains that they are not mutually
exclusive,61 and that the former entails that imagination is at least sometimes a kind of
thinking.62 For these reasons, it seems to me that passage (c) should be read—at the very
least—as seriously floating the suggestion that imagination is sometimes a kind of thought. And
given the weightiness of the ramifications that Aristotle attaches to this suggestion, it is difficult
to fathom how this can be explained away as a mere analogy. The stakes are nothing less than
human immortality! This question cannot hinge on so limp an observation as that thought and
imagination share the property of being faculties through which one becomes aware of things.
Passage (d), on the other hand, might initially seem to be more amenable to such an
interpretation, as there are no weighty theological implications hinging on its central claim.
60

In other words, they are both cognitive faculties (as opposed to the nutritive faculty, which itself does not make
us aware of anything outside of ourselves).
61
I’ll defend this premise at length in my final chapter.
62
Hence why I’ve counted it as support for the moderate thinking-model of imagination.
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Aristotle states that imagination, “…is not the same kind of thinking [noesis] as judgement.” But
his main purpose here is simply to distinguish imagination from judgement, which can easily be
done without committing oneself to the premise that imagination is literally a form of thinking.
One might therefore be tempted to suppose that if noesis can be interpreted colloquially as just
an umbrella term for faculties which make us aware of something, then this is how we ought to
interpret it in this context. In this case, passage (d) would be saying nothing more remarkable
than that imagination and judgement are not the same kind of awareness. But if we look back
more closely at Aristotle’s comparison of thought and perception in the opening lines of DA 3.3
(i.e. “in one as well as the other, the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something which is”)
we find that he is actually attempting to explain why thought is held to be a form of perception,
not the reverse.63 It would seem, then, that perception is Aristotle’s paradigmatic example of a
cognitive faculty.64 If this is right, then, if all Aristotle is trying to convey in passage (d) is that
imagination and judgment are different modes of awareness, our expectation should be that he
would distinguish them colloquially under the umbrella term of ‘perception’ (aisthesis), rather
than describing them as different kinds of thinking (noesis). That he chose the latter route
suggests that he has something more significant in mind.
As does Aristotle’s remark, in passage (e), that thought (noein) is held to be “in part
imagination, in part judgment.” Here, he seems to imply not just that imagination and
judgment belong to the same cognitive category, but that imagination (along with judgment) is
an integral component of any given thought-act. Such, at least, appears to be the upshot of his
follow-up remark that his analysis of phantasia must therefore be completed before the nature
of thought can be properly illuminated, in DA 3.4.
Passage (f) seems to be the most amenable to a superficial reading, as Aristotle’s purpose in
venturing to “regard imagination as a kind of thinking” does indeed appear, on closer
inspection, to be an awkward attempt to incorporate non-human animals into an
anthropocentric account of animal action as resulting (generally) from the mediation of desire
by thought. In other words, his point is very plausibly just to stress that in the case of
nonhuman animals, imagination plays a role in the mediation of action, which is similar to the
role played by practical reasoning in humans. Hence why Schofield had wavered on whether
passage (f) indicates that imagination is merely, “…analogous to or…[actually] (in the end) a
kind of practical thinking” (Pakaluk & Pearson, 121). He ought perhaps to have settled on the
former and stopped there, because his subsequent account of Aristotle’s evolution on the
subject between passage (f) and the closing lines of DA 3.10 inadvertently breathes new life
into the notion that Aristotle was advancing a non-superficial Thinking-Model of Imagination.
To reiterate, Schofield had credited Aristotle with having subsequently reconceptualized animal
63

Truth be told, I see a similar dynamic in EN 6.11. The chapter is not a meditation on the nature of perception, but
rather on the role of comprehension (nous) in demonstration and practical reasoning. It is thus not Aristotle’s use
of the term nous which should surprise us here, but rather, his use of aisthesis. Brentano’s entire argument may
therefore be predicated on a false precedent.
64
This makes sense, as it is the only cognitive faculty which is ubiquitous throughout the animal world.
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action, as resulting from the mediation of desire by imagination; then with having distinguished
between “sensitive” and “calculative” imagination in order to account for the differences
between nonhuman animals and humans. But this seems to reduce the uniquely human
contribution to action (i.e. practical reasoning) to a form of imagination. This echoes Aristotle’s
earlier flirtation with the notion that thought might be a kind of imagination in the first
antecedent of passage (c). And as I’d pointed out in the previous chapter, this notion supports a
moderate version of the Thinking-Model of Imagination. That this doesn’t register as a problem
for Schofield is due, I think, to his failure to distinguish between the strong and moderate
versions of the Thinking-Model of Imagination; on his view, if DA 3.10 turns out not to be
affirming a strong Thinking-Model of Imagination, then it says nothing noteworthy about the
noetic status of imagination at all.
To summarize then, we have found that the contextual markers in passages (c), (d), and (e) give
us no compelling reasons for supposing that Aristotle was applying noetic terminology to the
imagination only informally, as a way of underscoring some loose analogy which holds between
imagination and thought. As for passage (f), it does lend itself to such an interpretation, but this
is only due to a hasty effort on Aristotle’s part to address complications arising from an illconceived (anthropocentric) account of animal action. But because Aristotle overhauls this
account of animal action at the end of the chapter, the need for passage (f)’s provisional
solution would appear to be obviated. The superficial Thinking-Model therefore looks to me to
be dead in the water.
That said, we’ve also found that Aristotle’s revised account of animal action winds up advancing
a claim—let’s call it (f)’—which supports the moderate version of the Thinking Model of
Imagination, by the same token that the first antecedent in passage (c) does. In light of this
development, it looks as though I’ll need to revise my own initial tally of the passages
supporting each variant of the Thinking-Model of Imagination. I’d initially counted no passages
favoring the superficial Thinking Model, two passages—(c) and (e)—favoring the moderate
Thinking-Model, and two passages—(d) and (f)—favoring the strong Thinking-Model. But
regarding passage (f), I was mistaken on two counts: firstly, it didn’t support the strong Thinking
Model at all, but rather (taking the full context into consideration) the superficial ThinkingModel. Secondly, it was discarded in favor of passage (f)’ by the end of the chapter. And so the
revised tally reads as follows: three passages—(c), (e) and (f)’—favoring the moderate ThinkingModel, and only one passage—(d)—favoring the strong Thinking-Model.
Of the two remaining variants on the table, the moderate Thinking-Model of Imagination
therefore enjoys the greatest textual support. Still, it will be worthwhile to explore the history
of the strong Thinking-Model, scrutinize various conceptual objections to it, and make the
strongest possible case for it, before turning our attention to the moderate Thinking Model.
This brings us to our next chapter.
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Chapter 3: The Strong Thinking-Model
This chapter will discuss the historical commentators who have defended the strong ThinkingModel of Imagination, their reasons for doing so, the ramifications of this model, and the
considerations which speak for and against it.

3.1. Historical Proponents of a Strong Thinking-Model
3.1.1. Edwin Wallace (1882)
It would be a touch misleading to say that Edwin Wallace subscribed to the strong ThinkingModel in an unqualified manner. However, he did express doubts as to whether there was any
meaningful distinction to be drawn between the images of our imaginative faculty and the
thoughts of our receptive mind, and so it strikes me as appropriate to credit him with having at
least flirted with the strong Thinking-Model. This flirtation is encapsulated in Wallace’s
observation, in Aristotle’s Psychology (1882), that, “…the images of our imaginative faculty
often approximate closely to the ideas of thought” (Wallace, xciii). 65
He arrives at this conclusion by way of a comparative analysis of the intentional contents of
imaginative and noetic psychological states, beginning with a bottom-up analysis of the process
through which images of perceptible objects are assembled. This process begins with the five
special senses (i.e. sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch), each of which is fundamentally
incapable of perceiving the reports of any of the other four.66 This poses a problem, however,
because the fully-fledged perception of an object (as an object) would have to involve the
integrated perception of multiple perceptible qualities, as well as other, supervening
properties. It follows that there must be some additional, unifying, meta-sensory faculty which
is capable of cognizing sensible qualities from all five of the special sensible categories at once,
and which, in so doing, performs the task of, “…translating sensations into things, and of
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He also cites passage (d) as indicating that, “…the imaginative faculty is looked at as a species of thought”
(Wallace, xciii). But he stops short of identifying the images of the imaginative faculty with the ideas of the
receptive intellect.
66
i.e. Each is restricted to its own proper category of sensible quality, such that the power of sight cannot perceive
sounds or odors or flavors, or tactile qualities, but only color. Similarly, the power of taste cannot perceive colors
or sounds or odors or tactile qualities, but only flavors.

28

apprehending…forms which give meaning to the intimations of our [individual] senses”
(Wallace, xcviii).67
Wallace assigns this task to the common or central sense. He describes the synthesizing
contribution of the central sense as consisting of three distinct but intertwined sub-functions.
The first is a power, “…which transcends the mere sensation of a colour or of a smell as such
and recognizes it as something belonging to ourselves” (Wallace, lxxx). In other words, the first
sub-function of the common sense is to provide us with conscious awareness of our
perceptions as our perceptions.68 The second sub-function is to distinguish between, and
compare, the communications of the individual senses. The third sub-function involves,
“…grasping the common properties [i.e. categories] which are involved in the existence of the
qualities of the body” (Wallace, lxxx). These include such properties as magnitude, number,
figure, movement, and rest, which we are said to perceive, “immediately in connection with
each [single] perception.”69
These three sub-functions of the central sense are said by Wallace to be intertwined in the
following manner: the third sub-function is predicated on the second, and the second is
predicated on the first. Wallace explains this in the following manner: To begin with, the
common properties are not all on an equal footing; our awareness of movement is foundational
among them and serves as the basis for our awareness of all the other common properties.
However, our awareness of movement supervenes on our combined awareness of the special
sensory-properties of sight and touch.70 And our ability to recognize the co-presence of visual
and tactile qualities depends upon our ability to distinguish and compare multiple different
kinds of sensations. Hence the third sub-function (grasping the common properties) is
predicated on the second sub-function (distinguishing and comparing special sensations). But as
Wallace also points out, “To judge of [i.e. compare] two sensations we require a power of
holding them [both] before the mind” (Wallace, lxxx). By this he means we must be able to
stand back from our special sensations and recognize them as belonging to us. Hence the
second sub-function (distinguishing and comparing special sensations) is predicated on the first
(perceiving that we perceive). This also means that the third sub-function (grasping the
common properties) is indirectly predicated upon the first (perceiving that we perceive).
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The sum total of the individual senses cannot accomplish this, since the animal would, in this case, become
aware of nothing more than an incoherent smattering of sensory impressions. Hence, Wallace concludes that,
“…these single senses as such [either individually or collectively] never really constitute the [complete] act of
sense-perception” (Wallace, xcviii).
68

In effect, this means that the common sense enables us to perceive that we are perceiving.
So, for example, “…at the same time as we perceive (say) a color, we perceive it further as a coloured surface or
magnitude” (Wallace, ixxviii).
70
Which means that our awareness all of the other common properties is indirectly predicated on our combined
awareness of sight and touch, since our awareness of all of the other common properties is predicated on our
awareness of movement.
69
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Taken together, these three interlocking sub-functions of the central sense fill out the process
by which the disparate reports of the individual senses are synthesized into coherent
perceptions of objects. And while Wallace acknowledges that particulate-images (i.e. images of
colors, sounds, tastes…etc.) are present from the outset of this cognitive-process,71 he does not
assign images any special role in translating the reports of the special senses into fully-fledged
perceptions of objects, as some other commentators appear to have done.72 On his view, the
particulate-images merely supervene on the reports of the special senses, piggybacking on
them as they are processed through the central sense. As the central sense assembles these
into coherent perceptions of objects, it also (incidentally) processes the supervening
particulate-images into fully-fledged images of those objects, which supervene on the
assembled perceptions: “…the pictures of imagination, though dependent on the sensations
which have passed away, are not of a merely sensuous character: they become through that
koine dunamis of sense generalized conceptions of an object” (Wallace, xciii).
But why should any of this have led Wallace to question the distinction between the images of
the imaginative faculty and the ideas of receptive thought? Well, firstly because, if the work of
translating disparate qualitative sensations into fully-fledged perceptions of objects occurs prior
to any unique contribution made by the imaginative faculty,73 this would seem to leave little
work for the imaginative faculty to perform, save the reception and retention of those objectrepresentations, following the termination of the perceptible object’s contact with our sensory
organs.74 And secondly, because Wallace apparently regards the ideas of thought as, at least
sometimes, representing particular objects just as these processed images do.
I’ll have more to say about the defensibility of this second point as my third chapter progresses.
For now, it should suffice to point out that although Wallace doesn’t commit himself to this
premise explicitly, it must be an implicit component in his thought-process, because his claim
that, “…the images of our imaginative faculty often approximate closely to the ideas of
thought” (Wallace, xciii), simply wouldn’t follow unless he believed that ideas could sometimes
represent particular objects.

71

Produced as a natural consequence of the impingement of sensible objects on the individual sensory organs, as
per the canonical model of imagination.
72
For example, Dorothea Frede (1992) has argued that, “…Animals without phantasia would therefore only get a
sequence of incoherent imprints” (Nussbaum & Rorty, 285). Martha Nussbaum also describes the imagination as a
faculty of perceptual interpretation, in the notes to her 1978 edition of the MA, and in the fifth of her
(accompanying) interpretive essays.
73
Logically at least—though it may turn out to be chronologically simultaneous with the imagination’s
contribution.
74
That is, the removal of the formal representation from the matter of the original perceptible object. Wallace
would therefore likely wish to correct Frede’s claim that animals without phantasia would be unable to cognize
anything more than incoherent imprints, so as to read that animals without phantasia would be unable to recollect
objects that they had previously perceived, once the object was removed from contact with their sensory organs.
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I’d also remind readers that the rejection of this premise was central to Wedin’s case against
the strong Thinking-Model.75 This lends additional support to my intuition that the strong
Thinking-Model pivots on the premise that thoughts at least sometimes denote particular
objects.

3.1.2. Edwin Hartman (1977)
In Substance, Body, Soul. (1977), Edwin Hartman arrives at a very similar conclusion to the one
approached by Wallace, only this time, by way of an examination of Aristotle’s solution to the
eristic paradox from the Meno. This paradox concerned the problem of how we could possibly,
“…come to recognize substances as exemplars of their species” (Hartman, 241), prior to having
grasped the essence. Plato’s solution in the Meno was that each individual human soul had a
prenatal existence, during which it came into direct contact with the realm of intelligible Forms,
and that we are reminded of this latent knowledge in part by the stimulation of perceptible
exemplars, and in part by a programme of Socratic questioning.
Aristotle rejected this solution in favor of the view that we gradually extract universals from
repeated sensory experiences,76 by way of a process of induction; and that it is by virtue of our
possession of nous that we are able to do this. Hartman describes the contribution of nous in
the following manner: “…it enables us to know what is not, or not usually, given in
experience…by [allowing] us to progress from cognition of mere phantasmata to knowledge of
true universals, especially species and genera” (Hartman, 235).
Put another way, “Nous is the faculty that permits humans not only to have phantasmata, but
also to have [certain] attitudes towards them…” (Hartman, 239), which are constitutive of a
realization that the image that one calls to mind of—for example—a man, will inevitably have
certain properties which are inessential to the what-it-is-to-be a man, which must be excluded
from consideration if one is to truly set one’s mind on the universal: “Having the concept man,
knowing what a man is, requires more than simply having the ability to call up a man-like
phantasma. One must understand that the phantasma called up represents a certain universal;
and this involves understanding among other things that, considered as a universal, man is
neither short nor tall, light nor dark, young nor old and so on, even though any man-like
phantasma will inevitably have some of these (irrelevant) characteristics” (Hartman, 239).
As to how this is supposed to provide an alternative solution to the eristic paradox of the Meno,
the idea appears to be that a human being only truly comes to know that a given substance
(represented cognitively by an image) is an exemplar of its proper species, at the moment in
which he grasps the distinction between its “irrelevant” (i.e. inessential) properties, and those
75

This, again, is really the only version of the Thinking-Model that he entertains.
The universals being contained implicitly—though perhaps not given explicitly—in the contents of sensory
impressions, which are retained via the contribution of the imaginative faculty.
76
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properties which could not be stripped away without the substance ceasing to be the kind of
substance that it is.77
But what does this tell us about the possible noetic status of phantasmata? Well, one might be
tempted to interpret the process described above by Hartman78 as one in which the knower
graduates from an apprehension of a mere image (which is not a thought at all) to an
apprehension of the most primitive kind of thought (viz. a universal).
Interestingly, however, this is not the way in which Hartman seems to view the process. On his
view, the image is the most primitive form of thought: “The simplest case of having a thought is
having an image of an object of thought, much as the simplest case of perception is having an
aisthema of the thing perceived” (Hartman, 243).
We have here then a rather definitive endorsement of the strong version of the Thinking-Model
of Imagination; whereas Wallace had merely confided that he was having trouble grasping the
distinction between images and the most primitive form of thought, Hartman appears to be
boldly asserting that there is no distinction.

3.2 Ramifications of the Strong Thinking-Model: Naturalistic View of the
Human Soul
Now, Wedin—who, as we have seen above, is the most vocal critic of the strong ThinkingModel of Imagination—is also a vocal critic of the view that the human soul is, for Aristotle,
separable from the body. In fact, in the preface to his book, he specifies that the principal aim
of his project is to show, “…why thinking is not [for Aristotle], in any serious sense, divine”
(Wedin, xi). And it is important to note that Wedin regards his opposition to the strong
Thinking-Model as a necessary step in his defense of this position. But why is this the case?
Well, recall that Wedin had cited the functional incompleteness of the imaginative faculty as
one of the key reasons why imagination cannot be a kind of thought. Recall also that, in
unpacking the ramifications of the imagination’s functional incompleteness, he’d claimed that
images cannot appear on their own, but only within the context of complete acts performed by
the other, functionally complete faculties. Which, in the case of the rational faculty, means that
they appear as non-propositional (viz. simple) terms in the propositional complexes of thoughtacts—a state of affairs that Wedin describes as a kind of “subservience” relation between
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The implication here appears to be that knowledge of the particular and knowledge of the universal actually
occur simultaneously.
78
Wherein a human being graduates from the mere ability to call up an image to the ability to appreciate that that
image has certain extraneous features which are inessential to the species that it exemplifies.
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imagination and thought. And this notion of subservience appears to occupy a pivotal place in
Wedin’s case against the divinity of human thought.
This last point becomes easier to grasp once we recall the naturalistic conditional from passage
(c). Here, Aristotle had stipulated that if thought “…proves to be a form of imagination or to be
impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence.” And
while Wedin does not regard Aristotle as having taken the former of these two eventualities
seriously, he does believe that Aristotle affirmed the latter. And to say that the imagination
subserves the faculty of thought is one possible way of unpacking the claim that thought is
dependent upon the imagination.
The reason why Wedin regards the strong Thinking-Model of Imagination as an impediment to
his naturalistic reading of Aristotle therefore appears to be as follows: Thought is a functionally
complete faculty. If imagination were a form of thought, it would therefore be functionally
complete. But this would undermine Wedin’s rationale for regarding the imagination as a quasifaculty which subserves the faculty of thought,79 thereby—supposedly—blocking the
satisfaction of the naturalistic conditional from passage (c).
I’ll have more to say in the next chapter about the notion of subservience and the extent to
which Wedin’s particular conception of the subservience relation between imagination and
thought is an effective means of fleshing out the second antecedent of passage (c)’s naturalistic
conditional. For now, though, I will simply urge that there are other possible avenues for
satisfying passage (c)’s naturalistic conditional, and that—contrary to what Wedin seems to
believe—the strong Thinking-Model of Imagination is a fairly direct one. The conditional
stipulates that if thought turns out to be impossible without imagination, then thought will be
inseparable from the body. But it can hardly be the case that thought is independent of (viz.
possible without) imagination if images just are thoughts, particularly if they are the most basic
kind of thought. And so it seems to me that, rather than serving as an impediment to it, the
strong Thinking-Model of Imagination can actually be enlisted in support of the naturalistic
reading that Wedin seeks to advance.
It also seems to me (with only minor reservations) that Wallace can be invoked to provide
additional support for this intuition. As we have seen in the previous section, Wallace comes
very close to advocating a strong Thinking-Model of imagination, noting that, “…the images of
our imaginative faculty often approximate closely to the ideas of thought” (Wallace, xciii). And
although he does not comment specifically on the connection between this understanding of
images and the question of the soul’s (im)mortality,80 there is a strong case to be made that he
also favored a naturalistic reading of Aristotle’s view of the human soul, not too dissimilar from
the one championed by Wedin.
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“Phantasia…cannot be the same as thought because it is not a faculty at all” (Wedin, xii).
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Hence my minor reservations.

33

For one thing, a guiding theme of Wallace’s commentary is that body and soul are mutually
complementary facets of a living thing, representing, “…two sides of an antithesis, in which the
opposing members only exist in the true sense of the terms in their combination with each
other” (Wallace, xxxix). This implies that, just as the body isn’t truly itself (i.e. fully what it is
capable of being) in the absence of the soul, neither is the soul truly what it is in the absence of
the body. Here, Wallace is clearly echoing Aristotle’s remark, from the closing lines of DA 2.1,
that, “…[just] as the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body
constitutes the animal” (413a3), and that “From this it is clear that the soul is inseparable from
its body [i.e. by the same token that the power of sight is inseparable from the pupil]” (413a4).
These passages also constitute the bedrock of Wedin’s naturalistic reading of Aristotle, in that
they—in conjunction with certain other passages from the second book of the DA—help to
establish a presumptively naturalistic definition of psuche, with which Wedin seeks to square
Aristotle’s seemingly dualistic remarks about the intellect, through his appeal to the idea that
imagination is a subservient quasi-faculty.81
For another thing, Wallace makes a series of moves in his interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion
of the intellect in the third book of the DA, which parallel several of the other interpretive
strategies that Wedin employs in order to square Aristotle’s seemingly dualistic claims about
the intellect with his presumptively naturalistic definition of the soul. Firstly, Wallace rejects the
proposition that the fourth and fifth chapters can be conceptually separated, “…as if Aristotle
were speaking of one reason in the one chapter, [and] of another reason in the other” (Wallace,
cvi). On Wallace’s view, both chapters refer to a single intellect. This, of course, requires
Wallace to reject the proposition that the creative intellect of DA 3.5 refers to the deity, as the
receptive intellect of DA 3.4 is clearly referring to the individual human intellect. Hence,
Wallace concludes that it is, “…‘in the soul of man’ that the distinction which [Aristotle] draws
[in DA 3.5, between the passive and creative intellects] is found” (Wallace, cix). He adds that
“Aristotle views the partition of the soul into faculties [which presumably includes his partition
of the human intellect into passive and creative aspects] as merely a convenient application of
abstraction,” which does not entail that these faculties are separable, “in actual fact or actual
locality” (Wallace, liii). Rather, the partition “rests simply on a difference in their mode of
working, on the point of view from which they are regarded: it is in short a distinction not a
division” (Wallace, liii). Again, these are all moves that Wedin makes in his own commentary,
and which (as I will explain in more detail in the final chapter) he regards as integral to his case
against the divinity of human thought.
Finally, as I will explain in more detail in the next section, Wallace advocates for a gradational
reading of Aristotle’s view of the animal world, according to which man, “…stands on the same
line as the rest of animal existence,” such that, “all forms of life lead gradually up to man as the
perfect development of what is contained implicitly and imperfectly in lower forms” (Wallace,
li). This really does not sit well with the view that the human soul is immortal, possessing the
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capacity to outlive the body. That is, of course, unless we introduce the additional premise that
the human soul is capable of transcending its naturalistic origins and acquiring immortality,
perhaps by forging some sort of a connection with the divine intellect of the Metaphysics. But
while there is some precedent in the historical literature for this additional premise, it is (as we
will see in the next chapter) fraught with difficulties.
The only aspect of Wallace’s commentary that gives me pause in attributing to him a
naturalistic reading of Aristotle derives from a series of remarks made during his attempt to
explain the function of the creative intellect. His discussion of the creative intellect aims to
clarify how, on Aristotle’s view, material things come to be intelligible—that is, capable of being
grasped by the receptive intellect. His answer is that, when a material object comes to be
apprehended by the receptive intellect, this is really just a process of rendering in explicit terms
what was already implicitly rational; by which he means that although a human being may not
always be consciously aware of the rational categories into which material objects fit, he is
always nonetheless unconsciously aware of them. And it is, “…the creative reason [which]
communicates to things those ideas, categories, or whatever we may call them, by which they
become objects on which thought as a receptive passive faculty may operate” (Wallace, cv).82
Wallace describes the creative intellect’s implicit communication of rational categories to the
objects of experience as a sort of “creation of the world” (not ex nihilo, but qua intelligible). He
adds that this act of creation, “…never began to exist—rather it is coeval with the world…in
itself as eternal and unceasing it is outside all relations of time” (Wallace cvx).
Given Wallace’s prior denial that the creative intellect refers to the deity, and his insistence that
it refers to something internal to the soul of each man, this attribution of timelessness to the
creative intellect and its contribution to the intelligibility of the world might seem to yield the
obvious implication that each individual human soul is immortal, not only in the sense of having
the capacity to outlast the lifespan of the body, but also in the sense of preceding it from
eternity. And this might seem to place Wallace rather firmly in the dualistic camp of Aristotelian
commentators.
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In addition to addressing the question of how material objects come to be intelligible, Wallace is also interested
in finding a way to harmonize some seemingly conflicting passages from the APo (and also the EN), in which
Aristotle had identified now sense-perception, now reason, as the originating source of our knowledge and ideas.
Wallace believes that his account of the creative intellect will allow him to maintain that while sensory perception
is a necessary condition for the organizing and systematizing of the materials of thought (so that, in a sense, the
power of sense-perception is what makes thought possible), the creative intellect is what sheds the necessary
intellectual light on the material world for even this to happen. So that, ultimately, it is the creative reason which
provides the necessary condition for perception to carry out its necessary function. And as Wallace points out,
“…there is no contradiction in holding on the one hand that thought requires for its exercise an object suggested
by sense and maintaining on the other hand that thought requires to illuminate this object in order that it may
think it” (Wallace, cxiii).
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That said, Wallace’s treatment of the creative intellect contains several indications that this is
not his intended meaning. For one thing, his attribution of timelessness to the creative intellect
is tempered by the claim that the creative intellect is, “…at once in our minds and immanent in
the world” (Wallace, cvii). This could be interpreted in a number of ways. It could signify that
the creative intellect is a singular, independent substance, which enters temporarily into the
cognitive apparatus of each individual person.83 Of course, this interpretation seems to be
precluded by Wallace’s claim that the creative intellect does not refer to the deity at all, but
rather to an element of each human soul.
Alternatively, it could mean that in addition to existing in each of our individual minds, the
creative intellect is immanent in the world, in the sense that, quite independently of any
particular human being, there is—and presumably always has been and will be—a thing called
humanity, which is endowed with a creative intellect, and which therefore guarantees that the
material world always has been and always will be potentially intelligible. In other words, when
Wallace says that the creative intellect is timeless, he may be referring to humanity as a
collective or in the abstract, rather than to the individual human soul. In which case, this would
be perfectly consistent with a naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle. And it seems to me that
this interpretation is supported by Wallace’s subsequent remark that the creative intellect (as
immanent in the world), “…takes us back to the time when man first thought the universe: and
it thus easily approximates to that universal thought or logos which “was in the beginning”—as
the a priori condition of a rational experience” (Wallace, cx).
To reiterate, then, in addition to coming very close to advocating a strong Thinking-Model of
Imagination, there is a very persuasive case to be made that Wallace preferred a naturalistic
reading of Aristotle’s view of the human soul. And while his commentary does not give us any
concrete reasons for thinking that a strong Thinking-Model of Imagination entails a naturalistic
reading of Aristotle, the co-incidence of these two positions in Wallace’s commentary should at
least provide us with some additional reassurance as to the coherence of the two positions.

3.3. Ramifications of the Strong Thinking-Model: Thinking Animals?
3.3.1. Thinking Animals?
The most radical implication of the strong Thinking-Model’s claim that images are inherently
noetic would be that a subsection of the non-human animal world would be, for Aristotle,
endowed with the capacity for a kind of thought. This would follow from the conjunction of the
proposition that imagination is a kind of thought, with Aristotle’s implication in DA 3.3 that,
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with very few exceptions (e.g. some insects),84 imagination is found among non-human animals:
(h) If actual imagination and actual sensation were the same, imagination would be found
in all the brutes: this is held not to be the case; e.g. it is not found in ants or bees or
grubs (428a8-10).
The conjunction of these two propositions forms the following argument: if most non-human
animals possess imagination, and imagination is a kind of thought, then most non-human
animals possess the capacity for some form of thought.
Now, this conclusion will likely strike many readers as so obviously wrongheaded as to
constitute a definitive refutation of the strong Thinking-Model, in and of itself. This is because
there is a good deal of textual evidence, peppered throughout the Aristotelian corpus, which
suggests that it was precisely by virtue of their possession of intellectual capacities that
Aristotle sought to distinguish human beings from the rest of the animal genus.
A number of these indicator-passages occur in the DA. For example, in DA 2.3, Aristotle writes
that
(i) Lastly, certain living beings—a small minority—possess calculation and thought, for
(among mortal beings) those which possess calculation [logismos] have all the other
powers above mentioned, while the converse does not hold—indeed some live by
imagination alone, while others have not even imagination (415a8-12).
And, in DA 3.3:
(j) And because imaginations remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations,
animals in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the
non-existence in them of thought, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in
them of thought by feeling or disease or sleep (429a5-8).
Another occurs in PA 1.1:
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Victor Caston (1996) disputes whether there are really any exceptions in the animal world at all. In support of his
contention that ”Phantasia belongs to every animal” (44), Caston gathers textual evidence from a variety of
sources, in order to construct the following argument, to which he believes Aristotle is committed: P1. Anything
that has at least one of the five senses will experience pleasure, and therefore also desire (DA 2.2, 2.3, 3.11). P2.
All animals possess at least one of the five senses (DA 2.2, 2.3, 3.12, 3;13; SS 1; HA 1.3 ). P3. Therefore, all animals
will have desire (DA 3.7). P4. Desire requires phantasia (DA 3.10). P5. Therefore, all animals have phantasia.
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(k) But perhaps it is not the whole soul, nor all its parts collectively, that constitutes the
source of motion; but there may be one part, identical with that in plants, which is the
source of growth, another, namely the sensory part, which is the source of change of
quality, while still another, and this not the intellectual part, is the source of locomotion.
For other animals than man have the power of locomotion, but in none but him is there
intellect (641a41-45).
Several more indications can be found in the Nicomachean Ethics. Firstly, in EN 1.7:
(l) Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man.
Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of
perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every
animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle
[logon] (1097b32-36).
Next, in EN 7.3:
(m) It also follows that this is the reason why the lower animals are not incontinent, viz.
because they have no universal beliefs but only imagination and memory of particulars
(1147b3-5).
And, again, at EN 10.7:
(n) And what we said before will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by nature
best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to intellect
is best and pleasantest, since intellect more than anything else is man. This life therefore
is also the happiest (1178b2-6).
In light of this collection of passages, one might understandably be tempted to conclude that
because Aristotle regarded the intellectual power as marking a sharp demarcation between
human and non-human animals, a strong Thinking-Model of Imagination is flatly impossible.
That said, I would urge that it is still worthwhile to keep our minds open to a strong ThinkingModel of Imagination, for two reasons. Firstly, there is some textual evidence in the corpus
which supports an alternative reading of Aristotle’s conception of the animal world, according
to which the various animal species form a gradational hierarchy, such that the human species
can be viewed as differing from its inferior neighbors, not so much by a matter of kind—as
passages (i) through (n) might seem to suggest—but by a matter of degree. And secondly,
because it is possible to square this gradational reading with passages (i) through (n). I’ll discuss
each of these reasons in turn.
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3.3.2. Alternative Gradational View of the Animal World
Edwin Wallace—who, as we have seen, came very close to defending the strong ThinkingModel—believed it to be Aristotle’s view that man, “…stands on the same line as the rest of
animal existence. He is the end and centre of creation: but he is so simply in so far as all forms
of life lead gradually up to man as the perfect development of what is contained implicitly and
imperfectly in lower forms” (Wallace, li). In defense of this gradational reading, he cites the
following thread of passages, from HA. 8.1.
(o) In the great majority of animals there are traces of psychical qualities which are more
markedly differentiated in the case of human beings (588a16-17).
(p) “Some of these qualities in man, as compared with the corresponding qualities in
animals, differ only quantitatively: that is to say, a man has more of this quality…”
(588a21-23).
(q) “The truth of this statement will be the more clearly apprehended if we have regard to
the phenomena of childhood; for in children may be observed the traces and seeds of
what will one day be settled habits, though psychologically85 a child hardly differs for
the time being from an animal…” (588a26-b1).
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This remark about children hardly differing psychologically from animals should not be interpreted as suggesting
that children and animals only share a similar range of cognitive abilities. Aristotle’s broader point is that they have
nearly indistinguishable souls, at least with respect to the psychic powers that they exhibit in actuality—and this
encompasses all of the psychic powers that they exhibit in actuality, including the capacities for nutrition and
growth, which all animals share with plants. Nor, therefore, should passages (o) through (q) be understood as
supportive only of the proposition that humans and non-human animals exist on the same continuum. The
gradational picture in support of which Wallace cites these three passages entails that all living things (including
plants) exist on the same continuum. This can be easy to overlook, as passages (o) through (q) do seem to focus
mainly on the psychological overlap between humans and non-human animals (the most salient facet of which
would presumably be their shared range of cognitive abilities). But the psychological overlap between animals and
plants with respect to nutrition and growth is nonetheless implied, and there is another passage from GA 2.3
which drives this point home more explicitly. Here Aristotle notes that animal embryos which have been separated
from their mother appear to live the life of a plant; which is the same sort of claim that he makes in passage (q)
about human children hardly differing psychologically from animals. And since this latter claim is invoked to
illustrate the continuity between non-human and human animals, it seems reasonable to suppose that the remark
from GA 2.3 would have similar implications with respect to the continuity between plants and animals. The
passage from GA 2.3 can therefore be counted as further support for Wallace’s gradational picture, which, in
conjunction with passages (o) through (q), helps to flesh out the full scope of this picture’s import.
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Now, the notion that non-human animals might possess some kind of thought is perfectly
consistent with the gradational picture described between passages (o) through (q), provided
we specify that it is only a limited, imperfect form of thought, which falls short of the full range
of intellectual activities that human beings are capable of exhibiting. If we were to express this
idea in the terms used in passage (o), we might say that the vast majority of (non-human)
animals possess limited or imperfect traces of intellectual activity, which are more “markedly
differentiated” in human beings.86 In the terms of passage (p), we might say that although some
intellectual capabilities are shared in common by many non-human animal species and human
beings, the intellectual capabilities possessed by human beings are quantitatively greater than
those possessed by non-human animals.87 And in the terms of passage (q), the idea would be
that, in the early stages of their development, human beings only exhibit (in actuality) those
intellectual capabilities which are shared in common between humans and non-human
animals88—but that as they develop into adulthood, they gradually begin to exhibit the other
more numerous and more markedly differentiated intellectual capabilities which characterize
adult humans, but which they only possessed in potentiality during childhood.
Of course, this is all contingent on whether there are solid textual grounds for supposing that
Aristotle believed in the sort of gradational hierarchy of intellectual capacities, posited above.
In particular, we would need to produce some textual evidence for the existence, in the
Aristotelian schema, of a kind of thought which is more primitive than (and separable from) the
sorts of intellectual capacities which characterize fully-developed human beings. As it happens,
there are good textual reasons for supposing that Aristotle did believe in such a species of
thought. Malcolm Lowe makes the case for us in “Aristotle on Kinds of Thinking” (1993). Lowe’s
argument centers on the following passage, from DA 3.4:
(r) When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows is
said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own
initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the
potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; and
thought is then able to think of itself (429b6-429b9).
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Here, we might interpret “more markedly differentiated” as meaning that the intellectual capabilities exhibited
by human beings, being more fully-developed, are more easily recognizable as being “Intellectual.” Whereas those
exhibited by non-human animals, being more primitive, tend to resemble lower-order psychical qualities.
87
This quantitative asymmetry might be fleshed out as meaning that human beings possess a greater number of
different kinds of intellectual capabilities than non-human animals.
88
So that they resemble non-human animals, in terms of their psychological behavior.
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In this passage, Lowe finds a distinction between two species of thought: “…[a] an apprehensive
process, whereby the mind acquires thoughts in the first place, and [b] an autonomous process,
which can begin once the mind has acquired thoughts” (Durrant, 115-116).
In the latter category, Lowe places such intellectual capabilities as abstraction, propositional
judgment, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning.89 And the nature of the dependencerelation which passage (r) appears to signal between autonomous thought and apprehensive
thought—i.e. that apprehensive thought is a prerequisite for autonomous thought—suggests
that apprehensive thought is both more primitive than, and separable90 from, those thoughtprocesses which fall under the category of “autonomous thought.”
Given that there very plausibly exists in Aristotle a kind of thought which is more primitive than,
and separable from, the sorts of intellectual capacities which characterize fully-developed
human beings—i.e. apprehensive thought—it should be entirely possible to formulate a
coherent gradational picture of the animal world in accordance with passages (o) through (q),
which recognizes some degree of overlap between humans and non-human animals with
respect to the capacity for thought. According to this gradational picture, apprehensive thought
is shared in common by humans and some non-human animals, and represents the absolute
pinnacle of non-human psychic capacities; human children initially only exhibit apprehensive
thought (hence why a child “hardly differs for the time being from an animal” psychologically),
but gradually begin to express more numerous and markedly differentiated intellectual
capacities, which fall under the category of autonomous thought.
Of course, this by itself only establishes that the Aristotelian corpus contains two conflicting
accounts of the animal world. On the one hand, we have the gradational account, represented
by passages (o) through (q). On the other hand, we have the standard account, represented by
passages (i) through (n), in which Aristotle seems to regard human beings as being sharply
demarcated from non-human animals, by virtue of their possession of intellectual capabilities.
And so in order to properly legitimize the gradational picture (and along with it, the strong
Thinking-Model of Imagination) an additional step is required. We’d need to be able to show
that the gradational picture is reconcilable with the picture painted by passages (i) through (n).
This would require us to make a case that, when Aristotle designates thought as the
distinguishing mark of the human animal in passages (i) through (n), he is referring specifically
to autonomous thought, rather than to thought simpliciter. And I believe that this is possible.
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I’ll say a bit more about this in the next section of the chapter.
Passage (q) lends further support to the idea that apprehensive thought is separable from autonomous thought,
by confirming that an individual human child can have the one without the other.
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3.3.3. Autonomous Thought as the Distinguishing Mark of Human Animals?
In order to begin to understand why the gradational picture sketched above might be
compatible with passages (i) through (n), we might look to John Cooper’s observation that it
was Aristotle’s tendency, “…always to search out the best and most fully realized instance,
when attempting to define a kind of thing” (Cooper, 320).91 If this is right, then it might be
possible to advance the view that, in passages (i) through (n), when Aristotle appears to be
citing thought simpliciter as the distinguishing characteristic of the human animal, he is really
only referring to intellectual capacities which fall under the category of “autonomous thought,”
since these are the more fully realized manifestations of nous. And if this is right, then, since
none of these passages will be saying anything about apprehensive thought,92 it will turn out
that passages (i) through (n) are not giving us any reason to think that apprehensive thought
could not extend downward into the upper echelon of the non-human animal world.
In which case, the seemingly contentious implication of the strong Thinking-Model of
imagination—that some non-human animals possess a kind of thought—will turn out to be
consistent with Aristotle’s apparent appeal to rationality as the distinguishing feature of the
human species, in passages (i) through (n).
However, before helping ourselves to this conclusion, we should pause to consider a potentially
serious problem with our proposed application of Cooper’s claim that Aristotle tends to define
things in terms of their most fully realized instances. The problem comes to us in the form of
the following passage, from EN 9.9:
(s) “Now life is deﬁned in the case of animals by the power of perception, in that of man by
the power of perception or thought” (1170a15-17).
If, as Cooper suggests, it was Aristotle’s tendency to define a thing in terms of its most fully
realized instance, and if we wish to utilize this principle in order to motivate the view that
animals possess a rudimentary species of thought, then we should expect Aristotle to define
animals in terms of this rudimentary form of thought. But passage (s) clearly states that animals
are defined by the power of perception. Which, in light of Cooper’s claim about Aristotle’s
tendency to define a thing in terms of its most fully realized instance, would seem to suggest
that non-human animals have no psychic capacities beyond perception.93
A response to this objection might begin with the observation that (as we have seen above),
many non-human animals possess the power of imagination, according to Aristotle. And we
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Cooper attributes this to the “pervasive teleological bias of his thinking” (Cooper, 320).
Which, as we have seen above, is more primitive than autonomous thought, and separable from it, even in an
individual human being.
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Which would rule out the possibility of their having the capacity for any kind of thought, however rudimentary.
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know that the faculty of imagination is superior to mere perception. So that really, on the
supposition that Aristotle defines a thing in terms of its best and most fully realized instance,
we should expect Aristotle to define animals in terms of imagination, rather than perception.
Of course, this invites the accusation that we have inadvertently toppled Cooper’s claim about
Aristotle’s approach to definitions, in our attempt to defend our proposed application of it. If
Cooper’s claim should yield the conclusion that animals are defined in terms of imagination, but
Aristotle instead defines them in terms of perception, then we are faced with a contradiction.
And the most intuitive solution—given the unambiguous nature of Aristotle’s appeal to
perception as the defining characteristic of animals in passage (s)—might seem to be to reject
Cooper’s claim that Aristotle defines things in terms of their most fully-realized instances.
My response to this follow-up objection would be that there is a way of qualifying Cooper’s
claim about Aristotle’s approach to definitions, which will allow us to square the claim (and our
proposed application of it) with Aristotle’s appeal to perception as the definitive feature of
animals, in passage (s).
This qualification can be developed in the following manner: The reason why Aristotle does not
cite imagination as the distinguishing feature of animals is because not all animals possess
imagination. As we saw above, in passage (h), bees and grubs lack imagination. Perception, on
the other hand, is shared in common by all animals; no animal can fail to have at least one of
the five senses. And any adequate definition of animals would have to be sufficiently broad to
be applicable to all of the different kinds of animals. Which means that the definition must be
in terms of characteristics which are shared in common by all animals (hence why perception is
a better candidate than imagination).
We might therefore consider tweaking Cooper’s claim about Aristotle’s approach to definitions,
to read as follows: Aristotle defines a thing not in terms of the highest capacity that a given
instance of that thing might happen to have, but in terms of the highest capacity that it shares
with all of the other instances of that thing. Interpreted in this manner, Cooper’s claim about
Aristotle’s approach to definitions is perfectly compatible with Aristotle’s claim, from passage
(s), that animal life is defined by the power of perception.
But it can also accommodate the notion that some animals have additional, superior capacities,
since this interpretation of Cooper’s claim about Aristotle’s approach to definitions does not
require that ‘animal’ be defined in terms of the highest capacity that a given animal might
happen to have. And—crucially, for our purposes—we know that such additional capacities can
include those which are shared by human beings, since we know that both non-human animals
(not all, but apparently most), and human beings, possess the faculty of imagination.
The pivotal question, then, is whether our qualified interpretation of Cooper’s claim can
accommodate the inclusion of Lowe’s apprehensive thought among the higher-order faculties
which can be attributed to some non-human animals, in addition to their defining power of
perception.
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The only reason to think that it couldn’t do this would be that, because animals were defined by
a lower, more broadly applicable capacity—i.e. perception, rather than imagination—then,
given that Aristotle distinguishes between two hierarchically-ordered and potentially separable
species of thought, perhaps our expectation should be that humans would be defined by the
lower of these two capacities. So, the argument might conclude, because human beings are
defined by their possession of apprehensive thought (autonomous thought therefore being an
additional feature which human beings might or might not happen to possess), we cannot
entertain the notion that apprehensive thought might extend downward into the higher
echelon of the non-human animal world.
The trouble with this argument lies in its assumption that apprehensive thought’s lower
position on the thought-hierarchy implies that it is more broadly applicable to human beings
than autonomous thought. This is a mistake. Unlike non-human animals—which, as Aristotle
tells us, can be divided into a relatively small camp which possesses only perception, and
another larger camp which possesses imagination in addition to perception—human beings are
not divided into one camp which possesses only apprehensive thought and another camp
which possesses the capacity to engage in autonomous thought, in addition to apprehensive
thought. Rather, all human beings possess the ability to graduate from apprehensive to
autonomous thought, to one degree or another. Therefore, on our interpretation of Cooper’s
claim about Aristotle’s approach to definitions (that he defines a thing in terms of the highest
capacity that all members of the category share in common), we can understand Aristotle’s
appeal to thought as the defining feature of the human animal, as referring specifically to
thought-forms which fall under the category of “autonomous thought.”94
And, in fact, if we look back more carefully at passages (i) through (n),95 we will find that there
are good contextual reasons, either in the passages themselves, or else in the text surrounding
the passages, for supposing that Aristotle is referring specifically to autonomous thought, when
he cites thought as the distinguishing feature of the human animal.
3.3.3.1. Passage (i)
In the case of passage (i), we needn’t look too deeply into the surrounding text, as Aristotle
clearly specifies that he is referring to “calculation,” (logismos) as the distinguishing mark of the
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Now, if we are supposing that autonomous thought is the highest capacity that every human being shares in
common, then one might reasonably inquire as to what sorts of additional, contingent capacities human beings
might happen to possess on top of their capacity for autonomous thought. The answer is that there are not, strictly
speaking, any additional faculties which outstrip autonomous thought. However, there are varying degrees to
which human beings are capable of engaging in autonomous thought processes, after having graduated from mere
apprehensive thought. And there are some individuals who are capable of exhibiting autonomous thought to such
a high degree that they approximate the life of the gods. i.e. those who live a maximally contemplative life.
(1178a-1861)
95
Upon which the sharp-demarcation model was based.
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human animal. And calculation, as we have seen above, in Lowe’s discussion, belongs to the
category of autonomous thought.
True, the passage also states that non-human animals “live by imagination alone.” Which, on
the surface, might seem to preclude the possibility that non-human animals possess
apprehensive thought. But remember that the whole point of our discussion is to inquire into
the possibility that imagination and apprehensive thought might be one and the same. And so,
given our foregoing demonstration that it is potentially feasible to extend apprehensive
thought downward into the upper-echelon of the non-human animal world, as well as our
demonstration that passage (i) is specifically designating autonomous thought as the
distinguishing feature of the human animal (with no mention of apprehensive thought), it
seems to me that to interpret this remark about the imagination as excluding the possibility
that non-human animals might possess apprehensive thought would be, at this stage in the
discussion, question-begging.
3.3.3.2. Passage (j)
Passage (j) presents a somewhat greater difficulty, as Aristotle here stresses the “non-existence
of thought” in animals, without explicitly stressing which type of thought he is speaking about,
which might lead some interpreters to assume that he is speaking of thought in the broadest
possible terms. However, we can still gather, from contextual markers in this passage (and in
other, related passages) that Aristotle most likely intends some variant of autonomous thought.
The main point that Aristotle is trying to convey in passage (j) is that while both imagination and
thought can be guiding forces of animal action, it is the imagination which occupies the more
fundamental (i.e. default) position in this regard.96 He communicates this point by examining
two scenarios in which the influence of the intellect has been removed from the equation, and
noting that, in these cases, imagination is the sole determinant of an animal’s action. The first
scenario is the case of non-human animals, who are only ever guided by imagination, because
they supposedly lack intellect altogether. The second is the case of human beings who are
temporarily guided by imagination alone, due to the temporary eclipse of their intellectual
capacities by feeling or sleep or disease.
It is this second example which provides us with grounds for suspecting that Aristotle is
referring (in either case) to a variant of autonomous thought, rather than to thought simpliciter.
The temporary nature of man’s guidance by imagination—during bouts of emotional unrest,
illness, or sleep—suggests that, whenever thought is present and in working order, it possesses
ultimate control over the animal’s action. With this in mind, it is perfectly appropriate for us to
press the question of how the intellect oversees action, in those cases in which it does.97
96
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Recall that this was a common theme in Wedin and Schofield’s treatments of passage (f).
i.e. In human beings whose rational faculties are in proper working-order.
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We can look to a parallel discussion of animal action, in MA 7, for some insight as to precisely
how thought oversees action when it is present and in working order. Here, Aristotle explains
thought “in the domain of conduct”98 by analogy to “thinking and inferring about the
immovable objects.” His account runs as follows:
(t) There [i.e. in the case of thinking and inferring about the immovable objects] the end is
the truth seen (for, when one thinks the two propositions, one thinks and puts together
the conclusion), but here [i.e. in the case of thinking in the domain of conduct] the two
propositions result in a conclusion which is an action—for example, whenever one
thinks that every man ought to walk, and that one is a man oneself, straightaway one
walks; or that, in this case, no man should walk, one is a man: straightaway one remains
at rest (701a8-13).
Passage (t) indicates that although thought in the domain of conduct may have a different
object and a different result than thought concerning the immovable objects,99 these two forms
of thought are nevertheless fundamentally similar, in that both involve the putting-together of
multiple propositions, and the distillation of a resultant conclusion. In the case of thought in the
domain of conduct, the conclusion which results from the putting-together of propositions just
is the action which is (or is not) performed.
This gives us our answer as to how thought oversees action, and as to what kind of thought is
involved, in those cases in which it does exert an influence. Thought oversees action by putting
together the relevant propositions pertaining to what ought or ought not to be done, and
distilling the conclusion (i.e. the action to be done). Which means that “thought,” as it pertains
to animal action, refers to a species of propositional reasoning.100 And since we know from
Lowe’s discussion that propositional reasoning belongs to the category of “autonomous”
thought, it follows that in those cases in which intellect does contribute to animal action, it is
qua “autonomous” that it does so.
Hence, when Aristotle notes—in his second example—that human beings are guided solely by
imagination when their intellectual capacities have been eclipsed by feeling or disease or sleep,
it is clear that he is referring specifically to the eclipse of “autonomous” intellectual
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i.e. As it pertains to action or inaction.
The object of thought in the domain of conduct is thing to be done, and the result is the action or inaction. The
result of thought concerning the immovable objects consists in the seeing of truth, rather than the performance of
an action.
100
Specifically, in the domain of conduct.
99
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capacities,101 since it is this specific sub-category of thought which has turned out to be relevant
to the sphere of animal action.
So too, then, we are justified in interpreting Aristotle’s first example—of non-human animals,
who are only ever guided in their actions by imagination because thought is absent in them—as
referring specifically to “autonomous” thought. To insist that he is referring more broadly, to
thought simpliciter, would be to attribute to Aristotle a far stronger claim about non-human
animals than would be required in order for the example to fulfill the purpose for which
Aristotle is utilizing it.102 To reiterate, the purpose of both examples is to underscore the
primacy of the imagination as the most fundamental guiding principle of animal action. And, in
light of our finding from MA 7, that it is specifically “autonomous” thought in the domain of
conduct which is relevant to animal action,103 a focused denial of “autonomous” intellectual
capacities to non-human animals would be sufficient to make this point.
Of course, one could argue that because Aristotle clearly intends for the animal example to
provide more emphatic support for the primacy of imagination than his stunted human
example, a broader interpretation of passage (j) as referring to thought simpliciter might
actually serve this purpose more effectively than my narrower interpretation—particularly in
light of our foreknowledge (from DA 3.4) that the presence of apprehensive thought is a
precondition for the presence of autonomous thought. The idea here would be that, since it is
specifically “autonomous” thought which plays a direct role in guiding animal action when
intellect is involved at all, and since non-human animals do not even possess the intellectual
prerequisite for “autonomous” thought (i.e. apprehensive thought), they certainly cannot
possess the intellectual capacities which are directly responsible for guiding action.
But this would be no more necessary than interpreting Aristotle’s stunted human example as
suggesting that feeling or disease or sleep act as suppressants of both the apprehensive and the
autonomous intellectual capacities. Apprehensive thought simply isn’t directly relevant to
animal action, and since it is perfectly conceivable for apprehensive thought to exist in the
absence of autonomous thought,104 the most appropriate approach would be to interpret both
the animal example and the stunted human example as being silent on the question of
apprehensive thought.105 This would still enable us to insist that Aristotle’s animal example
provides a more emphatic case for the primacy of imagination than his stunted human
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If it is qua autonomous that intellect contributes to animal action when it does contribute to animal action, then
it would seem to follow that, in those cases in which the intellect fails to contribute to animal action, it should be
qua autonomous that it fails to do so.
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It would also be question begging since, as I had mentioned above in my treatment of passage (i) this would be
to rule out a priori the possibility that imagination and apprehensive thought are one and the same, which is
precisely the question we are inquiring about.
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And in light of the fact that, according to DA 3.4, apprehensive thought is separable from autonomous thought.
104
As the prerequisite for autonomous thought, apprehensive thought is therefore separable from autonomous
thought.
105
Leaving us some room for agnosticism as to whether Aristotle would have been willing to grant non-human
animals a share in apprehensive thought.
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example. We could simply say that, whereas “autonomous” intellectual capacities (specifically)
are capable of being temporarily eclipsed in human beings, they (specifically) are wholly absent
in non-human animals.106
3.3.3.3. Passage (k)
Moving on, we find exactly the same situation in the case of passage (k). Here, Aristotle repeats
the sentiment that thought is not found in non-human animals, and (again) declines to specify
whether he is referring to any particular form of thought.107 And, just as in the case of passage
(j), the purpose of Aristotle’s emphasis on the supposed non-existence of thought in nonhuman animals is to underscore that it is the imagination, rather than the intellect, which
serves as the default impetus to animal action. The main difference between passage (j) and
passage (k) is that, in passage (k), Aristotle relies solely upon the example of non-human
animals in order to make this point, rather than including the example of the stunted human.
This lends to passage (k) the superficial appearance of denying that intellect makes any
contribution to animal action at all. But if this were the correct reading, it would mean that
passages (j) and (k) are in direct conflict with one another, since passage (j) allows that intellect
sometimes makes a contribution to animal action, and that it in fact possesses ultimate control
over an animal’s action in those cases in which it is involved.
In order to avoid this conflict and render passages (j) and (k) compatible, we need only consider
that Aristotle might just as well have included the stunted human example in passage (k), (in
which case, it would have been more easily discernible that Aristotle did not intend to deny
that intellect makes any contribution to action at all, but only that intellect is the baseline
contributor to action). On this reading, passage (k) is implicitly friendly to the notion that
intellect sometimes contributes to animal action.108
This being the case, we are again free to press the question of how the intellect contributes to
animal action, when it does. Which will lead us down the same path that our examination of
passage (j) took. As before, an appeal to Aristotle’s parallel discussion of animal action in MA 7,
106

Or, if we wished to express this in terms of our agnosticism concerning whether non-human animals possess
apprehensive thought, we might put it as follows: We cannot be sure, based on what Aristotle has to say in
passage (j) whether Aristotle believed that non-human animals possess apprehensive thought. But we can be sure
that, if they do, they do not possess the ability to graduate beyond apprehensive thought, into the realm of
autonomous thought.
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Which, as before, might motivate readers to assume that he is speaking of thought in the broadest possible
terms.
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This is corroborated by EN 6.2, which echoes Aristotle’s claim from passage (k), that “intellect is not the source
of locomotion,” but which is more careful about qualifying the statement, so as to clarify his intended meaning,
that it is not just any function of the intellect which is the source of locomotion, but one function in particular (i.e.
deliberation in the domain of conduct): “Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims
at an end and is practical” (1139a36-b1).
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will indicate that the intellect contributes to animal action by putting together the relevant
propositions pertaining to what ought or ought not to be done, then distilling the conclusion,
which is identical with the performance or non-performance of the relevant action. Which, in
light of Lowe’s classification of propositional reasoning as a variant of “autonomous” thought,
will lead us to the conclusion that it is qua autonomous that the intellect makes a contribution
to animal action, in those cases in which it does. From this we can again derive the conclusion
that, when the intellect fails to contribute to animal action, it fails to do so qua autonomous.
Hence, in passage (k), when Aristotle notes the supposed absence of thought in non-human
animals, we can reasonably infer that he is speaking specifically of “autonomous” thought, for
the same reasons that we did in our analysis of passage (j). The purpose of Aristotle’s appeal to
the example of non-human animals in passage (k) is to stress that imagination is the sole
determinant of an animal’s action, in those cases in which thought does not make a
contribution (and that therefore, imagination is the most fundamental determinant of animal
action). And our examination of Aristotle’s discussion in the MA 7 has revealed that it is
specifically autonomous thought which is directly relevant to animal action, in those cases in
which thought does make a contribution. And since apprehensive thought is separable from
autonomous thought, there is no reason to interpret Aristotle’s apparent denial of thought to
non-human animals as applying to apprehensive thought, in addition to autonomous
thought.109 To do so would be superfluous, since the more moderate interpretation—that
Aristotle is merely denying non-human animals a share in “autonomous” thought—is sufficient
to render Aristotle’s example of non-human animals effective as an illustration of the primacy
of the imagination as a determinant of animal action.
3.3.3.4. Passage (l)
Passage (l), when read out of context, gives the impression of designating rationality (again,
seemingly broadly construed) as something uniquely human; which, if true, would mean that
non-human animals can have no share in thought whatsoever. But it is important to remember
that, in the context in which this passage appears, Aristotle is not trying to render a definition
of “human being,” but rather, to discern the nature of human happiness. His seemingly
generalized appeal to the human soul’s “rational principle,” in passage (l), is only the beginningstage of what will, over the course of the EN, become an increasingly fine-tuned answer.
In EN 1.7, in the lines immediately following passage (l), Aristotle clarifies that it is not any and
every activity of the soul’s rational principle which conduces to human happiness, but more
specifically, activity of the rational principle in accordance with its appropriate excellence. But of
course, even this needs to be parsed a bit further in order to be genuinely informative. Which is
why, in EN 1.13, Aristotle introduces a distinction between two kinds of rational excellence—
109

Unless, as I have also noted in my treatments of passages (i) and (j), we are begging the question in favor of the
view that non-human animals cannot possess any kind of thought at all.
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one intellectual and another moral—and zeros in on the latter as being the most pertinent to
his project of defining human happiness. Thus, by the end of the first book of the EN, Aristotle’s
account of human happiness has already matured from “activity of the soul’s rational
principle,” to the more specific “activity of the soul’s rational principle, in accordance with
moral excellence.”
He develops his answer even further in the second book, by expounding more precisely on the
nature of moral excellence. In the sixth chapter of this book, Aristotle posits that moral
excellence is a state of one’s soul, which comes about as a result of habitually choosing the
correct course of action, in response to the pleasures and pains that circumstance might make
available to us or impose upon us. As a general rule, he posits that the correct course of action
will aim at a mean between excess and deficiency, with regard to one’s responses to
pleasurable and painful circumstances.110 However, he is careful to acknowledge that this does
not amount to a formula which can be easily applied to every situation; rather, choosing the
correct course of action requires careful deliberation about the particulars of the situation that
one finds oneself in, just as the practice of medicine requires the physician to “consider what is
appropriate to the occasion,” before deciding upon a regimen of treatment.
Thus, over the course of the first two books of the EN, Aristotle’s account of happiness develops
from the seemingly generic “activity of the soul’s rational element,” to the far more specific “a
state of the soul, which results from repeated (and successful) deliberation about what ought
to be done in a given set of circumstances, particularly in response to the pleasures or pains
which are attendant upon those circumstances.” This clearly indicates that happiness comes
about not as a result of thought simpliciter,111 but as a result of what Aristotle had referred to,
in the De Motu, as “deliberation in the domain of conduct.”
He is even careful, in EN 3.3, to distinguish this form of thought from philosophical
contemplation (which he had referred to in the MA 7 as “thinking and inferring about the
immovable objects”):
(u) Now about eternal things no one deliberates, e.g. about the universe or the
incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square…We deliberate about
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However, merely performing the median action in response to pleasurable and painful circumstances is not
enough to establish that the person has attained a state of moral excellence. This is merely the process by which
one gradually (by habituation) attains the state of moral excellence. The state of moral excellence is characterized
by one’s attainment of the median state with regard to one’s passions concerning pleasurable and painful
circumstances (for the passions too admit of means, as Aristotle tells us in EN 2.7). This means that, in addition to
choosing the correct course of action in regard to the pleasure and pain that one experiences, the morally
excellent person will also, “…feel them [i.e. pleasure and pain] at the right times, with reference to the right
objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way, [which] is what is both intermediate and
best, and this is characteristic of excellence” (1106b21-23).
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Which a passing glance at passage (l) might seem to suggest.
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things that are in our power and can be done (1112a21-31).
And we know, from Aristotle’s discussion in MA 7, that deliberation in the domain of conduct is
a form of propositional reasoning. Which makes it, according to Lowe’s discussion, a species of
autonomous thought.112
Hence, since Aristotle’s project in the EN is not to highlight the role of the rational principle in
providing a definitional demarcation of human beings from nonhuman animals,113 but rather to
highlight its role in bringing about a state of happiness, and since his developed theory specifies
that it is by virtue of our capacity for propositional reasoning in the domain of conduct that we
are able to attain happiness, it follows that Aristotle’s emphasis on the activity of the rational
principle in passage (l) must refer specifically to autonomous thought.
3.3.3.5. Passage (m)
As for passage (m), a superficial reading might lead some to understand Aristotle as saying that
non-human animals are incapable of akratic action (i.e. incontinence) because they have no
share in thought whatsoever. However, a more careful reading should yield the conclusion that
non-human animals are incapable of akratic action because they have no share in autonomous
thought. Right from the outset of his discussion of akratic action in EN 7.1, Aristotle describes
the akratic person as one who abandons the results of his calculations:
(v) The same man is thought to be continent and ready to abide by the result of his
calculations [logismou], or incontinent and ready to abandon them (1145b10-11).
And although Aristotle does ultimately back away from the notion that akratic action involves
any literal contravention of the results of one’s calculations, his subsequent account of the
mechanics of akratic action in EN 7.3 does nevertheless retain the presupposition that akratic
action occurs against a backdrop of propositional reasoning. In rough strokes, Aristotle’s
mature position appears to be that akratic action involves a sort of misfiring of one’s
propositional reasoning (such that the correct conclusion is never actually reached), caused by
the interference of a passion. More precisely, the idea would be that, although one might be in
active possession of the necessary theoretical information required to draw the correct
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This conclusion is also bolstered by Aristotle’s repeated reminders, throughout books 2 and 3 of the EN, that
moral excellence comes about as a result of choice—which is to say that we choose the actions which, when
undertaken habitually, bring about a state of excellence in our souls. A clear expression of this principle can be
found in the opening lines of EN 3.5: “The end, then, being what we wish for, the things contributing to the end
what we deliberate about and choose, actions concerning the latter must be according to choice and voluntary.
Now the exercise of the excellences is concerned with these” (1113b3-6).
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As a cursory, decontextualized reading of passage (l) might seem to suggest.
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conclusion about what ought to be done in a given circumstance,114 one’s distillation of the
correct conclusion is nevertheless impeded, because the particular premise,115 whose
combination with the foregoing universal propositions would ordinarily clinch one’s arrival at
the correct conclusion, is in some sense suppressed by a passion:
(w) …the last proposition both being an opinion about a perceptible object, and being what
determines our actions, this a man either has not when he is in the state of passion, or
has it in the sense in which having knowledge did not mean knowing but only talking, as
a drunken man may utter the verses of Empedocles (1147b9-12).
Insofar, then, as akratic action is effectively defined by Aristotle as a hiccup in one’s
propositional reasoning, it follows that any organism which lacks the capacity to engage in
propositional reasoning in the first place will be incapable of akratic action as well. And this is
how we need to interpret Aristotle’s explanation as to why non-human animals are incapable of
akratic action; his emphasis on the non-human animal world’s lack of “universal beliefs” should
be taken as shorthand for their inability to engage in acts of propositional reasoning (from
which follows, implicitly, an inability to have their propositional reasoning compromised by the
impingement of a passion).
And since we know, from Lowe, that propositional reasoning belongs to the category of
autonomous thought, the upshot is that when Aristotle stresses the absence of “universal
beliefs” in non-human animals as the explanation for why these animals are incapable of akratic
action, he is not necessarily denying them any share in thought simpliciter, but only a share in
autonomous thought. We have no reason for thinking that this denial of autonomous thought
to non-human animals extends also to apprehensive thought, because apprehensive thought is
a prerequisite for autonomous thought, and separable from it. This means that the absence of
autonomous thought does not imply the absence of apprehensive thought. The category of
apprehensive thought simply is not addressed in passage (m).116
3.3.3.6. Passage (n)
Coming finally to passage (n), many readers might be inclined to seize upon Aristotle’s remark
that “intellect (again, seemingly broadly construed) more than anything else is man” as
114

i.e. Universal propositions such as, for example, that “dry food is good for every man,” that “I am a man,” and
that, “such and such food is dry.”
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i.e. That “this food here is such and such.”
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As with passages (i), (j), and (k), this passage also clarifies that non-human animals have only imagination, which
some might be inclined to take as confirmation that non-human animals have no share in thought whatsoever (not
even apprehensive thought). However, this would be question-begging, for the same reason given in my
treatments of those earlier passages.
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conclusive evidence that non-human animals cannot be granted any form of thought, since this
remark seems to intensify the familiar appeal to thought as the characteristic feature of the
human species, to the point of approximating an identity claim between each individual
intellect and each individual human-being. The idea would then be that, if each human being
just is their intellect (their other psychic faculties being in some sense presupposed), then
perhaps—with the exception of the divine intellect of the Metaphysics—each individual
intellect just is a human being. This would allow us no wiggle-room for any kind of overlap
between intellectual expression and non-human animal life.
The problem with this reading is that it neglects not only the distinction between apprehensive
and autonomous thought (which, as we have seen, are separable), but also, the extent to which
Aristotle recognized distinctions between lower and higher echelons, even within the category
of autonomous thought. Sensitivity to this latter fact is especially crucial to understanding
passage (n) within its proper context.
For example, we saw, in MA 7, that Aristotle drew a comparison between two distinct forms of
propositional reasoning, one of which was concerned with the domain of conduct, and one of
which was concerned with the immovable objects. We also saw that although these two forms
of thought differed with respect to the nature of the conclusions that they yielded,117 they were
nonetheless united under the category of “autonomous thought,” by virtue of the fact that they
involved the putting-together of propositions and the distillation of conclusions.
Granted, we did not see any clear indication in MA 7, that these two forms of thought stand in
any particular hierarchical ranking, in relation to one another. However, in the tenth book of
the EN (from which passage (n) is drawn), Aristotle is very clear that they do. His metric, in
deciding the layout of this hierarchical arrangement, is the extent to which each of these two
forms of thought is conducive to happiness. And in EN 10.7, he identifies the life of
philosophical contemplation—by which he means thought in the realm of the immovable
objects—as the maximally happy life. Thought in the domain of conduct receives only a
secondary position on the scale of happiness.
Aristotle defends this ranking by stressing that philosophical contemplation outstrips thought in
the domain of conduct, in terms of continuity and self-sufficiency, both of which he had listed
as criteria for the happiest life in the first book of the EN.
(x) …it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we
can do anything (1177b29-30).
(y) For while a wise man, as well as a just man and the rest, needs the necessaries of life,
when they are sufﬁciently equipped with things of that sort the just man needs people
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towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave
man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the wise man, even when by
himself, can contemplate truth (1177b35-40).
All of this is established in the paragraphs leading up to passage (n), and so it must inform our
interpretation of that passage. In fact, passage (n) contains a clause which harks back to
Aristotle’s preceding discussion of the hierarchical ordering among thought-forms: immediately
after declaring that intellect, more than anything else, is man, Aristotle closes the passage (and
the chapter), by remarking that the life lived in accordance with intellect, “…therefore is also
the happiest.”
Given our prior understanding—gleaned from a complete reading of EN 10.7—that the
“happiest” life, for Aristotle, refers to the life of philosophical contemplation, this closing
remark makes it clear that, when Aristotle speaks of intellect in passage (n), he is referring not
only to a form of autonomous thought, but indeed, to the highest possible form of autonomous
thought.118

3.3.4. Summary
To recap, then, our analysis of the objection to the strong Thinking-Model of Imagination, that
it leads to a conclusion which conflicts with Aristotle’s designation of intellect as the
distinguishing feature of the human animal, in passages (i) through (n), has yielded the
following results:
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At this point, some might be inclined to point out the following tension between my treatment of passage (l),
and my treatment of passage (n). Both of these passages occur in the context of a discussion of human happiness.
However, my treatment of passage (l) revealed that when Aristotle identified the life of rational activity as the
happiest life, he was speaking about rational activity in the domain of (moral) conduct. Whereas, in my treatment
of passage (n), it was revealed that, when Aristotle identified the life of rational activity as the happiest life, he was
referring to something even higher (i.e. philosophical contemplation). This objection gestures towards a
notoriously difficult problem for interpreters of the EN—namely, whether the account of happiness that Aristotle
develops throughout the bulk of the text (focusing as it does on rational activity in the sphere of moral excellence)
is compatible with his emphasis on pure philosophical contemplation, in the tenth book. Much ink has been spilled
on the question. However, for our present purposes, the answer to this question really isn’t relevant. This is
because both thought in the domain of conduct and philosophical contemplation are forms of propositional
reasoning and are therefore both subsumed under the category of “autonomous thought.” And the point that I am
making here—that in passages (i) through (n), when Aristotle appears to be citing intellect in general as the
distinguishing feature of the human animal, he is, in fact, only referring to the category of “autonomous
thought”—requires nothing more than a demonstration that thought, in the context of each passage, refers to
some variant of autonomous thought. It does not require that every one of these passages be shown to be
referring to the same variant of autonomous thought.
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Firstly, the objection overlooks the gradational picture of the Aristotelian animal world
suggested by passages (o) through (q), which is perfectly capable of accommodating the notion
that non-human animals might possess a kind of thought, so long as there exists within the
Aristotelian schema a distinction between the fully-developed intellectual capacities which
typify mature human beings, and a more primitive, less complete form of thought which serves
as a precursor and a prerequisite to those other more complete intellectual capacities.
Secondly, it overlooks the distinction between autonomous thought and the more primitive
(and separable) “apprehensive” thought, the latter of which fulfills the foregoing condition for
the gradational picture of passages (o) through (q) to be able to accommodate the notion that
non-human animals possess a species of thought.
Thirdly, it overlooks the fact that a slightly modified version of Cooper’s proposition about
Aristotle’s approach to definitions (i.e. that Aristotle defines a living thing in terms of the
highest faculty that all members of that group share in common) makes it feasible to interpret
Aristotle’s apparent designation of rationality as the distinguishing feature of the human
animal, as referring specifically to thought-forms which fall under the category of “autonomous
thought,” rather than to thought simpliciter.
And finally, the objection overlooks the fact that this interpretation of Aristotle’s designation of
rationality as the distinguishing mark of the human animal really is born out by passages (i)
through (n). Read within their proper contexts, each of these passages does indeed turn out to
be referring specifically to one or another form of autonomous thought, when they speak of
“intellect” or “rationality” as the distinguishing feature of the human animal. None of these
passages addresses apprehensive thought at all.
Attentiveness to these details makes it clear that passages (i) through (n) do not give us any
compelling reason for thinking that apprehensive thought could not extend downward into the
upper echelon of the non-human animal world. It would seem, then, that the existence of a
form of thought in non-human animals can be viewed as a genuinely interesting ramification of
the strong Thinking-Model of Imagination, rather than as a self-refutation.

3.4. Answering Wedin’s Objections
With that in mind, the most likely fallback strategy for opponents of the strong Thinking-Model
would be to appeal to Wedin’s a priori arguments against the identification of images with
learned thoughts. These were, to reiterate: (1) that the faculty of thought is functionally
complete, whereas the faculty of imagination is functionally incomplete, (2) that thought is
necessarily propositional in structure, whereas imagination is non-propositional, and (3) that
thought always takes universal concepts for its intentional content, whereas imagination
(barely) concerns particulars. This section will respond to each of these objections, in turn.
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3.4.1. On Functional Completeness
What Wedin means by “functional completeness”, we recall, is the ability of a psychic faculty to
graduate from first to second-order actuality. Or, in other words, an animal’s ability to proceed
from the mere possession of the relevant power to its actual exercise (the former being itself
the result of some prior alteration).
Now, as to Wedin’s claim that the faculty of thought is functionally complete, there is no doubt
that he is correct. Not only is the faculty of thought functionally complete for Aristotle, it is his
paradigmatic example of functional completeness. When he introduces the concept of
functional completeness in DA 2.5, he relies on the example of thought in order to
communicate his point; first-order actuality, in the case of intellect, refers to the possession of
knowledge, and is said to be the result of a prior alteration (that is, an acquisition of knowledge,
via instruction). Second-order actuality refers to the exercise of this previously acquired
knowledge, via reflection. Crucially, this second-order actualization is said to be within the
knower’s autonomous control:
(z) …he can reﬂect when he wants to, if nothing external prevents him (417a28-29).
Where Wedin goes wrong is in his claim that the faculty of imagination is functionally
incomplete. This becomes clear when we check the faculty of imagination against the template
for functional completeness, exemplified by the faculty of thought. When we do this, we get a
near perfect correlation between the faculty of imagination and the faculty of thought. The
first-order actualization of the faculty of imagination consists in the acquisition of an image—
which results from a qualitative alteration resulting from an occurrence of perception—and
correlates with the intellectual faculty’s acquisition of knowledge via instruction. This
acquisition of images in turn enables the human agent to call images to mind at will, as is clear
from the following passage in DA 3.3:
(aa)
For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a
picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images) (427b19-20).
This willful calling to mind of images constitutes the second-order actualization of the
imaginative faculty and corresponds to the autonomous exercise of learned knowledge
referenced in passage (z).
That the faculty of imagination maps so seamlessly onto Aristotle’s paradigmatic template for
functional completeness should be sufficient to undermine Wedin’s claim that, “…there is no
complete act that counts as imagining something” (Wedin, 55). But we can go a step further.
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When we check the faculty of perception against Aristotle’s paradigmatic template, we find a
rather striking dis-analogy. As in the case of thinking, there is still a graduation from first to
second-order actualization. However, unlike the paradigmatic example of thought, the secondorder actualization of the perceptual faculty is not an autonomous process:
(bb)
…a man can think when he wants to but his sensation does not depend upon
himself—a sensible object must be there (417b25-26).
Rather, the process which we might expect to correspond to the acquisition of knowledge in
the case of intellect (i.e. being passively affected or altered by a sensible object) is the secondorder actualization of the faculty of perception, and corresponds to the willful exercising of
knowledge in the case of intellect—though, again, it is not itself autonomous.
What, then, is the first-order actuality, which, having been attained, renders one capable of
proceeding to the second-order actualization of perceiving, and which corresponds to the mere
possession of knowledge in the case of intellect? It appears to consist simply in being the kind
of thing which possesses a sensitive faculty. And the process of alteration which brings about
this state is said to occur prenatally:
(cc) In the case of what is to possess sense, the ﬁrst transition is due to the action of the
male parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect of
sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge (417b17-20).
I bring this up not to suggest that it is perception, rather than imagination, which is functionally
incomplete, but simply to illustrate that the faculty of imagination is more similar to Aristotle’s
paradigmatic example of functional completeness (i.e. thought), than is the faculty of
perception. For this reason, it strikes me as odd that Wedin should single out imagination as the
outlier.
But even if the passage indicating an autonomous facet to the imaginative faculty did not exist,
so that imagination could not be understood to be functionally complete in the same way that
thinking is, it could still be understood to fit Aristotle’s description of functional completeness,
as exemplified by the faculty of perception. Given that imagination is said to be a motion in the
soul caused by an actualized sensation, we could make the case that the contribution of the
male parent prior to birth, which endows the animal with the capacity for being affected by
sensible objects (i.e. the first-order actuality of sensation), also endows the animal with the
capacity to receive images (i.e. the first-order actuality of imagination), which is then actualized
at the secondary level, along with perception, by the impingement of a sensible object.
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3.4.2. Can Thoughts Denote Particulars?
When it comes to responding to Wedin’s second argument—that the faculty of thought, unlike
the imagination, always takes universals for its intentional content—the best strategy would be
to make a case that thought doesn’t necessarily take universals for its intentional content (at
least not in any sense that wouldn’t also be applicable to the imagination). And this strikes me
as a defensible position, provided that one accepts Lowe’s “apprehensive vs. autonomous
thought” dichotomy, which I’d introduced in the previous section.
This is because the function of “apprehensive thought,” at least as described by Lowe, appears
to be to render judgements about particular substances. He says that apprehensive thought is
responsible for “judging concrete examples of flesh to be flesh” (Durrant, 117),119 which implies
the articulation of statements like, “This [particular] thing here is flesh.”
True, the precise wording of Lowe’s description also seems to imply that apprehensive thought
concerns particulars in a way that presupposes a familiarity with the corresponding essences; as
if the knower, upon being presented with a concrete instance of flesh, were consulting their
previously acquired knowledge of the essence of flesh, and then, by reference to that
knowledge, verifying that the concrete object with which they were being presented is in fact
an instantiation of the essence of flesh. Which, if correct, would vindicate Wedin’s argument, as
the same could certainly not be said of the imagination. But it seems to me that ordinary
language is simply failing Lowe here. Such a view of apprehensive thought cannot be charitably
attributed to him, given the dependence-relation that passage (r) signals between
“apprehensive” and “autonomous” thought, and given his classification of abstraction as a form
of autonomous thinking.120
119

He arrives as this position while wrestling with the problem, which we’ve encountered above (during our
treatments of Wallace and Frede, in the first section of this chapter), that, “…the [special] senses are able to
perceive the shapes, colours, flavors and sounds of objects, but not their substance, be it gold, iron, bronze—or
flesh” (Durrant, 117). Or—to borrow Wallace’s phrase—that the special senses are incapable of “translating
sensations into things.” Reasoning as Wallace and Frede had that some additional faculty is therefore required to
perform this interpretive work, he departs from both of them in assigning the task not to the central sense (as
Wallace had done) or to the imagination (as Frede had done), but to the mind itself (specifically the apprehensive
mind): “It makes Aristotelian sense to say that it is the mind that judges a concrete example of a substance to be a
substance, through acting by means of the senses” (Durrant, 117).
120

Lowe claims that, “…infallible thinking is the thinking of essences as such, as a special case of thinking
concerned with things that are ‘without matter’” (Durrant, 118). For Lowe, “thinking concerned with things that
are without matter” refers to autonomous thought (the point being that autonomous thought-acts are about
things that are not making direct contact with our sensory organs; hence the objects of thought contain no matter
external to our bodies). So, what Lowe is effectively saying in this passage is that abstraction is a special case of
autonomous thinking (i.e. special in the sense that it alone is infallible). Lowe’s designation of abstraction as a form
of “autonomous” thought seems to me to be supported by the fact that Aristotle’s abrupt shift in focus (at 429b69) from apprehensive to autonomous thought is followed closely by an extended discussion of essence-grasping.
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This is because passage (r) indicates that autonomous thought is predicated on apprehensive
thought, in such a way that it can only occur after apprehensive thought has already occurred.
If apprehensive thought is a prerequisite for autonomous thought, and if abstraction is a form
of autonomous thought, then it follows that apprehensive thought is a prerequisite for
abstraction.121 And if apprehensive thought is a prerequisite for abstraction, it follows that
apprehensive thought cannot itself entail any awareness of the relevant essences, as it is
precisely through abstraction that one comes to an awareness of the relevant essence. To
construe apprehensive thought as involving prior knowledge of essences would therefore result
in an absurdity (that, for example, one would have to have already grasped the essence of flesh
in order to have ever become capable of grasping it).
That is, of course, unless Aristotle subscribed to some Platonic notion of latent, unremembered
knowledge; in this case, the construal of apprehensive thought as implying some prior
familiarity with essences need only entail that one must have knowledge of essences in order to
become capable of remembering it (a perfectly coherent statement). But while Aristotle does
consider the notion that we possess unremembered knowledge of essences in APo 2.19, he
ultimately rejects this notion as an absurdity:
(dd)
…as to knowledge of the immediates, one might puzzle…whether the states are
not present in us but come about in us, or whether they are present in us but escape
notice. Well, if we have them, it is absurd; for it results that we have pieces of
knowledge more precise than demonstration and yet this escapes notice (99b26-27).
Since consistency precludes the idea that apprehensive thought presupposes any conscious
awareness of essences, and since Aristotle rejects any notion of latent knowledge of essences,
it follows that there is no sense in which apprehensive thought can be understood to involve
knowledge of essences. The only remaining alternative is that such knowledge “comes about in
us” where it was not already present—presumably via abstraction, following our apprehension
of particular objects. And this is very much the story that Aristotle goes on to tell, during the
remainder of APo 2.19.
That said, there is one complication in Aristotle’s subsequent account of abstraction, which
might seem to tip the scales back in favor of Wedin’s argument; and Wedin does in fact seize
upon this, in his response to Lowe. This complication arises in the following passage:

(ee)
…there is a primitive universal in the mind (for though one perceives the
particular, perception is of the universal—e.g. of man but not of Callias the man); again,
121

This also follows intuitively from Lowe’s claim that apprehensive thought involves the grasping of particular
substances, as abstraction—by definition—involves induction from our awareness of particulars.
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a stand is made in these, until what has no parts and is universal stands—e.g. such and
such an animal stands, until animal does (100a15-100b1).
What this passage seems to suggest is that although the process of abstraction does technically
begin with the apprehension of concrete particulars,122 it is not qua particular that these
objects are registered by our internal cognitive apparatus—not even at the level of
perception—but rather, qua universal.123 Obviously, this cannot mean that we become
immediately aware of essences the moment an object comes into contact with our sensory
organs; if this were the case, then there’d be no need for abstraction to occur, and perception
itself would qualify as a form of thought. Nevertheless, the passage does indicate that our
perception of particular objects makes us privy to a qualified flavor of universality which falls
short of the pure universality of essences; and that, moreover, these “primitive universals”
serve as the most immediate precursors to our distillation of essences via abstraction.
Now, if this passage can be plausibly interpreted as telling us anything about Lowe’s
apprehensive thought,124 the upshot would appear to be that apprehensive thought grasps
particulars qua “primitive universal,” just as perception does. And Wedin exploits this
implication in order to make the case that, even if we accept Lowe’s apprehensive vs
autonomous thought dichotomy (which he does not125), apprehensive thought still will not give
us any reason for doubting the premise that thought necessarily denotes universals. Cognition
involves universals from the moment of perception, and therefore, “…thinking that involves
perception, Lowe’s apprehensive thinking, will also involve universals” (Wedin, 262).
What Wedin overlooks is that this would also have to apply to the imagination, since
imagination “has for its content what can be perceived,” and is “similar in character to the
sensation itself,” as Aristotle says in passage (a).

122

In that it is concrete particulars which initiate the entire process, by stimulating our peripheral sensory-organs.
“…in standard cases of perception one receives the form from a particular—not, however, qua particular but,
rather, qua universal” (Wedin, 262).
124
And I think that it can be; recall that Lowe theorizes apprehensive thought as being directly informed by the
perceptual faculty, and passage (ee) states that it is through perception that primitive universals come to be
present in the mind, with no mention of mediation by any other faculty.
125
Though he grudgingly acknowledges that 429b5-9 alludes to the process of knowledge acquisition discussed in
APo 2.19, he argues that it does so only by way of reminding readers of the necessary background information for
understanding the central project of DA 3.4. Which, on Wedin’s view, is not to distinguish between two kinds of
thinking, but rather—in conjunction with DA 3.5—to explain, “…the nature of the activity a fully equipped thinker
is capable of” (Wedin, 264). Or, in other words, to describe the, “…functional organization [of the mind] that
explains the fact that from a ready stock of concepts [previously acquired through learning] persons are able to
produce thoughts autonomously and spontaneously” (Wedin, xii). On Wedin’s view, any autonomous thought act
involves the interplay of two noetic sub-systems, one of which involves the mind’s becoming like its object, and
another of which involves the mind’s making itself like its object. Wedin had previously advanced this line of
reasoning in “Tracking Aristotle’s Nous” (1986).
123
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In fact, APo 2.19 identifies imagination—not perception—as the really pivotal precondition for
the possibility of knowledge acquisition. The idea here seems to be that knowledge requires not
only the entry of primitive universals into the soul by way of the sensory organs, but also their
retention within the soul following the cessation of the perceptible object’s contact with the
sensory organs. And that this retention is made possible by the faculty of phantasia.
Hence, Aristotle writes that,
(ff) …for those [animals] in which it [retention] does not come about, there is no knowledge
outside perceiving (either none at all, or none with regard to that of which there is no
retention); but for some perceivers [i.e. those with imagination], it is possible to grasp it
in their minds (99b38-40).
Admittedly, passage (ff) does not sit well with Lowe’s claim that apprehensive thought is
directly sensory-induced. My sense is that he would want to interpret the dependence relation
that it posits between imagination and knowledge as applying only to autonomous thoughtforms (i.e., either knowledge attained via abstraction or via propositional reasoning, or both),
as it is Lowe’s general contention that images serve as a kind of substitute for sensations in the
context of autonomous thought-acts, performing the role that sensations play in apprehensive
thought-acts.126 As to whether this is a plausible reading of passage (ff), I am rather skeptical, as
it specifies that without the retention made possible by the imagination, there’d be no grasping
of the object in question by the mind (which is just how Lowe describes apprehensive thought),
and no knowledge of any kind beyond perception (which would certainly have to apply to
apprehensive thought, even if it also applied to autonomous thought). This passage also seems
to me to function in context as a sort of qualifier to passage (ee), which itself was dealing
specifically with apprehensive thought. However, I should add there does seem to me to be
independent textual evidence to support Lowe’s general claim that images serve as a substitute
for sensations in autonomous thought-acts. I’ll have more to say about this in the closing
section of the chapter. But for now, it really isn’t necessary to dwell upon it, as we’re presently
concerned with answering Wedin’s objection, and our foregoing observation from passage (a),
concerning the intentional content of imagination, is sufficient to enable us to do so.
Wedin may well be correct in his claim that if perception involves the apprehension of
particulars qua primitive universal, then so too must apprehensive thought (inasmuch as it is
supposedly caused and informed directly by perception). But this will turn out to be something
that it shares in common with the imagination, since imagination is also caused and informed
directly by perception. The denotation of “primitive universals” therefore cannot serve as the
126

He reasons that autonomous thought, “…is not directly connected with the ordinary process of sensation”
(Durrant, 116)—meaning that it occurs in the absence of sensible objects, after they have ceased to make contact
with our sensory-organs—and that therefore, “…the mind would need some substitute for sensation in dealing
with things ‘without matter’ [meaning the external matter of the sensible object]” (Durrant, 120).
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basis for a distinction between imagination and Lowe’s apprehensive thought, as Wedin’s
argument would require it to.127 In order to really uphold the desired distinction, Wedin would
need to be able to show that Lowe’s apprehensive thought denotes the pure universality of
essences, which cannot be said of the imagination.
Therefore, if one accepts Lowe’s dichotomy between apprehensive and autonomous thought, it
seems to me that one is accepting the presence, within the Aristotelian framework, of a species
of thought which seriously undermines Wedin’s second argument for the qualitative
incongruity between imagination and thought.

3.4.3. On Propositionality
Coming now to Wedin’s final argument, that imagination—unlike the faculty of thought—is
non-propositional, there are two ways in which we might respond. The first would be to accept
Wedin’s supposition that thought is always propositional, and dispute the premise that
imagination is non-propositional. This is not my favored strategy, but there is some textual
evidence which appears to indicate that imagination is propositional in nature, and this
evidence must be taken seriously.
The textual evidence in favor of the propositionality of imagination occurs in Aristotle’s
discussion of animate motion, between MA 6-7. In these chapters, Aristotle is attempting to
explain the contingent nature of animate motion, as compared with the eternal motion of the
universe. His explanation is that the universe is moved directly by the prime mover, whereas
the animal is moved directly by its soul’s faculty of desire.128 In both cases, the “being moved”
can be said to be for the sake of some good, and in the case of the universe, its motion is for
the sake of the prime mover itself. In the case of the animal, its motion is for the sake of the
object which stimulated its faculty of desire. But since the prime mover’s goodness is
unqualified,129 it never ceases to move the universe (hence the universe never ceases to move).
The object of animal desire is, by contrast, not even eternally present, let alone eternally good.
And the fact that the object is not eternally present to the animal is sufficient to explain the
contingency of animal motion.
However, in the case of rational animals, things are even further complicated by the fact that,
interposed between the impingement of the object upon the soul (through perception or
imagination) and the resulting action lies a chain of propositional reasoning,130 a chain of
127

Lowe himself is rather cryptic about the nature of the relationship and distinction between imagination and
apprehensive thought. I’ll discuss this in more detail in the closing section of this chapter.
128
Which itself is stimulated to action by an impinging object, through perception or imagination.
129
Aristotle refers to it as “the eternally ﬁne, and the truly and primarily good (which is not at one time good, at
another time not good)” (700b30-31).
130
Of which the rational animal’s action is the conclusion.
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reasoning which may occur with varying degrees of speed, depending upon how many premises
are contained within the chain and how meticulous the rational animal is in pausing to consider
each premise.
It is within the context of his discussion of variations in the speed of deliberative action, that
Aristotle appears to describe the imagination as propositional. After noting that deliberative
action occurs more quickly when the rational animal passes over certain obvious premises
rather than pausing to reflect on them, he goes on to acknowledge that there are
circumstances under which imagination, rather than thought as such, affirms the pivotal
premise needed for the conclusion (viz. action) to go through:
(gg)
For the actualizing of desire is a substitute for inquiry or thinking. I want to drink,
says appetite; this is drink, says sense or imagination or thought: straightaway I drink
(701a31-32).
A straightforward reading of this passage seems to indicate that the imagination itself
articulates propositional judgments (i.e. “this is drink”). And numerous commentators have
pointed this out. For example, Schofield (2011) notes the “propositional content of what
phantasia is here represented as saying” (Pakaluk and Pearson, 124), and he criticizes Wedin
for failing to address passage (gg).131
Of course, the idea that the imaginative faculty literally articulates propositional judgments is
difficult to countenance, as most non-human animals also have a share in imagination on
Aristotle’s view, and they cannot be credited with possessing any propositional-reasoning
capabilities, even if they can be credited with possessing some rudimentary form of thought.132
And so there is a strong imperative to find some other way of interpreting passage (gg), which
does not require that imagination literally articulates propositions.
Thankfully, this is not an especially difficult task. Rather than interpreting passage (gg)’s claim
that imagination “says “this is drink”” as meaning that the imagination itself literally articulates
propositions such as “this is drink,” we might just as well read it as indicating that imagination
makes an animal aware of the presence of drink, perhaps on some baseline intuitive level—
common to both non-human and human animals—which, in the case of humans, may or may
not in some sense find its expression within the context of a chain of propositional reasoning.133
131

Bolton (2005: 240) and (Labarriere (2004: 238n2) also criticize Wedin on this score.
As I’d explained above, during my discussion of the cognitive limitations of non-human animals.
133
If non-human animals have the ability to be made aware of particular substances in a totally non-propositional
manner, then it follows, in light of the Aristotelian principle that the higher psychic faculties presuppose the lower
ones, that human beings must also possess the capacity to be made aware of particular substances in this way.
Hence why a human being’s imaginative awareness of a particular substance may or may not be expressed in the
context of a propositional judgement.
132
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This strikes me as a perfectly plausible reading of passage (gg), and it is one that Schofield
suggests himself. It also seems to fit quite conveniently into Wedin’s overarching narrative
about the kind of subservience relation that obtains between images and thought acts, as this
narrative does suggest one possible sense in which a human being’s imaginative awareness of a
particular substance—though non-propositional in itself—might find its expression within the
context of a chain of propositional reasoning. Or at least it could do this, if Wedin hadn’t
committed himself to the premise that there are no images of particular sensible substances,
but only of special and common sensibles. Recall that according to Wedin, images never occur
on their own134 but only within the context of complete acts performed by the fully-fledged
faculties, and that what this means in the case of thought acts is that images appear as simple
terms in propositional complexes articulated by the rational faculty.
The problem for Wedin is that it is difficult to imagine what this might mean, other than that
images denote or represent the particular objects referenced in certain non-definitional
propositions which make some claim about that particular object—i.e. “This thing here
(represented by an image) is a daffodil.” But this would conflict with Wedin’s insistence that
there are no images of sensible substances, but only of special and common sensibles; if there
are only images of shapes, colours, flavors, sounds, and accompanying properties such as
magnitude, number, figure, movement, or rest—and not of objects as such—then it is difficult
to see how imagination could pick out a “this thing here.” Wedin would therefore need to
accept the following correction to his claim about the intentional content of phantasia:
although there may exist images of special and common sensibles, these cannot be the only
kinds of images which exist. There must also be images of particular substances.
Once having been corrected on this point, Wedin would be able to respond effectively to our
observation that passage (gg) appears to credit the imaginative faculty with articulating
propositional judgments—and, moreover, to do so in a manner that squares with his overall
perspective on the relationship between images and thought acts: In the case of humans, it is
strictly speaking the faculty of thought that articulates the proposition, not the imagination.
That said, the imagination does provide a representation of the proposition’s referent, thereby
helping to fill out not only the intentional content, but also the mechanical structure of the
proposition. And so there does remain a limited sense (at least in the case of humans) in which
the imagination really can be credited with “saying” something about a particular object, as the
prima facie reading of passage (gg) seems to suggest. Whereas in the case of non-humans, this
“saying” can only be figurative, since there is no possibility of their imaginative awareness of an
object finding its way in any sense into a propositional complex.
This solution would also provide us with some additional insight into why the type of
subservience relation that Wedin posits between imagination and thought might be taken as
134

It seems to me that this claim would need to be softened, in light of passage (aa)’s assertion that we can call up
images “whenever we wish.”
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supportive of the second antecedent entertained in passage (c)’s naturalistic conditional, that
thought is dependent upon the imagination. We’ve seen that on a prima facie level, passage
(gg) appears to credit the imagination with articulating a propositional judgment of the form
“this is drink.” And that while Wedin’s reading does downplay the imagination’s involvement in
the actual articulation of the linguistic complex,135 he still retains the notion that the
imagination makes an indispensable contribution to the mind’s ability to articulate a
propositional judgement of this sort, by picking out its referent. Which—if true—would mean
that the imagination makes an indispensable contribution to the mind’s ability to complete a
chain of propositional reasoning leading to the conclusion that one will perform the action of
drinking, by enabling it to affirm the pivotal premise. Hence, we have at least one kind of
thought-act (i.e. propositional reasoning within the domain of conduct; or deliberative action)
whose reliance upon the imaginative faculty might be thought to be plausibly explained by
Wedin’s subservience hypothesis.
The second—and in my view, the more effective—method of responding to Wedin’s final
argument would be to accept the premise that imagination is non-propositional, but also to
dispute the premise that all thought acts are necessarily propositional. And it seems to me that
this position is perfectly defensible, again, provided that one accepts Lowe’s apprehensive vs.
autonomous thought distinction. This is because Lowe’s apprehensive thought needn’t
necessarily be construed as propositional. This might seem counterintuitive at first, as Lowe
does describe apprehensive thought in terms which seem to entail that it involves the
articulation of a propositional judgement.136 Lowe writes that apprehensive thought is
responsible for “…judging concrete examples of flesh to be flesh” (Durrant, 117). Which is
effectively the same as crediting apprehensive thought with saying things like “this thing here is
flesh.”
However, as with Aristotle’s remark about the propositionality of imagination in passage (gg),
Lowe’s apparently propositional description of apprehensive thought needn’t be taken literally,
either. Let’s suppose, for the moment, that apprehensive thought did involve a literal
propositional judgement of the sort, “this thing here is flesh.” If so, then this still could not
mean that apprehensive thought implies any genuine understanding as to why the thing in
question is an example of flesh. This is—to reiterate—because apprehensive thought is a
prerequisite for autonomous thought, and because abstraction (at least according to Lowe) falls
under the category of autonomous thought.137 As I had explained above, the upshot of all of
this is that there is no sense in which apprehensive thought can be informed by any
foreknowledge of essences; the apprehensive mind’s judgement that a concrete example of
flesh is flesh occurs prior to the agent’s having grasped the essence of flesh.
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Maintaining that it is ultimately the rational faculty that does this.
The same kind of propositional judgement, moreover, which passage (gg) seems to attribute to the imagination.
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And also because Aristotle rejects the notion of any latent, unremembered knowledge of essences.
136
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But if the apprehensive mind’s identification of an object as an instance of flesh does not reflect
any genuine understanding of what it is to be flesh, we should ask ourselves what else it could
reflect. And it seems to me that the only other thing that it could reflect is an awareness that
the object in question bears a certain resemblance to other objects of a similar character—let’s
call it an awareness of family resemblance. But there is no reason to suppose that this sort of
awareness is inherently propositional. If it were, then non-human animals would not be capable
of grasping resemblances between objects, since non-human animals are incapable of
formulating propositional judgements. But non-human animals are capable of grasping family
resemblance, on the Aristotelian view. Such, at least, appears to be the implication of
Aristotle’s acknowledgement that non-human animals are capable of being moved to action by
their apprehension of particular objects; it is difficult to imagine how an object which an animal
has never before encountered could present itself to the animal as an object of desire, unless it
bore a certain resemblance to other, previously encountered objects, which turned out to be
pleasing to the animal.
Now, a proponent of the propositionality of apprehensive thought might well allow that
because the awareness of family resemblance is common to both non-human and human
animals, it needn’t be inherently propositional.138 However, they might still insist that it is
propositional insofar as it manifests in the form of apprehensive thought in humans. The idea
here might be that while both non-human and human animals possess the capacity to become
imaginatively139 aware of an object as belonging to a certain kind, humans possess the further
ability to grasp this family resemblance via apprehensive thought. And insofar as apprehensive
thought serves as a direct prerequisite for the human being’s ability to graduate to an
awareness of the corresponding essence via abstraction (and, thereafter, to engage in the
various other forms of autonomous thinking), it must possess some additional quality—absent
in cases of imaginative awareness—which enables it to do this. The prime candidate would
seem to be logos. This would help to explain why non-human animals are incapable of
advancing beyond an awareness of family resemblance among particulars to an awareness of
the corresponding essence: because they lack the ability to first express their awareness of
family resemblance in the form of a propositional judgement. In support of this line of
reasoning, one might even invoke Charles Kahn’s observation that, “…lacking logos, animals
cannot have our way of understanding what we perceive” (Nussbaum & Rorty, 369).
But while Kahn’s remark could be spun as support for this position, it strikes me as a bit of a
stretch. He doesn’t seem to me to be making a point about what logos enables the autonomous
mind to do indirectly. Rather, he’s just making a claim about what logos contributes to the
138
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propositional” (Nussbaum & Rorty, 287).
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apprehensive mind, which marks it off qualitatively from imaginative apprehension. A more
economical reading of Kahn’s statement would simply be that logos enables human beings to
express their awareness of family resemblances among particular objects in linguistic terms.
Moreover, the idea that our ability to render our awareness of family resemblance in this way
contributes something crucial to the human ability to grasp essences is fraught with difficulties.
For instance, given that apprehensive thought has already been shown to entail no genuine
understanding, it is doubtful whether the contribution made by logos to our awareness of
family resemblances among particulars would consist of anything more substantial than the
ability to apply names or labels to those objects. But the application of names or labels needn’t
necessarily take the form of a propositional judgment, either. For example, although my
application of the label “flesh” to a concrete object may take the form of a proposition like “this
thing here is flesh,” it may just as well take the form of an exclamation like, “aha, flesh!” 140
Moreover, the latter, exclamational style of name-application may not even be a uniquely
human capacity. Kahn himself seems to flirt with the idea that non-human animals might, on
Aristotle’s view, “…have something corresponding to sortal classifications like man, dog, or my
master, my sibling” (Nussbaum & Rorty, 369). If this is right, then the capacity for naming as
such cannot be what logos contributes, which is of pivotal significance to the human ability to
grasp essences. It would have to be something more fine-grained; something which nonhumans lack, but which humans possess. And so it seems to me that Kahn’s appeal to logos is
really of no help to proponents of the propositional-model of apprehensive thought, in their
efforts to substantiate the pivotal premise in their counter-argument.
We therefore have no good reason for thinking that apprehensive thought must be
propositional in nature.141 Thus, if one accepts Lowe’s dichotomy between apprehensive and
autonomous thought, it seems to me that one is accepting the presence, within the Aristotelian
framework, of a species of thought which seriously undermines Wedin’s final argument for the
qualitative incongruity between imagination and thought.

3.5. Is Wallace Right?
We have seen, during our treatment of Wedin’s arguments, that imagination and thought are
both functionally complete faculties. Moreover, we have seen that there is very plausibly a kind
of thought within the Aristotelian framework (i.e. apprehensive thought) which, like the
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Imagine me saying this while pointing to an object.
That is, of course, unless we’re still motivated by a desire to avoid extending apprehensive thought downward
into the upper echelon of the non-human animal world, out of some sense that non-human animals couldn’t
possibly exhibit any form of thought. But, given my extensive argumentation to the contrary in the previous
section, this would be question-begging.
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imagination, is non-propositional, and which—being caused and informed by perception—is
concerned with concrete particulars.142
But there are several other similarities between imagination and Lowe’s apprehensive thought,
which might be added to the foregoing list. For starters, apprehensive thought is—like the
imagination143—a passive affection. This should be clear from the fact that apprehensive
thought is, according to passage (r), a prerequisite for autonomous thought. If apprehensive
thought precedes our ability to think at will, then it cannot itself be within our autonomous
control. The only remaining alternative is that it is something that happens to us. This can also
be inferred from Aristotle’s heavy reliance upon an analogy to the perceptual faculty (which is
indisputably a passive affection), while apparently describing apprehensive thought, in DA 3.4.
Imagination and Lowe’s apprehensive thought also appear to be similar in that they are both
fallible. That the imagination is fallible (i.e. “true and false”) was made clear all the way back in
passage (a). But as we have also seen—during our examination of Lowe’s conception of
apprehensive thought in the previous section—apprehensive thought precedes infallible
thought (viz. abstraction) and must therefore itself be subject to error.
Finally, we can state with confidence that both imagination and Lowe’s apprehensive thought
are prerequisites for autonomous thought. This should already be clear with regard to Lowe’s
apprehensive thought, as it is practically the defining characteristic of apprehensive thought to
be a prerequisite for autonomous thought, according to Lowe’s reading of passage (r). But it
can also be inferred about the imagination, from numerous passages in the Aristotelian corpus.
For example, as we have seen above already, passage (ff) states that imagination is the pivotal
prerequisite for an animal’s ability to acquire any knowledge beyond perception. And while I
remain convinced that this is referring specifically to the relation between imagination and
apprehensive thought,144 it will in any case support the premise that imagination is a
prerequisite for autonomous thought forms—albeit an indirect one—insofar as we know
apprehensive thought to be a direct prerequisite for autonomous thought.
Besides passage (ff), there are also a number of passages which could be taken as supportive of
Lowe’s claim that autonomous thought-acts proceed directly by means of images. Take, for
example, the following passage from DA 3.7:
(hh)
The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images and…sometimes by
means of images or thoughts which are within the soul, just as if it were seeing, it
calculates what is to come by reference to what is present (431b2-7).
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The reference to calculation (logizetai) here indicates that what is being described in passage
(hh) is a situation in which the autonomous mind makes direct use of images (since calculation
is something that one does at will).
Another passage from DA 3.7 repeats this same point:
(ii) To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it
asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the
soul never thinks without an image (431a15-17).
In summary, then, we know that imagination and Lowe’s apprehensive thought are both (i)
functionally complete, (ii) non-propositional, (iii) caused by sensations, (iv) informed by
sensations, and therefore (v) concerned with concrete particulars,145 (vi) passive affections, (vii)
fallible, and (viii) prerequisites for autonomous thought. With so many commonalities between
the imagination and Lowe’s apprehensive thought, some might find it difficult to resist the pull
of Wallace’s remark that, “…the images of our imaginative faculty often approximate closely to
the ideas of thought” (Wallace, xciii). That is, at least, if one accepts the terms of Lowe’s
apprehensive vs autonomous thought dichotomy.
One might of course attempt to avoid this result by disputing the legitimacy of Lowe’s
apprehensive vs autonomous thought distinction. And I will discuss the potential drawbacks of
the distinction in the final section of this chapter. But it is actually not necessary to do so at this
juncture, as there is a dissimilarity between imagination and thought (per se), which Wedin
does not discuss, but which would hold true even if one did accept Lowe’s apprehensive vs.
autonomous thought distinction. Moreover, this distinction will come to bear on the drawbacks
of Lowe’s apprehensive vs autonomous thought distinction, and so it should be unpacked first.

3.6. The Real Problem with the Strong Thinking-Model.
3.6.1. Images Reside in the Sensory-Organs
The strongest argument against the strong Thinking-Model is prompted by the following,
pointed question: “Where do images reside?” Aristotle’s final statement, in the closing lines of
DA 3.3, seems to indicate that images reside in the organs of sense:
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(jj) …because imaginations remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations, animals
in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the nonexistence in them of thought, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in
them of thought by feeling or disease or sleep (429a5-429a8).
This sentiment also appears in the second chapter of the Mem et. Rem. After declaring that
memory is a function of the faculty of imagination, Aristotle says the following, by way of
elaboration.
(kk)
That the affection is corporeal, i.e. that recollection is a searching for an image in
a corporeal substrate, is proved by the fact that some persons, when, despite the most
strenuous application of thought, they have been unable to recollect, feel discomfort,
which even though they abandon the effort at recollection, persists in them none the
less…the reason why the effort of recollection is not under the control of their will is
that…he who tries to recollect and hunts sets up a process in a material part, in which
resides the affection (453a14-453a31).
The conclusion that images reside in the bodily organs can also be derived from the following
passage in the first chapter of the De Insomniis.
(ll) But since we have, in our work on the soul, treated of imagination, and the faculty of
imagination is identical with that of sense-perception, though the being of a faculty of
imagination is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception (459a15-459a22).
This passage is striking in its apparent intensification of the canonical theory of imagination
contained within passages (a) and (b). Rather than merely claiming that imagination is caused
by perception, as he does in passage (a) and (b), Aristotle goes as far as to claim that
imagination and perception are identical. Which, if true, would seem to necessitate that images
reside in the organs of sense, since this is where perceptual changes occur. Of course, the claim
that imagination and perception are identical cannot be literally true for Aristotle, as this would
conflict with his argument, from DA 3.3, that the two are distinguished by the fact that
perception is always correct, whereas imagination is capable of being mistaken. And so we
should probably interpret passage (ll) more moderately, as meaning something like
“imagination supervenes on perception.”146 But even this more moderate interpretation of the
passage still implies that, if images reside anywhere, they reside in the organs of sense. We
therefore have pretty substantial textual evidence for the claim that images reside in the
146
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are nevertheless different in their being.

70

sensory organs.
This is actually quite a serious problem for the plausibility of the strong Thinking-Model of
Imagination, given the lengths to which Aristotle goes in DA 3.4, to stress that thought…
(mm)
…cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would
acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive
faculty: as it is, it has none (429a22-26).
If images reside within the sensory organs, but thought is not blended with any bodily organ at
all, then it is difficult to see how imagination could possibly be a species of thought, at least in
any strong sense. And it is important to note that Aristotle is referring in passage (mm) to
thought in its first-order actualization—what Lowe would call “apprehensive thought.” So even
if one accepts Lowe’s formulation of apprehensive thought, there will still be a fairly strong
prima facie asymmetry between images and learned thoughts, with regard to the property of
corporeality.
That said, there are a number of strategies that one might employ in order to cast doubt on the
supposed corporeality of images—or at least, the necessity of their always remaining
corporeal—and so we should take the time to subject these to charitable scrutiny before
declaring the aforementioned difficulty unanswerable.

3.6.2. Aren’t Images Still Immaterial in Themselves?
Those wishing to challenge the alleged corporeality of images might begin by citing the
following passage, from DA 3.8:
(nn)
When the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along
with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no
matter (432a7-9).
This passage states, in no uncertain terms, that images are, in themselves anyway, immaterial.
Which is almost certainly something that Aristotle is trying to communicate to us about
thought, when he claims that thought is unblended with the body, in passage (mm).
However, it would be a mistake for us to infer that images must be unblended with the body
simply because they are immaterial. We know, for example, that although Aristotle regards the
sensitive faculty as being intrinsically immaterial, he also regards it as being blended with the
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body. Aristotle tells us as much in the following passage from DA 2.12
(oo)
The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same.
What perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude [megethos], but we must not admit
that either the having the power [dunamis] to perceive or the sense itself is a
magnitude; what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude (424a24-424b19).
And if we shift our focus from the formal powers which bring about the first-order actualization
of the perceptual faculty147 to the formal qualities whose acquisition constitutes the secondorder actualization of the perceptual faculty, we get the same result. In DA 2.12, just prior to
making his distinction between the sense and its organ and specifying that the sense, though
not a magnitude itself, is in some way housed within the magnitude of the sensory organ,
Aristotle defines a sense as,
(pp)
…what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without
the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring
without the iron or gold (424a18-21).
Although Aristotle does not press the point explicitly, it seems reasonable to infer, given his
claim that the sense is in some way housed within the magnitude (megethos) of the sensory
organ, that the sense’s reception of perceptible formal qualities into itself implies a reception of
those same formal qualities into the corresponding sensory-organ. The second-order
actualization of the perceptual faculty—i.e. the actual perceiving, as distinguished from the
mere capacity for perceiving—would thus involve a qualitative change in the organ of sense.148
We find, then, that perception is (firstly) made possible and (secondly) made actual, by formal
causes which, although immaterial in themselves, are nevertheless bound up with the sensory
organs. This illustrates that Aristotle’s foregoing claim about images—that they contain no
matter—is perfectly consistent with the proposition that they are intermingled with the body.
Of course, one might raise the objection that although there is nothing about the claim that
images are immaterial which (in itself) necessitates their being unblended with the body, the
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i.e. The forms whose presence render the body capable of perception, thereby making it a distinctively animal
body
148
This inference also seems the best way to make sense of the bulk of the textual evidence indicating that images
are contained within the sensory-organs. We know already that imagination is caused directly by perception.
Therefore, if images are formal qualities which reside within the sensory organs, then the most complete
explanation for their presence within the organs would be that the process whereby they came to reside there (i.e.
perception) itself involved the uptake of these formal qualities into the sensory organs.
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context in which the claim is delivered nevertheless requires that we understand the
immateriality of images in this stronger sense.
The rationale behind this objection runs as follows: In passage (nn), Aristotle is citing the
immateriality of images as a point of dissimilarity between images and perceptual contents.
This tells us that whatever the sense is in which Aristotle thinks that images are immaterial, it
needs to be a sense which is not applicable to perceptual contents; otherwise, Aristotle would
be attempting—absurdly—to distinguish between sensuous contents and images by appealing
to a common feature. But we have just seen that the faculty of perception—and indeed,
perceptions themselves—are blended with the sensory organs, despite being immaterial in
themselves. Therefore, a charitable reading of passage (nn) requires us to understand the
immateriality which Aristotle ascribes to images as implying freedom from any admixture with
the body.
The trouble with this objection is that it only considers “sensuous contents” in terms of the
internal effects that they produce in the observer. And in this respect, it would be correct to say
that they are similar to images, insofar as the internal effects of sensuous contents on the
perceptual faculty are, like images, formal in nature, while also being expressed in the material
substratum provided by the sensory-organs. However, in passage (nn), Aristotle is making a
point about the difference between images and “sensuous contents,” considered in
themselves, as potential objects of awareness. And in this respect, sensuous contents possess a
material component which images do not—namely, the matter which the sense (and the organ
that it inhabits) does not take on along with the sensible form. This is the external matter of the
perceptible object.
Therefore, since we can explain Aristotle’s material-asymmetry claim as referring to the fact
that perceptible objects (but not images) have a material component external to the animal’s
sensory organs, it turns out that passage (nn) is not giving us any concrete reason to think that
images aren’t bound up with the body.
Those wishing to salvage the strong Thinking-Model of Imagination will therefore need to adopt
a more moderate position concerning the relationship between images and the bodily organs.

3.6.3. Can the Imaginative Faculty be Disengaged from Sensory-Organs?
Rather than attempting to dispute the textual evidence suggesting that images are unblended
with the body from their inception, one might instead try to make a case for the more
moderate view that images, though they do originate in the material substrate provided by the
sensory organs, nevertheless have the capacity to become disengaged from the bodily
substrate, thereby achieving a state of pure incorporeality. In addition to salvaging the
coherence of the strong Thinking-Model of Imagination by retaining the notion of a one-to-one
correspondence between the formal content of images and the formal content of apprehended
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thoughts, this would also furnish Aristotle with a rather elegant (and badly needed) explanation
as to how it is that incorporeal cognitive states such as thoughts can have their origin in bodily
processes.149 The idea would be that a learned thought is just an image that has become
disengaged from the bodily substrate.
Such an argument would need to proceed, firstly, by establishing that the formal content of
images has some resonance within the soul, which is distinguishable—at least by definition—
from its resonance within the sensory organs. This criterion can be satisfied easily enough. We
have seen already, in passage (oo), that Aristotle regards a given sensitive power as being
essentially distinguished from its corresponding sensory organ, by virtue of the fact that the
sense itself is not a spatial magnitude, whereas the organ is. And we have interpreted passage
(pp) as implying that perception involves the uptake of formal qualities into both the sense and
the corresponding sensory organ. Taken together, these two premises enable us to make the
following definitional distinction between the uptake of a perceptible form into a sense, and its
uptake into the corresponding sensory-organ: the former amounts to the uptake of a formal
quality into something which is not itself a spatial magnitude, whereas the latter amounts to
the uptake of that same formal quality into a spatial magnitude. And since imagination is so
subtly distinguished from perception,150 it would seem that imagination can likewise be parsed
into two definitionally distinct facets: (1) the persistence of a formal quality in the sensory
organ (which is a magnitude), and (2) the persistence of that same formal quality in the faculty
of imagination itself (which is not a magnitude).
We can find further support for such a distinction in passage (hh). Rather than affirming
Aristotle’s claim, from passage (jj), that images reside within the sensory organs, this passage
opts to focus on their presence “within the soul.”
Of course, this is all perfectly consistent with the notion that the presence of an acquired
formal quality within the soul merely supervenes on its presence within the particular sensory
organ through which it entered the soul. This, if correct, would most likely entail that its
presence within the soul, though distinguishable from its presence in the organ, is nevertheless
dependent upon its presence within the organ. What we would need, in order to begin to
motivate anything stronger than a mere supervenience claim, is some way of establishing that
an image, having once been imprinted on the soul, is capable of persisting within the soul,
following the destruction or removal of the sensory organ which facilitated its entry into the
soul.
And there is some precedent for such a view, both in the secondary literature, and in the
primary texts themselves. H.R. Robinson, for example, has cited the following passage, from DA
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That is, at least, on the supposition that Aristotle was not a strong dualist. As I will explain in more detail in the
final chapter of my discussion, I subscribe to a naturalistic reading of Aristotle’s psychology, and so I at any rate will
require an answer to this question.
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Accounting for the persistence of perceptible forms in the agent, rather than their uptake.
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1.4:
(qq)
…if the old man could recover the proper kind of eye, he would see just as well
as the young man. The incapacity of old age is due to an affection not of the soul but of
its vehicle, as occurs in drunkenness or disease (408b21-24).
Robinson’s reasoning here is that if sight is restored by the old man’s reacquisition of healthy
eyes, then the power of sight must have still been present (albeit in a dormant state) during the
interim between the destruction of the man’s original eyes, and his acquisition of new eyes. Or,
in other words, that although the destruction or removal of the organ of sight may be an
impediment to the visual power’s ability to proceed from first to second-order actuality, the
power nevertheless persists as a first-order actuality,151 due to the man’s possession of the
right kind of soul.152 And that therefore, the power of sight—at least as a first-order actuality—
must be proper to the soul itself, and separable from the organs of sight. Assuming that this
holds true of the other senses as well, it would seem that Robinson’s argument enables us to
advance the claim that each individual sense is capable of being disengaged from its respective
sensory organ.
And if this is right, then we ought to be able to extrapolate in order to make a similar point
about each of the various manifestations of the imaginative faculty. The idea here would be
that because imagination is directly predicated on perception—and because it is so subtly
distinguished from perception153—the destruction of the old man’s eyes would have resulted
not only in the termination of his ability to (actually) see, but also, simultaneously, in the
termination of his ability to acquire visual images. And in the absence of any concrete reason
for thinking otherwise, it seems reasonable to assume that the restoration of the man’s ability
to see, upon receiving new eyes, would be accompanied by a restoration of his ability to
acquire visual images. From which we can draw the conclusion that each of the individual
imaginative powers is separable from its respective sensory organ, by the same token that its
underpinning sensory power is.
The problem with this strategy is that it assumes that if the imaginative faculty turns out to be
separable from the sensory organs, then so too must be any images which had already been
imprinted in the faculty, prior to its disengagement from the sensory-organs. And this
assumption might not be warranted. It might rather be the case that, when the faculty itself is
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Which is really just to say that the man is still the kind of organism which, in optimal condition, would have the
capacity to actually perceive.
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Namely, a perceptual or animal soul.
153
Recall Aristotle’s remark, from passage (ll), that “the faculty of imagination is identical with that of senseperception,” though “different in its being.”
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disengaged from the sensory organs, its imprinted contents are reset, so that it is essentially a
blank slate—i.e. a formal power containing no qualitative formal content.154
In order to determine which of these two options is more plausible, we might consider posing
the following question about the hypothetical old man with the transplanted eyes: What would
the outcome be on Aristotle’s view if, after having had his sight restored by the acquisition of
new eyes, the old man were to be presented with objects which he had previously seen with his
original eyes before they were destroyed? Would he recognize the objects? If so, then this
would seem to confirm that images—which we know to be key to Aristotle’s conception of
memory—persist within the soul, independently of the organs through which they entered the
soul. And since it seems uncharitable to suppose that Aristotle would not grant to blind
individuals the capacity for remembering what previously viewed objects looked like,155 we
might therefore be inclined to draw the conclusion that images are indeed capable of being
disengaged from the sensory organs, along with the faculty of imagination itself.
One potential problem with this line of thinking is that although images might very well be
separable from the specific sensory organs through which they entered the soul, this might not
entail their separability from the body as a whole. An alternative explanation of the persistence
of images within the soul following the destruction of their specific entry-way organ might be
that, having entered through the doorway provided by a particular sensory-organ, images are
subsequently transferred to some other organ. If this is right, then the persistence of images
within the soul following the destruction of their specific entryway-organ might not actually
give us any reason for thinking that images are capable of attaining any persistence in the soul
which isn’t also, simultaneously, a persistence within the body.
And there are good reasons for thinking that images are transferred to another organ. Firstly,
Aristotle seems to think that images, having once been introduced into the soul through one or
another of the special sensory organs, are subsequently carried about in the blood. The
following passage, from the third chapter of the De Insomniis, communicates this point nicely:
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A helpful analogy might be the “Magic Slate.” This is a classic children’s toy comprised of an acetate sheet
placed over a wax surface, such that, when a stylus is pressed against the acetate (pushing it into more direct
contact with the wax), impressions are made on the acetate. These impressions remain in the acetate until the
sheet is lifted out of direct contact with the wax. When the acetate is lifted from the wax backdrop, the
impressions disappear. In the scenario that I am suggesting, the acetate sheet would represent the imaginative
faculty, and the wax surface would represent a sensory organ. The act of drawing on the slate would represent the
stimulation of the sensory organ (together with the psychic faculties associated with it), by a perceptible object.
And the impressions left on the acetate would represent images. The co-affection of the acetate together with the
wax would represent the fact that the presence of images in the soul supervenes on their presence in the sensory
organ. The lifting of the acetate sheet from the wax surface would represent the dissociation of the imaginative
faculty from the sensory organ. And the vanishing of the impressions from the acetate sheet would represent the
resetting of the imaginative faculty’s store of intentional content, upon its dissociation from the sensory-organ.
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Though it may be perfectly reasonable to suppose that he might have thought that such recollection fades over
time.
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(rr) …they [images] are within the soul potentially, but actualize themselves only when the
impediment to their doing so has been relaxed; and according as they are thus set free,
they begin to move in the blood which remains in the sensory organs, and which is now
but scanty, and take on likenesses after the manner of cloud-shapes, which in their
rapid metamorphoses one compares now to human beings and a moment afterwards to
centaurs. Each of them is however, as has been said, the remnant of a sensory
impression taken when sense was actualizing itself; and when this, the true impression,
has departed, its remnant is still there… (460b28-462a7).
He also says, in Somn. et Vig. 3, that:
(ss) …the veins are the place of the blood, while the origin of these is the heart" (456b1-2).
Taken together, these two claims open up the possibility that images, having entered the blood
through a given sensory-organ, are capable of travelling, by way of the blood (as it travels
through the veins), from the sensory organ to the heart.
We can construct a second, parallel argument for this view, beginning with Aristotle’s claim, in
the first chapter of the De Mem et. Rem, that:
(tt) …the image is an affection of the common sense (450a11-12).
Recalling our discussion of Wallace, in the first section of this chapter, the common sense is
what enables us to distinguish between the reports of the individual senses, to perceive
common properties, and to recognize our perceptions as our perceptions. Together, these
interlocking sub-functions satisfy the conditions necessary for the disparate reports of the
individual senses to be synthesized into coherent representations of objects as objects. So that
when Aristotle says, in passage (tt), that “the image is an affection of the common sense,” he is
referring specifically to the fully assembled image of an object. However, the passage can also
be understood to be implicitly making a weaker claim about the more basic particulate-images
(i.e. colours, tastes, sounds…etc.), out of which the object-image is assembled. Since the object
image is comprised of particulate-images, and since the object-image is assembled by the
common sense, it follows that, although they may have their origin in the individual special
senses, the particulate-images must pass through the common sense in order to be processed
by it and incorporated into the object-image.
From passage (tt), we can therefore derive the premise that all images bear some relation to
the common sense; object-images are derived from it, whereas particulate-images pass
through and are processed by it. In order to complete our argument, we need only combine
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this premise with another of Aristotle’s claims, from Juv et. Resp. 3, that the heart is the locus
of the common sense:
(uu)
Certainly, however, all sanguineous animals have the supreme organ of the
sense-faculties in the heart, for it is here that we must look for the common sensorium
belonging to all the sense-organs (469a10-12).
If the common sense is housed within the heart, then the fact that all images bear some
relation to the common sense—either as input or output—illustrates that they must bear the
same relation to the heart. Since object-images are assembled by the common sense, it follows
that object-images (as such) come into being in the heart. And since particulate-images
originate with the special sensory powers but are subsequently processed by the common
sense, it follows that they must travel from the peripheral sensory-organs to the heart to be
processed. The foregoing argument, based upon the mobility of images in the bloodstream,
provides us with some insight as to how they complete this journey.
One might attempt to counter these arguments by citing the intervening period—during which
an image is in transit from a peripheral sensory organ to the heart—as evidence that images
don’t necessarily require a sensory organ within which to be instantiated. However, the fact
remains that during this interval of transit, the images are nevertheless expressed in a material
substratum contained within the body (namely, the blood). So that this organless transit-period
does not give us any reason for thinking that images are capable of attaining any persistence
within the soul which isn’t simultaneously a persistence within the body.
With that said, it seems to me that there is only one remaining strategy for motivating the idea
that images can persist in the soul independently of the body: one would need to argue that
images are capable of persisting within the soul, following the death of the body.
In order for an affirmative answer to this question to even be possible, a strongly dualistic
reading of Aristotle—according to which the soul as a whole is capable of persisting
independently of the body—would need to be on the table. Of course, it goes without saying
that this cannot be true of soul per se in relation to body per se; Aristotle defines psyche as the
form of the body in the second book of the DA and from this, he derives the conclusion that
soul is, generally speaking, inseparable from body.156 The question is whether the human soul
might constitute some sort of an exception to this rule.157 And Aristotle does entertain the
156

Which rules out any notion that the souls of plants or nonrational animals might be capable of becoming
disengaged from their bodies.
157
And although I do not personally subscribe to such a reading, it must be acknowledged that there have been
many notable commentators—even some relatively recent ones—who have defended such a reading. Robinson,
for example, cites passage (qq) in support of a strong dualistic reading of Aristotle; his rationale being that if the
perceptual powers are capable of persisting in the absence of functional sensory organs, then the same must be
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possibility that the human soul—or at least a part of it—might be an exception; recall the
conditional from DA 1.1, stating that:

(vv)
If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be
capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible
(403a10-11).
And as I’d also noted above, the antecedent of this conditional does appear to be satisfied by
Aristotle’s claim, in passage (mm), that thought involves no organ. The consequent is further
corroborated by the following passage, from DA 2.2.
(ww)
…it [i.e. thought or the power of reflection] seems to be a different kind of soul,
differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of being
separated (413b25-27).
It would seem, then, that there is a reasonably strong prima facie case to be made that the
human intellect is separable from the body. As to whether this would entail the mutual
separability of the other psychic faculties (including the faculty of imagination), it will depend
upon Aristotle’s answer to the question of,
(xx) …whether each of these [i.e. the psychic faculties] is an attribute of the soul as a whole,
i.e. whether it is with the whole soul we think, perceive, move ourselves, act or are
acted upon, or whether each of them requires a different part of the soul? (411a29-b2).
If each psychic faculty is an attribute of the soul as a whole,158 then it seems that the
separability of nous would entail the mutual separability of all the other psychic faculties—most
significantly for our purposes, the imagination. On the other hand, if each faculty requires a
different part of the soul,159 then the separability of nous would likely only entail the
separability of the intellectual faculty.

true of the soul more broadly, in relation to the body more broadly. We might call this a bottom-up demonstration
of Aristotle’s dualism (as contrasted with the usual approach, which begins by illustrating the separability of the
intellect).
158
i.e. If the soul is a metaphysically simple unity.
159
i.e. If the soul is composed of divisible parts.
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Now, Aristotle does seem to genuinely struggle with the question of whether the soul is a
metaphysically simple unity, or whether it is a composite of potentially divisible parts.160
However, the bulk of the textual evidence seems to me to indicate that Aristotle preferred to
think of a soul as a unity.161 In DA 1.5, between 411b5 and 411b31, Aristotle offers up a threepronged argument against the idea that a given soul is composed of divisible parts.
Firstly, he reasons that if the soul were composed of divisible parts, then there would have to
be some principle which holds all of these parts together. He rules out the body, on the grounds
that it seems rather to be the case that the soul holds the body together.162 But he then
observes that anything other than the body which could conceivably hold the parts of the soul
together would be more appropriately termed “soul” than the things that it holds together. At
which point we’d need to ask whether it too is composed of divisible parts (and if so, what
holds those parts together, and so on ad infinitum). Secondly, Aristotle points out that if the
whole soul holds together the whole body, and if it is composed of divisible parts, then we
would expect each part of the soul to hold together a particular part of the body; which, as he
has already pointed out, appears not to be the case with intellect, since thought corresponds to
no organ. Thirdly, he points out that when certain animals and plants are divided into
segments, the parts continue to exhibit all of the psychic capacities that characterised the
entire organism, which suggests that souls are homogeneous.163
Given the weight of the evidence suggesting that Aristotle regarded each soul as a unity rather
than a composite of divisible parts, there seems to me to be a fairly strong presumption that
the separability of nous would entail the separability of the entire human soul, along with all of
its other psychic capacities—most significantly for our purposes, the faculty of imagination.
And so, given that there is a prima facie case to be made for the view that the intellect is
separable from the body, it looks as though there is also (by the same token) a reasonably
strong prima facie case to be made for the view that the faculty of imagination can persist in
the absence of the body.
Of course, even if this is the correct view, it is still not obvious that this would necessitate the
retention of the imaginative faculty’s store of previously imprinted images.164 We can be sure,
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This tension is reflected in the inconsistency of Aristotle’s language, when referring to the soul and its faculties;
he wavers in various places, between speaking of “parts” (merē) of the soul, and “kinds” (genē) of soul.
161

In other words, Alexander had it right. Aquinas and Robinson also held this view, but I want to emphasize
Alexander here because he stands apart from these others in combining the unified-soul hypothesis with a
naturalistic reading of Aristotle. I’m going to defend a variation on Alexander’s naturalistic thesis in the next
chapter.
162
As evidenced by the fact that the body disintegrates once the soul departs.
163
He repeats this point later on, in DA 2.2.
164
Since, as we have discussed above, it is still possible that imaginative content might be reset upon the faculty’s
separation from the body, like the Magic Slate.
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at least, that disembodiment would cause the cessation of the imaginative faculty’s capacity for
acquiring new images, since this is predicated on the perceptual faculty’s ability to proceed
from first to second-order actuality, which we know to be impeded even when an individual
perceptual organ such as an eye is compromised.165
But the really pivotal question, if we wish to determine whether already-acquired images are
capable of being separated from the body along with the human imaginative faculty itself, is
whether we have any grounds for thinking that a disembodied human soul would, on Aristotle’s
view, retain memories of the perceptible objects that it had encountered during its embodied
life.
The most plausible answer, based upon the available textual evidence, is that it would not. In
spite of a substantial number of passages peppered throughout the DA which suggest that nous
(and probably the rest of the human soul along with it) is separable from the body, Aristotle has
very little to say about the character of its post-mortem existence; and what little he does say
appears to disconfirm the idea that it retains previously imprinted images.
(yy)
“When separated it is alone just what it is, and this above is immortal and
eternal (we do not remember because, while this is impossible, passive thought is
perishable)” (430a22-26).
Besides which, if the generation of learned thoughts simply consisted in the disengagement of
the formal content of images from the matter of the bodily organs, and if images are only
capable of becoming disengaged from the bodily organs when the entire soul becomes
disengaged at the moment of bodily death, this would imply that people can only think when
they die. This, in addition to conflicting with passage (yy), is a rather bizarre and unempirical
notion.
Since we have been unable to motivate the notion that images can be disengaged from the
matter of the body,166 it would seem that a strong Thinking-Model of Imagination is definitively
refuted by the fact that images, but not thoughts, are always blended with the body.

165

We should probably infer from this that the capacities for nutrition, growth, reproduction, locomotion…etc.
would also be disabled by the soul’s disembodiment, since these seem to be activities which, by definition, are
undergone by a body. That said, Aristotle’s acknowledgement, in passage (qq), that the power of sight would be
restored by the replacement of the faulty eye, seems to warrant the counterfactual supposition that these other
more rudimentary activities would also be restored, were the soul as a whole to be re-embodied after death.
166
Neither in general (since the animal soul is inseparable from the body), nor in exceptional cases such as the
human soul (since we have found that, even if the human soul is separable from the body, it is apparently
incapable of retaining its store of memory-images following its dissociation from the body).
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3.7. Revisiting Lowe’s Apprehensive Thought.
In the third section of this chapter, I’d invoked Lowe’s distinction between apprehensive vs.
autonomous thought in order to cast doubt on the notion that non-human animals couldn’t
possibly be endowed with any form of thought for Aristotle. And in the fourth section, I’d relied
on two claims about the nature of apprehensive thought—with which I think Lowe would
agree—in order to illustrate that imagination and thought aren’t necessarily incompatible for
the reasons that Wedin cites: Firstly, apprehensive thought takes concrete particulars for its
intentional content, and secondly, it does so in a way that needn’t necessarily be construed as
propositional.
But in so doing, I hadn’t necessarily meant to commit myself to Lowe’s understanding of
apprehensive thought, nor to definitively endorse the strong Thinking-Model of Imagination.167
The purpose of the aforementioned sections was to present the strongest possible case that
could be made for the strong Thinking-Model, before acknowledging its insurmountable
difficulties (sketched out in the previous section) and moving on to my discussion of the
moderate Thinking-Model (forthcoming in Ch. 4). And this does not require a firm commitment
to Lowe’s conception of apprehensive thought; it only requires that this conception be
defensible. And I still maintain that is defensible, for a number of reasons.
For one thing, Aristotle’s sudden shift to the subject of essence-grasping, following his
articulation of the distinction between apprehensive and autonomous thought, in passage (r),
really does strike me as a plausible indication that he regards abstraction as a form of
autonomous thinking. And if this is correct, then it would require that apprehensive thought, as
a prerequisite for autonomous thinking, must concern concrete particulars.
For another, Lowe had theorized that apprehensive thought is caused and informed directly by
perception (which would give us a pretty good explanation as to why it denotes particulars),
whereas autonomous thought proceeds by means of images. And there is direct textual
evidence to support both of these claims. As we’ve seen already, passage (ee) seems to affirm
the former claim, specifying that it is through perception that particulars168 come to be present
in the mind. And passage (hh)—when read in its broader context—seems to affirm both claims
simultaneously.
(hh) The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images and as in the former case
what is to be pursued or avoided is marked out for it, so where there is no sensation and it
is engaged upon the images it is moved to pursuit or avoidance. E.g. perceiving by sense
that the beacon is fire, it [i.e. the mind] recognizes in virtue of the general faculty of sense
that it signifies an enemy, because it sees it moving; but sometimes by means of images or
167
168

Though that was admittedly my aim in an earlier version of my thesis.
Qua primitive universal.
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thoughts which are within the soul, just as if it were seeing, it calculates what is to come by
reference to what is present.”
Here, Aristotle contrasts the autonomous process of calculation (logizetai)—which is said to
proceed by means of images (or thoughts)169—with another form of thought, which proceeds
by means of sensation. Moreover, Aristotle’s description of the intentional content of this
perceptually informed species of thought matches Lowe’s description of the intentional content
of apprehensive thought almost perfectly; he designates it as that by which we recognize “that
the beacon is fire, [or]…that it signifies an enemy.”170 Whereas Lowe had described
apprehensive thought as that by which we “judge concrete examples of flesh to be flesh.”
Granted, these do seem to be explicitly propositional judgments about particular objects that
Aristotle and Lowe are attributing to the apprehensive mind. But as I’d established above, it is
perfectly feasible to reframe this non-literally, as indicating some sort of a baseline recognition
of the object,171 which may or may not be subsequently expressed in propositional terms, given
the proper cognitive machinery.
Finally, it seems to me that Lowe’s conception of apprehensive thought (as concerning
particular substances) fits much more comfortably into the gradational view of the animal
world advanced by Aristotle between passages (o) through (q), than would the standard notion
that Aristotelian thought necessarily concerns universals. Recall that according to the
gradational view, “…all forms of life lead gradually up to man as the perfect development of
what is contained implicitly and imperfectly in lower forms” (Wallace, li). But if this is really the
case, then we should expect non-human animals to exhibit at least some sort of rudimentary
thought-form, rather than there being an abrupt disconnect between non-human and human
animals with respect to thought. And while there seems to be nothing particularly outlandish
about the suggestion that non-human animals might possess an intellectual awareness of
particulars, it strains credulity to suppose that they are capable of grasping essences. Thus, if
we wish to make good sense of the gradational picture proposed between passages (o) through
(q), it seems to me that we have a fairly strong motivation for adopting Lowe’s conception of
apprehensive thought.
With all of that said, there are still some difficulties with Lowe’s understanding of apprehensive
thought, which incline me to want to step away from it. For instance, although Aristotle does
indicate, in passage (ee), that the faculty of perception is the initial point of entry through
which particulars come to present themselves before the mind, he also indicates, in passage
(ff), that it is imagination, rather than perception as such, which constitutes the really pivotal
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I’ll have more to say about this caveat in the final chapter of my discussion.
Implying judgements of the form “This thing here is fire,” or “This thing here is enemy.”
171
“Aha, flesh!” aha, “fire!”
170
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prerequisite for knowledge acquisition.172 But the story that Lowe tells about human cognition
doesn’t seem to assign any mediating role to the imagination in the activation of apprehensive
thought whatsoever, let alone a pivotal one. Nor does this appear to be an oversight on Lowe’s
part; rather, as we have seen already, it appears to be a key feature of Lowe’s narrative that
apprehensive thought is directly sensory-induced, just as we know imagination to be, based on
passage (a).
And to be fair to Lowe, passage (hh) does seem to reaffirm passage (ee)’s original suggestion
that thought of particulars proceeds directly by means of perception; in fact, the entire point of
passage (hh) is to stress that calculation is unlike apprehensive thought in that it proceeds by
means of images (or thoughts)173 instead of sensation. Which, again, is one of the main reasons
why I maintain that Lowe’s conception of apprehensive thought is still textually defensible,
passage (ff) notwithstanding. But it also generates a rather serious conceptual difficulty for
Lowe, which becomes evident when we recall the list of commonalities that I’d noted between
imagination and apprehensive thought in the fifth section of this chapter, as well as the
conclusion that I’d drawn in the foregoing section (i.e., that images cannot be identical with
apprehended thoughts, because this would require that apprehended thoughts are registered
in the bodily organs).
In the fifth section of this chapter, I had stressed that imagination and Lowe’s apprehensive
thought share, among other things, the properties of being sensory-induced and prerequisites
for autonomous thought. Moreover, I’d opined, on the basis of these and all of their other
similarities, that it was understandable that Wallace should have arrived at the conclusion that,
“…the images of our imaginative faculty often approximate closely to the ideas of thought.”
(Wallace, xciii) However, I’d also entertained the possibility that imagination and apprehensive
thought might be asymmetrical in that, whereas imagination is directly caused by sensation,
apprehensive thought is only indirectly caused by sensation (meaning that it is in some sense
mediated by the imagination, as passage (ff) seems to suggest).174 If correct, this would enable
us to draw a clear distinction between imagination and apprehensive thought. But such an
addendum seems to be precluded for Lowe, by his conviction—which, again, in all fairness,
does appear to be supported by passage (hh)—that apprehensive thought is directly sensoryinduced. And without such an addendum, it is extremely difficult to fathom why Lowe should
feel the need to posit the existence of apprehensive thought, in addition to the imagination.
For instance, if the imagination and apprehensive thought are both directly sensory-induced
and bear no causal relation to one another besides sharing that common point of origin, then it
would seem to follow that they share the same intentional content. But if this is true, then it
172

i.e. He’d argued that although perception is a prerequisite for knowledge acquisition in an indirect sense,
animals without phantasia are incapable of acquiring any real knowledge.
173
Again, more on this in the final chapter.
174
Which would also mean that, whereas apprehensive thought is a direct prerequisite for autonomous thought,
imagination is only an indirect prerequisite.
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becomes rather challenging to explain why both should be necessary prerequisites for
autonomous thought-forms.
The most intuitive account of their respective contributions to autonomous thought—at least
to someone of Wedin’s sensibilities—would likely be that each makes a necessary but
insufficient contribution to our ability to engage in autonomous though-acts, thereby (together)
filling out the necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomous thought-acts to occur. For
example, in the case of deliberative action, the idea might be that the apprehensive mind
provides the universal terms that the autonomous mind will make use of when deliberating
about what is to be pursued or avoided in a given situation, whereas the imagination picks out
the particular items about which such calculations are made. But this solution is unavailable to
Lowe, since, on his view, apprehensive thought does not denote universals, but rather (like the
imagination), particulars.
In light of this, it would seem that any contribution made to deliberative action by the
apprehensive mind would have to pertain to the grasping of the particular items about which
the calculations are being made. But since images are already capable of doing this, it is unclear
why we should need to posit apprehensive thought as an additional prerequisite for these sorts
of calculations—unless it contributes something to our awareness of the relevant particulars
which the imagination is not equipped to contribute. For example, one might suggest that
because apprehensive thought is an intellectual faculty, perhaps its singular contribution
consists in furnishing us with an enhanced understanding (as opposed to mere awareness) of
the particular objects under deliberation. But this solution isn’t available to Lowe either, since,
on his view, apprehensive thought precedes abstraction and therefore (as I had pointed out in
Ch. 3.4.3) cannot be said to entail any prior familiarity with the relevant essences, upon which
we would expect such an understanding to be founded.
This all puts Lowe into a rather awkward position, as why should perception be thought to
generate two distinct and otherwise causally unrelated by-products, particularly if they have
the exact same intentional content, and make the exact same contribution to autonomous
thought? Wouldn’t it be more economical to posit only one direct by-product of perception
which mediates our ability to think autonomously by picking out the particular objects about
which the autonomous mind makes calculations? Why draw any distinction at all between
apprehensive thought and the imagination, if their relations to perception and autonomous
thought are as Lowe describes them? 175
These observations—coupled with the foregoing list of commonalities between imagination
and Lowe’s apprehensive thought—are why, from the earliest drafts of my thesis, I’d suspected
that what Lowe calls “apprehensive thought” might simply be the imagination. In the earlier
175

Recall that we had encountered this problem in the first chapter, while surveying Wedin’s claim that both
images and noemata serve as simple terms helping to fill out the structure of linguistic propositional complexes.
Wedin had resolved the problem by claiming that noemata denote universals, rather than particulars.
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drafts, my inclination was to magnify this into a radical claim about the metaphysical status of
images;176 hence my earlier sympathies with the strong Thinking-Model of Imagination. But,
given the finding of the previous section of this chapter—that the formal content of images is
incapable of becoming fully disengaged from the matter of the body—it now seems clear that
such a notion would be untenable.
In order to avoid the impossible conclusion that images and apprehended thoughts are the
same, Lowe would need to do one of two things. Firstly, he might abandon the notion that
apprehensive thought is directly sensory-induced and, in deference to passage (ff), specify
some sort of causal relation between images and apprehended thoughts (as he conceptualizes
them), by reference to which a clear distinction might be drawn between them, and distinct
causal roles assigned to them in the enabling of autonomous thought-acts. Ideally, this causal
relation would need to reflect at least some sort of differential in the intentional content of
images and apprehended thoughts, as this would aid in the justification of their mutual
necessity as distinct prerequisites for autonomous thought-forms. It also seems reasonable to
expect that this causal relation should offer us some insight as to how an incorporeal cognitive
state could emerge from corporeal ones (since we’re trying to avoid the conclusion that
thoughts are registered in the bodily organs).
But while I would not want to make any premature declarations about Lowe’s inability to
successfully bring off this first approach, I must say that I am at a loss as to how he might do so.
Given that apprehensive thought denotes particulars on his view—and in a manner that cannot
be said to be informed by any prior familiarity with essences (since it precedes abstraction)—
any distinction that he attempts to draw between apprehended thoughts and images would
have to be an extremely subtle one. Moreover, the project of explaining the emergence of an
incorporeal intellectual faculty from corporeal origins is one that has eluded many historical
commentators, and it seems improbable that Lowe will be able to accomplish this feat within
the already very narrow strictures of his apprehensive vs autonomous thought dichotomy.
Alternatively, Lowe might abandon both the notion that apprehensive thought is directly
sensory-induced, and the notion that it denotes particulars—passages (ee) and (hh)
notwithstanding. This wouldn’t require a total upheaval of the distinction between
apprehensive and autonomous thought; insofar as it maps onto Aristotle’s distinction between
thought in its first-order actuality and thought in its second-order actuality, the apprehensive vs
autonomous thought dichotomy still strikes me as a useful one. What it would require is a
reconceptualization of the place that abstraction occupies, within this framework. Abstraction
would no longer be relegated to the category of autonomous thought, but would instead be
identical with apprehensive thought. Which would mean that apprehensive thought involves
the distillation of essences directly from images of particulars.177

176
177

i.e. That they are intrinsically noetic.
Interestingly, this would also entail that abstraction is involuntary.

86

This second approach would admittedly chafe against the aforementioned textual
considerations in favor of Lowe’s notion of apprehensive thought as being directly sensoryinduced and as denoting particular objects. However, it would also enable Lowe to avoid the
difficulties with his theory, that I’ve outlined above. For one thing, it squares with passage (ff)’s
claim that the imagination not only plays a role in the generation of thoughts, but indeed, a
pivotal one.178 In so doing, it also gives us a clear distinction between imagination and
apprehensive thought, which would enable Lowe to avoid the impossible conclusion that
apprehended thoughts are registered in the bodily organs. Moreover, since this distinction
operates at the level of intentional content (images denote particulars, whereas apprehended
thoughts denote essences), it would furnish him with a coherent explanation as to why both
imagination and apprehensive thought are prerequisites for autonomous thought-acts:
Whether or not images are strictly required to pick out the particular objects about which the
autonomous mind deliberates (a question I’ll return to in the next chapter179), there is certainly
nothing to prevent them from performing this function. And in any case, they will still be
indirect prerequisites for autonomous thought, since they are the pivotal causal precursors to
apprehended thoughts (i.e., universals)—which themselves are directly indispensable to
autonomous thought acts, since all autonomous thought acts make use of universals.
The only respect in which this reconceptualization of apprehensive thought would not
constitute a clear improvement upon Lowe’s formulation is that it does not (in itself, anyway)
provide us with any additional insight as to how an incorporeal faculty could emerge out of
corporeal ones. But the relative ease with which it resolves the other problems with Lowe’s
formulation strikes me as justification enough for adopting it. And besides, while it may not
offer its own explanation of the intellect’s emergence, it seems to me that it at least opens a
window for such an explanation, since it is perfectly consistent with the most plausible iteration
of a moderate Thinking-Model of Imagination, which—as we will see in the next chapter—does
contain an explanation of the intellect’s emergence. I turn my attention now to the moderate
Thinking-Model of Imagination.
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i.e., it retains representations of perceptible objects, from which we are enabled to distill the corresponding
essences once the perceptible objects have been removed from contact with our sensory-organs.
179
Passage (hh) says that calculation may proceed by means of “images or thoughts,” and it’s worth remembering
that passage (gg) says something similar.
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Chapter 4: The Moderate Thinking-Model
4.1. A Disposition in the Imagination
We have found that a strong Thinking-Model of Imagination which simply identifies images with
apprehended thoughts is untenable because the persistence of the formal content of images
within the soul (which accounts for our first-hand experience of that formal content)
supervenes on its persistence within the sensory-organs, whereas the persistence of the formal
content of apprehended thoughts within the soul does not. We have also found that, although
the formal content of images is capable of being transferred from one organ to another by way
of the blood, it is incapable of becoming entirely disengaged from the matter of the body,
which rules out the possibility that images might become apprehended thoughts in this
manner.
That said, we might still entertain a hypothesis according to which images can contribute to the
generation of apprehended thoughts, solely by virtue of their formal content. And, depending
on how we choose to flesh this hypothesis out, it may provide us with support for the more
moderate view—entertained by Aristotle in passages (c), (e) and (f)’—that images sometimes
have a certain degree of authentic noetic status.180
This final chapter will examine a hypothesis which treats the material intellect as a disposition
residing specifically in the formal content of the activated imaginative faculty. To clarify, this
hypothesis would not entail that the activation of the imaginative faculty is sufficient to activate
the material intellect (otherwise we’d be back to the strong Thinking-Model). Rather, the
hypothesis is that apprehended thoughts come into being in some sense from the formal
content contained within the activated imaginative faculty, provided that certain additional
conditions are met.

4.2. The History of the Dispositional View
Although he did not hold to it personally, the history of the idea that the material intellect is a
disposition residing in the imagination begins with Alexander. As I had explained in the second
chapter of my discussion, Alexander had construed the material intellect as a disposition in
order to bolster his belief in its inseparability from the other psychic faculties (and the body),
against the seemingly dualistic implications of Aristotle’s remark, from DA 3.4, that intelligible
forms must be potentially within the mind, “…just as characters may be said to be [potentially]
on a writing-table on which as yet nothing actually stands written” (429b30-430a1). Rather than
180

At least while they are making their contribution to the generation of learned thoughts.
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interpreting this analogy as likening the mind to the writing-tablet itself (which would have
entailed that the material intellect is a potentially separable subject that is acted upon when it
apprehends intelligible objects), Alexander had read it as likening the mind instead to the
tablet’s disposition for being written upon.
But while this may have been an effective means of avoiding the implication that the material
intellect is a potentially separable subject, it does generate an additional problem for
Alexander, stemming from his identification of the subject within which the intellectual
disposition inheres.181 As I’d also noted in my second chapter, Alexander had located the
intellectual disposition in the soul (broadly construed), and since he regards the soul as an
embodied unity, this makes it very difficult for him to avoid the implication that the material
intellect makes use of the body when it apprehends intelligible objects. This seems to put
Alexander’s dispositional reading squarely at odds with Aristotle’s main contention in DA 3.4,
that there is no intellectual organ.
As to Alexander’s proposed solution to this problem—i.e. invoking the notion of “common
forms,” which result from the coalescence of other, inferior forms, and which, in so doing,
achieve some manner of functional independence from matter—we had found that it was illequipped to explain why the intellect should be the sole exception to the rule that the activity
of psychic faculties involves alterations in bodily organs. After all, on Alexander’s understanding
of hylomorphism, all formal powers except for those of the primary bodies fall under the
category of “common forms.” And so we had found that, barring some additional explanation
as to what is so special about the intellectual faculty (which Alexander seemed unable to
proffer) each of the remaining psychic faculties would have a claim to functional independence
from matter, by the same token that the intellect supposedly does.
The notion that the material intellect is a disposition inhering more specifically in the activated
imaginative faculty was developed in response to these problems, as we shall see in the next
section.

4.2.1. Ibn Bajjah (Avempace)
Ibn Bajjah (1085-1139)—known as Avempace in Latin—is the first commentator reported to
have held the view that the material intellect is a disposition inhering specifically in the
activated imaginative faculty, though it would be difficult to find any explicit statement of this
position in his extant writings. This is likely due to the fact that the most pertinent text by
Avempace182 has not survived in its entirety, and it is in precisely the missing section that we
would expect to find this position laid out. As Herbert A. Davidson (1992) points out, “…the
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i.e. The “tablet” with the capacity for being written upon.
i.e. The Kitab al-Nafs, also known as his De Anima. In the introduction to his 1958 translation of the text, M.S.
Hasan describes it with only mild reservations as a paraphrase of Aristotle’s De Anima. (pg. 2)
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published text [of Ibn Bajjah’s De Anima] …breaks off tantalizingly in the middle of the
discussion of intellect” (Davidson, pg. 261). Nonetheless, Averroes attributes this position to
Avempace in his (Averroes’) Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, and Davidson
speculates that this is because Averroes had found the position articulated in the now missing
section of Avempace’s De Anima, to which he would have had access.183
Avempace’s description of the material intellect as a “disposition” is reminiscent of Alexander’s
project, and Davidson confirms that Avempace was in fact sympathetic to Alexander: “A
comment in one of Ibn Bajja's works, which is corroborated by Averroes' report of Ibn Bajja's
position, places him close to Alexander” (Davidson, 258). That said, it would be misleading to
suggest that Avempace was in complete agreement with Alexander; his construal of the
material intellect “as a disposition located specifically in the imaginative faculty,” constitutes a
significant departure from Alexander, who had construed it, “more generally, as a disposition
residing in the human subject or the human soul” (Davidson, 274).
According to Davidson, what Avempace means by saying that the material intellect is a
disposition in the imaginative faculty is that the imaginative faculty serves, in some sense, as,
“…the “substratum of intellectual thoughts" in man” (Davidson, 286).184 From this, we can infer
that learned thoughts emerge—on Avempace’s view—as a result of a process of change
undergone in some sense by images. And Davidson seems to confirm this when he attributes to
Avempace the view that, “the ‘notions it [the imagination] contains…become actual intelligible
thoughts’” (Davidson, 286).185 As to the question of how this transformative process is brought
about on Avempace’s view, a more detailed account can be found in the introduction to
Richard C. Taylor’s 2009 translation of Averroes’ Long Commentary on the De Anima.
According to Taylor, the actualization of the material intellect from its potential state as a
disposition in the imagination occurs, for Avempace, when, “The agent intellect illuminates the
images of things in the imagination in such a way that human understanding of intelligibles
comes about” (Taylor, xxvi). When this illumination occurs, the imaginative faculty, “…acquires
the intelligible as a second form” (Taylor, xxvi). The idea here therefore seems to be something
analogous to the manner in which a statue of Hermes, when painted, acquires a new form (i.e.,
a color), such that it remains a statue of Hermes, but is now a colored statue of Hermes.186
Evidently then, Avempace wished to convey that the formal content of the image persists
through the process by which the apprehended thought is brought about, making the thought
183

Davidson also speculates that Averroes derived the position by drawing out the implications of certain
comments made by Avempace in his Treatise on the Conjoining of the Intellect with Man.
184
The wording here comes from Averroes’ description of Avempace’s position, in his Long Commentary. Notice
also that no matter how this position is ultimately unpacked, it will serve as a confirmation of Aristotle’s claim,
from passage (ff), that there can be no knowledge acquisition without the imagination.
185
Again, Davidson is quoting Averroes’ exegesis of Avempace, from the Long Commentary.
186
The analogy to the statue’s acquisition of color is particularly appropriate, as the generation of intelligibles from
the formal content of images is said by Avempace to be trigged by a process akin to illumination, and light, for
Aristotle, is responsible for turning potential colors into actual colors.
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effectively an image with some additional predicate.187 Such, at least, appears to be the upshot
of Taylor’s attribution, to Avempace, of the view that each of the intelligibles which results
from the agent intellect’s illumination of the imagination is, “a form having as its matter the
intermediate spiritual forms of the imagination” (Taylor, xxvii).
As to the question of why Avempace relocated the disposition of the material intellect
specifically to the imaginative faculty,188 Davidson suggests that he, “…wished to ‘escape the
absurdities attaching themselves to Alexander’” (Davidson, 286). By this he means Alexander’s
unintended construal of the material intellect, “…as a part of the human body or as a faculty
inhering in it189 (Davidson, 286). This complaint should sound familiar, as it is essentially the
same critique that I had raised against Alexander’s position, above, in my second chapter (and
which I reiterated at the beginning of this section). Recall that Alexander’s construal of the
material intellect as a disposition inhering in the soul (or the human subject) more broadly had
placed him at odds with Aristotle’s claim that the intellect makes no use of the body when it
thinks. Given that the soul is an embodied unity for Alexander and given that the human
subject is very much a bodily entity, to describe the material intellect as a disposition inhering
in the soul or the human subject more broadly really isn’t substantially any different from
describing it as a disposition of the body for undergoing some sort of alteration. Recall also that
Alexander’s attempt to resolve this problem by appealing to the notion of “common forms” had
been unsuccessful, since this concept is broadly applicable to most formal powers and is
therefore ill-equipped to account for the supposed uniqueness of the intellect as a functionally
incorporeal faculty.
Of course, some might worry that Avempace’s revised formulation of the dispositional reading
also leads to the impossible result that the material intellect is a faculty inhering in the body.
After all, Avempace designates the images of the activated imaginative faculty as the proximate
substrata for the generation of learned thoughts, and images are said in DA 3.3 to reside in the
bodily organs. And so one might understandably expect that because the starting-point of the
transformative process that gives rise to learned thoughts is bodily, then so too must be the
product of this transformation.190 But while this would follow on the supposition that it is by
virtue of their complete hylomorphic composition191 that images serve as the substrata for the
generation of learned thoughts, it needs to be pointed out that this supposition betrays a
rather serious misunderstanding of Avempace’s intention in locating the human intellectual
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i.e., the intellectual analogue of color.
Rather than placing it more broadly in the human soul or human subject, as Alexander did.
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This is corroborated by Taylor. He explains Avempace’s decision to relocate the material intellect as a
disposition residing specifically in the imagination as an attempt to remedy what he saw as an “impossible result”
of Alexander’s more general location of it. Namely, that, “…the subject receiving the intelligible forms is a body
made from the elements or a power in a body” (Taylor, xc).
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i.e., There doesn’t seem to be any additional property that the statue of Hermes could acquire which would
make it incorporeal.
191
i.e. The formal content of images, in addition to the matter of their sensory organ.
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disposition within the activated imaginative faculty. In order to better understand how
Avempace’s reformulation of the dispositional reading succeeds in steering around Alexander’s
difficulty, it might therefore be helpful to unpack his notion of “intermediate spiritual forms” in
more detail. In so doing, we should keep in mind the observation from the second-to-last
section of our third chapter, that the formal content of images is capable of transit between the
bodily organs by way of the blood.
As for Avempace’s notion of “intermediate spiritual forms,” Davidson’s commentary contains a
sustained treatment of the subject, which can guide us in our efforts to convey the full nuance
of Avempace’s position. Davidson begins by clarifying that Avempace uses the phrase
“intermediate spiritual forms” to refer to, “…all levels of abstraction within the soul below the
level of intellect. (Davidson, 266) From this, we can glean at least one sense in which the
spiritual forms of the activated imaginative faculty qualify as “intermediate”: namely, in that
their intentional content serves as a sort of quasi-universal stepping-stone between our
apprehension of particular objects via perception and our apprehension of essences via
thought. Thus, at the level of intentional content, it would seem that Avempace is using
“intermediate spiritual forms” in just the same way that Aristotle had used “primitive
universals” in APo 2.19.192 It is also worth underscoring that this sub-intellectual abstraction is
said to occur within the soul itself. As we saw above in the third chapter, the activation of the
imaginative faculty can be parsed into two definitionally distinct aspects: (1) the retention of a
perceived form within a bodily organ (which is a magnitude), and (2) the retention of that form
within the imaginative power itself (which is not a magnitude). And it would appear that
Avempace was cognizant of this distinction. In addition to conveying intermediate intentional
content, Davidson adds that, for Avempace, the spiritual forms of the activated imaginative
faculty are also “intermediate” in the sense that they occupy an ontological status which falls
somewhere in between bodily substance and disembodied substance.193 And he indicates that
it is by virtue of their being contents of the soul that they occupy this status194—hence why
Avempace calls them “spiritual.”
Of course, one mustn’t forget that the retention of an imaginative form within the soul
supervenes on its retention within a bodily organ, and a genuine solution to the Alexandrian
difficulty requires more than just the ability to consider the former retention in isolation from
the latter; it requires that the formal contents of images—qua contents of the soul (i.e., qua
“spiritual”)195—be capable of doing and undergoing things in their own right. And this is
precisely the line that Avempace takes. The pivotal move of his position is to argue that it is qua
contents of the soul (i.e., qua “spiritual”) that imaginative forms serve as the subject of change
192

Aristotle states in Apo 2.19 that the perceptual faculty also makes us privy to primitive universals, but it is by
virtue of the imagination that we are able to retain them and derive thoughts from them in the absence of the
particularizing external matter of the perceptible object.
193
This latter might best be typified by the agent intellect.
194
Since the soul itself is neither a body nor an independent substance.
195
Excluding their bodily facet.
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in the generation of learned thoughts. Or, to frame this in terms of the writing-tablet analogy,
the idea would be that it is neither the body as such, nor even images qua components of the
body which correspond to the tablet (and which possess the ability to have intelligible forms
“written” upon them) but rather, just images insofar as their formal content has been taken up
by and incorporated into the soul.
Davidson credits Avempace with having arrived at this position by way of the following line of
reasoning: while the subject of the human intellectual disposition cannot itself be a body (since
according to Aristotle, there is no intellectual organ), neither can it be something wholly
disembodied (viz. an intellect), as this would be tantamount to abandoning the dispositional
view of the material intellect altogether, in favor of some version of the dualistic view.196 Thus,
he concludes that the subject of the human disposition for thought, “…being neither a body nor
an intellect…must be the only [other kind of] entity remaining, namely, "a soul" (Davidson,
268)—specifically, the imaginative soul.
On the supposition that one may speak coherently of imaginative forms qua contents of the
soul serving as a subject of change in their own right, this would enable Avempace to explain
the dependence of the material intellect upon the body without inadvertently committing
himself (as Alexander had done) to the absurd conclusion that the material intellect is itself
body or a power inhering in a body. This is because the intellectual disposition would in this
case inhere not in a bodily subject, but rather in a formal one which, though in the final analysis
dependent upon the body, would still possess a sufficient degree of independence to be
capable of serving as a subject of change in its own right. And it seems to me that the
observation from the penultimate section of my previous chapter—that the formal content of
images, insofar as it is registered in the body, is capable of transit between organs by way of the
blood—can be invoked in defense of the claim that the spiritual forms of the imaginative faculty
possess that requisite flavor of partial independence.197
Moreover, since the spiritual forms of the imaginative faculty are unique in their partial
independence from the matter of the bodily organs,198 it seems to me that Avempace’s version
of the dispositional reading is also well-equipped to explain the uniqueness of the material
intellect’s functional incorporeality without inadvertently extending that property downwards
to all the other psychic faculties, as Alexander had done. This is because, rather than appealing
to a broadly applicable concept like “common forms” in order to account for the intellect’s
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This, incidentally, is why Avempace’s use of the term “spiritual” should not be interpreted in the colloquial
sense, as signifying some sort of incorporeal substance.
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Although the resonance of an imaginative form within the soul does supervene on that form’s resonance within
some part of the body, it needn’t supervene on that form’s resonance within any particular part of the body. So
the “soul form” can to some extent be said to have its own life.
198
This seems to be corroborated by Josép Puig Montada (2018), who notes that “spiritual forms” are, for
Avempace, distinguished by their, “…having the capacity to move.”
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functional incorporeality, he chooses to explain it as resulting from the fulfillment of a partial
incorporeality which itself is unique to the spiritual forms of the activated imaginative faculty.
Thus, it seems to me that there is a fairly strong prima facie case to be made that Avempace’s
dispositional reading is in a better position than Alexander’s to avoid the conclusion that the
material intellect is functionally corporeal. I will have a bit more to say in a subsequent section
about the defensibility of Avempace’s claim that the “spiritual forms” of the imaginative faculty
are unique in their partial independence from the matter of the bodily organs. But for now, I
will close out this section by turning my attention to one final, rather awkward, aspect of
Avempace’s position. In addition to having construed the material intellect as a disposition
seated in the imaginative faculty and fulfilled by the illuminating influence of the agent
intellect, Davidson credits Avempace with having, “…held fast to the rule that intellect is
identical with whatever thought it thinks, and [with having] therefore concluded that a human
intellect having the active intellect as an object of thought [is] hence conjoined with the active
intellect [and] is rendered identical with the active intellect” (Davidson, 322).
This means that the material intellect is, on Avempace’s view, capable of transcending its
naturalistic origins and attaining immortality,199 though Davidson is careful to specify that this
does not amount to personal immortality for each individual human being. Since each individual
material intellect becomes identical with the agent intellect, this seems to require that, in so
doing, all of the various material intellects become one. And this can only be construed as a loss
of personal identity for each material intellect. Hence, Davidson writes that, on Avempace’s
view, “…individuality and all distinction between human intellects is inconceivable after the
body's demise” (Davidson, 203).200
To summarize, then, we have seen that Avempace regarded the material intellect as a
disposition inhering in the activated imaginative faculty, which is fulfilled by the illuminating
influence of the active intellect, as it effects a sort of qualitative change in the spiritual forms of
images, for which they serve as the “material” substrate. We have seen, moreover, that
Avempace intended this as a solution to the difficulty faced by Alexander’s emergentist reading
of Aristotle, and that this solution does in fact have some prima facie plausibility. Finally, we
have seen that Avempace regarded the material intellect as being capable of attaining a sort of
impersonal immortality, by conjoining with the active intellect. The consistency of this last point
with Avempace’s conception of the material intellect as a disposition is debatable and, as we
shall see below, induced considerable discomfort in his disciple, the early Averroes.

4.2.2. Averroes (early works)
199

This is described by Davidson as having been the culmination of the intellect’s development, on Avempace’s
view.
200
This is all corroborated by Taylor, who writes that, “In Ibn Bajjah’s understanding, individual human beings
employ the material intellect toward their realization of intellectual perfection in conjoining with the agent
intellect and attaining happiness in a unity with it and all human intellects” (Taylor, xxv).
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Davidson reports that Averroes, in his earlier period,201 held much the same view of the
material intellect that Avempace did.
For starters, he holds that, “…intelligible thoughts ‘follow upon change’" (Davidson, 266), and
that therefore, “…they are, after all, in a sense ‘necessarily possessed of matter’” (Davidson,
267).202 However, this should not be construed as meaning that thoughts derive directly from a
bodily substrate, as this would seem to require that thoughts are themselves bodily, which we
know to be impossible on Aristotelian terms, given his insistence that thoughts are not blended
with any of the bodily organs. Nor should it be construed as meaning that the material
substrate for the generation of learned thoughts is just the intellect, considered as a subject in
itself.203 Such an idea would, on Averroes’ view, violate Aristotle’s stipulation that, “…whatever
is some thing potentially cannot contain any of the same thing actually” (Davidson, 267). The
material intellect is a pure potentiality, and Averroes understands this to require that, rather
than being the subject for its own actualization, it is rather a disposition inhering in some other
(incorporeal) substrate.
As on Avempace’s view, “The substrata to which [thoughts] are "essentially" linked are,” on the
early Averroes’ view, “the imaginative faculties of individual human souls” (Davidson, 267). I
italicize “of individual human souls” here because Averroes intends to isolate the formal
contents of images only insofar as they are contents of the soul204 as the substrata for the
process of change which gives rise to intelligible thoughts. Intelligible thoughts therefore come
into being as the result of a change undergone by a quasi-corporeal substrate provided by the
activated imaginative faculty, within which those thoughts inhere (potentially) as a disposition.
So far this is all in perfect accordance with Avempace.
As to the question of whether the material intellect possesses the capacity for attaining
immortality by conjoining with the active intellect205 Davidson reports that, although Averroes
did not have strong opinions one way or the other at this early stage in his career, he did leave
open the possibility, and would grow more committed to the Avempacean answer, as his
thought developed. Though it should be noted that Averroes would grow increasingly
suspicious about the consistency of this position with his view of the material intellect as a
mere disposition, as I’ll discuss in more detail below.
Averroes’ early position on the material intellect is therefore (excepting a tinge of uncertainty
about the possibility of immortality through conjunction with the agent intellect) more or less
201

Exemplified by his Epitome of the De Anima, and his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction.
In accordance with the tenets of Aristotle’s theory of the mechanics of formal alteration, which always posits a
material substrate.
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Though this would also satisfy the condition that the substrate for thought should be incorporeal.
204
i.e., Insofar as they constitute what Avempace had termed “spiritual forms.” Davidson notes that Averroes calls
them “soul forms” (suwar nafsaniyya).
205
Which was vigorously confirmed by Avempace, as we have seen above.
202
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identical with Avempace’s. Moreover, Davidson—citing a retrospective annotation attached to
the Epitome by Averroes himself—reports that this is because Averroes was, initially at any
rate, inspired by his reading of Avempace. Hence, Averroes was, during his early period, more
or less a devotee of Avempace.

4.3. A Template for a Moderate Thinking-Model
Avempace’s variation on the dispositional reading of the material intellect would—very
plausibly, I think—line up with the more moderate noetic-speculations put forward by Aristotle
about the imaginative faculty, in passages (c), (e), and (f).’
To reiterate, passage (c) had entertained two possible scenarios under which thought would be
dependent upon the body: firstly, if thought turned out to be a kind of imagination (which, as I
had pointed out above, would entail that imagination is sometimes a kind of thought). And
secondly, if thought turned out to be impossible without imagination. Were the material
intellect a disposition residing in the formal content contained within the actualized
imagination, as Avempace suggests, then the latter of these two scenarios would certainly be
confirmed, since—as I have noted above—Avempace’s position plainly affirms Aristotle’s claim,
from passage (ff), that there can be no knowledge of any kind in the absence of phantasia.
As for the former scenario, it too will be confirmed by Avempace’s position, provided we
interpret its implication that imagination is sometimes a kind of thought charitably as
suggesting that images are sometimes capable of being modified or recontextualized, in such a
way that they can be said to acquire some degree of authentic noetic character.206 After all,
Avempace explains the realization of the intellectual disposition as resulting from a process of
change undergone by the forms of the imagination (insofar as they are contents of the soul), for
which they serve as a kind of material substrate. To frame this in the language of the scenario’s
more explicit suggestion207 that thought is a kind of imagination, we might say that Avempace’s
position supports the view that learned thoughts are images in a certain modified state (which
would also confirm passage (f),’ since it too indicates that thought is a kind of imagination).
And if the forms of the imagination serve as the material substrate for the generation of
learned thoughts such that learned thoughts can be described as images in a certain modified
206

Were we to interpret it more straightforwardly as implying that images sometimes just are thoughts, then we’d
be back to the strong Thinking-Model (which was refuted in the previous chapter). Moreover, there seems to be
something self-defeating about the notion that images are only sometimes identical with learned thoughts. If
images just were learned thoughts, then this would have to be the case all of the time. The idea that imagination is
sometimes a kind of thought makes sense only if we presume that there isn’t a one-to-one correspondence
between images and learned thoughts.
207
From which I’d derived the implication that images are sometimes thoughts.
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state, then this implies that the formal content of images persists through the process whereby
the material intellect becomes actualized, as I had noted in the previous section. This being the
case, there seems to me to be a strong presumption that Avempace’s position would also
confirm passage (e)’s suggestion that images are component parts of thoughts. We need only
specify that they constitute parts in the sense of material causes.
Thus, since Avempace’s dispositional reading confirms each of Aristotle’s more moderate
remarks attributing noetic status to images, it seems to me that it could be revived and
marshalled quite fruitfully in defense of a moderate Thinking-Model of Imagination. That said,
certain modifications might need to be made to Avempace’s basic position, in order to
maximize the coherence of the resulting Thinking-Model. Specifically, it seems prudent to omit
Avempace’s claim that the human intellect is capable of acquiring immortality by forging a
connection to the agent intellect. This seems to me a rather awkward addendum to any theory
which describes the material intellect as a disposition, and it may even generate a contradiction
(as Averroes would come to realize).

4.4. Benefits of the Moderate Thinking-Model
As I had stressed in the second chapter, naturalistic readings of Aristotle’s DA have not enjoyed
a great deal of currency in the time since Alexander’s commentary was written, likely due to the
inclination among many religious commentators to interpret Aristotle’s theory of the soul as
being consistent with their own beliefs concerning human immortality. In recent years,
however, naturalistic readings have begun to enjoy something of a resurgence, with
commentators such as Wedin (1988) and Victor Caston (1999) arguing vigorously in favor of the
view that the DA contains no indication that Aristotle regarded any part of the human soul as
being immortal or separable from the body.
It is principally as a contribution to this naturalistic revival that I would want to recommend my
Avempacean moderate Thinking-Model of Imagination. It is my sense that, although both
Caston and (obviously) Wedin would have their reasons for wanting to reject the moderate
Thinking-Model, it would nevertheless offer real solutions to major problems with each of their
readings, and without sacrificing the main meat of either of their overarching projects.

4.4.1. A Correction on Caston
In “Aristotle’s Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal” (1999), Caston interprets Aristotle’s
philosophical project in the DA as being primarily a taxonomical one, aiming not so much to
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describe the various faculties which are found within a given human soul,208 as to catalogue the
various kinds of soul which populate the universe. He does this in order to avoid having to
explain why there should be two intellects—one passive and perishable and another creative
and imperishable—belonging to each individual human animal, as a prima facie reading of
passage (g) might seem to suggest. On Caston’s reading, this passage is not juxtaposing two
distinguishable intellectual features of a given human soul, but rather, two distinct species of
intellectual soul, one human, and another divine. This juxtaposition signals the termination of
Aristotle’s account of the human intellectual soul,209 and the commencement of his account of
the unembodied divine intellect, which he also discusses in the Metaphysics. Thus, on Caston’s
reading, passage (g) gives us no reason whatsoever to suppose that Aristotle intended to
identify any part of the human soul as divine. Its reference to an eternal nous poietikos simply
refers to God, whereas the reference to a perishable nous pathetikos harks back to Aristotle’s
foregoing account of the human intellect in DA 3.4. As readers will recall, this was precisely the
line adopted by Alexander in order to resolve the tension in passage (g). And Caston cites
Alexander explicitly as his inspiration.
Of course, if the human intellect contains nothing divine but is rather derived from bodily
mechanisms, then Caston owes us an explanation as to how it can also be the case that, as
Aristotle insists in DA 3.4, its way of acting or being acted upon involves no alteration in a bodily
organ. In other words, Caston owes us an explanation as to how a functionally incorporeal
faculty can arise from bodily mechanisms, and why its functional incorporeality needn’t
necessarily imply literal separability from the body. And although Caston does not address that
problem in this paper,210 it seems clear from his other works that he would want to appeal
again to Alexander for a solution.
In "Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern” (1997), Caston argues that the basic template of
Aristotle’s philosophy of mind is conducive to an emergentist reading, though he himself did
not unpack the precise mechanisms which give rise to the human intellect’s emergence. He
adds that commentators such as Alexander can be credited with filling in the details of
Aristotle’s implicit vision: “Aristotle’s…own tendencies are towards emergentism. But he never
develops these views in a systematic or explicit fashion. Our unsung heroes are thus the later
Aristotelians…Galen and Alexander, who develop the rich metaphysics that true emergentism
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Though this can to an extent be regarded as a secondary teaching, since Aristotle tends to regard an organism’s
possession of a higher psychic faculty as presupposing its possession of the lower ones.
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Or perhaps of his survey of embodied soul-types more broadly.
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He focuses instead on justifying his claim that passage (g)’s nous poietikos refers to the divine intellect, by
cataloguing the similarities between Aristotle’s description of nous poietikos in this chapter, and his description of
the divine intellect in the Metaphysics.
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requires” (Caston, 1997, 354). And so it would appear that Caston’s naturalistic reading of
Aristotle is modelled quite closely after Alexander’s.211
That said, it seems to me that Caston is somewhat overconfident in the coherence of
Alexander’s emergentist reading. He does not appear to recognize the tension—which I’d
unpacked in my second chapter—between Alexander’s belief in the functional incorporeality of
the material intellect and his belief that it belongs, as a disposition, to the human soul or
subject broadly construed. Nor, therefore, does he grapple with the inadequacy of Alexander’s
attempt to resolve this problem by appealing to the notion of “common forms.”
And so it seems to me that Caston overlooks the very problem that Avempace had sought to
rectify, by repositioning the material intellect as a disposition residing specifically in the
“spiritual forms” of the imaginative faculty (namely, that despite his best efforts, Alexander had
been unable to avoid construing the material intellect as a disposition of the body, which makes
use of the body when it apprehends intelligible forms). This being the case, Caston sees no
need to entertain the idea that the material intellect is a disposition residing specifically in the
imaginative faculty. On Caston’s view,212 Aristotle’s main reason for introducing the imaginative
faculty is not to secure any sort of “material” cause for the generation of thoughts, but rather
to account for cognitive error, as neither perception nor thought can do this.
My overall impression of Caston’s position would therefore be that, by appealing broadly to
Alexander’s schema without interrogating his take on the relation between the various psychic
faculties, he winds up inheriting the difficulties implicit in Alexander’s position.
And as I had observed above, Avempace’s designation of the material intellect as a disposition
residing specifically in the “spiritual forms” of the imaginative faculty seems to offer a real
solution to Alexander’s difficulties, in that it enables Avempace to avoid the implication that the
material intellect is a disposition inhering in a body, and in that it manages to account for the
emergence of the material intellect as a uniquely incorporeal faculty, without appealing to any
features which would be common to all the other psychic faculties. If this observation is
correct, then it seems to me that Caston would do well to consider a moderate Thinking-Model
of Imagination, modelled after Avempace.213
This would not only resolve the problems which Caston has inherited from Alexander; it would
do so without sacrificing any of what I take to be the fundamental tenets of Caston’s project.
These are, to reiterate, (1) that the nous poietikos of DA 3.5 refers to the divine intellect rather
than to any facet of the individual human intellect (whereas the perishable nous pathetikos
211

He also considers an epiphenomenal approach, but rejects it because it would render mental states ineffectual,
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Articulated in other papers like, “Why Aristotle Needs Imagination” (1996) and “Aristotle and the Problem of
Intentionality” (1998).
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Subtracting the bit about the material intellect attaining immortality through its conjunction with the agent
intellect.
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refers to the human intellect), and (2), that the project of the DA is principally a taxonomical
one, aiming to catalogue the various kinds of soul which populate the universe. Avempace’s
reading214 explicitly affirms (1) and is therefore compatible with (2).

4.4.2. A Correction on Wedin
A moderate Thinking-Model based upon Avempace would be more difficult for Wedin to
accept, as his project is not modelled as closely after Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle as
Caston’s is. It would therefore constitute a more radical departure from Wedin’s overall body of
commitments. Most notably, Wedin does not subscribe to the view that the nous poietikos of
DA 3.5 refers to the divine intellect of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. He regards it instead as a facet of
each individual human mind, alongside the material intellect.
That said, Wedin also does not belong to the camp of interpreters who’d attempted to marry
the material intellect to the agent intellect in order to secure the holistic immortality of each
individual human mind (i.e., Aquinas, Brentano). Quite the opposite, in fact. He argues
vigorously that, despite the strong prima facie appearance to the contrary, the nous poietikos of
DA 3.5 is not immortal.215 He does this in order to avoid the conclusion—which might otherwise
follow from his marriage of the two intellects—that the human mind is, as a whole, eternal, and
capable of existing independently of the body. Recall that the express purpose of Wedin’s
project is to show, “…why [human] thinking is not, in any serious sense, divine” (Wedin, xi). 216
Recall also that Wedin’s case for the inseparability of the human intellect had involved the
conjunction of his view of the imagination as a functionally incomplete quasi-faculty which
subserves the faculty of thought, with the conditional statement put forward by Aristotle in
passage (c), to the effect that, if thought proves, “…to be impossible without imagination, it too
requires a body as a condition of its existence.” If the imagination really is only a functionally
incomplete quasi-faculty and if it (therefore) subserves the rational faculty in the manner that
Wedin describes, then this supports the second antecedent of passage (c)’s naturalistic
conditional, that thought is dependent upon the imagination.
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Again, subtracting the bit about the material intellect attaining immortality through its conjunction with the
agent intellect.
215
His argument involves a number of steps. Firstly, he conceives of the agent intellect as a lower-level noetic
subsystem, by appeal to which Aristotle seeks to explain the higher-order capabilities of the human mind
(generalized in DA 3.4’s description of thought). Next, he interprets Aristotle’s apparent acknowledgement of the
separability of the agent intellect as simply meaning that it is separable by abstraction. Finally, he explains away
the alleged eternality of the agent intellect by drawing an analogy between it and mathematical objects, which
(Aristotle says elsewhere), though they are not extensionally separate and changeless, can be considered as if they
were.
216

He remarks, in the preface to his book, that, “Providing Aristotle with a thoroughly naturalistic account of the
soul’s operations is recommended by his characterization of psychology as a part of physics (Wedin, xii).
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But there are a number of internal problems with this narrative, which I believe could be
resolved rather handily by adopting a moderate Thinking-Model based upon Avempace’s
theory of the material intellect. Moreover, this would not require us to sacrifice the bottom-line
of Wedin’s project, that the human mind is not divine. To the contrary, it might even have the
effect of reinforcing Wedin’s bottom-line.
Firstly, as I had established in my third chapter, Wedin is incorrect about phantasia not being a
functionally complete faculty. This wouldn’t necessarily undermine his claim about the type of
subservience relation that obtains between the imagination and the rational faculty (though he
does present this as a consequence of the imagination’s functional incompleteness), because
there is no contradiction between saying that the imagination is functionally complete, and that
it subserves the rational faculty in the manner specified by Wedin; images can still appear as
simple terms in propositional complexes articulated by the rational faculty, even if they also
sometimes appear on their own in free-standing imaginative acts. Still, the notion that the
imagination is functionally incomplete constitutes a minor inaccuracy in Wedin’s position,
which a moderate Thinking-Model rooted in Avempace’s theory would help to resolve, since
Avempace correctly treats the imagination as a fully-fledged, functionally complete faculty.
Secondly, even if we retain Wedin’s claim about the type of subservience relation that obtains
between the imagination and the rational faculty, this still will not provide a sufficiently robust
demonstration of the mind’s dependence upon the imagination to guarantee the consequent of
passage (c)’s naturalistic conditional; and it seems to me that a moderate Thinking-Model based
on Avempace would be of some help here, too. But in order to better understand how Wedin’s
narrative falls short in this respect (and how a moderate Thinking-Model based on Avempace
would constitute an improvement), it might be helpful to elaborate on the various meanings
that might be ascribed to the term “subservience” in this context, and attempt to situate
Wedin’s specific conception of the subservience relation that obtains between imagination and
thought within this broader theoretical framework.
The claim that imagination subserves thought admits of at least two basic interpretations, only
one of which would really do the work that Wedin’s project requires of it. The first of these
would treat the claim as an application of the Aristotelian principle that the possession of the
higher psychic faculties presupposes the possession of the lower ones but not vice versa.217
Interpreted in this manner, the claim that imagination subserves thought would simply entail
that thought could never have arisen in an organism that was not at least sophisticated enough
to possess imagination (in addition to perception and nutrition/growth). But of course, this
claim—and the general principle from which it is derived—is primarily a claim about the
generation and development of an organism’s mortal, embodied life, and doesn’t necessarily
speak to the question at hand; namely, whether the intellectual soul mightn’t be uniquely
capable of persisting in a post-mortem state. Unless one is assuming from the outset that no
217

i.e. Plants possess only the nutritive.
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soul or part thereof can persist following the of the death of body—which would be questionbegging in Wedin’s case, since this is precisely the conclusion that he is attempting to motivate
with his claim that imagination subserves thought218—this weak conception of subservience will
not be sufficient to establish the mind’s dependence on the body.
To reach the desired conclusion more responsibly, one would need to adopt a second, more
robust interpretation of subservience, which specifies a causal relationship that necessarily
obtains between each individual thought act and a previously acquired image, thereby
providing an explanation as to why the rational faculty could not be separated from the
imagination, even in a post-mortem state. Interpreted in this stronger sense, the claim that
imagination subserves thought would give us a concrete reason for concluding that there is no
serious sense in which the faculty of thought can be said to enjoy post-mortem longevity; if
every individual thought act is causally dependent upon a previously acquired image, and if the
capacity for acquiring and retaining images ceases at the moment of bodily death, then there
can be no post-mortem thought acts. And if there can be no post-mortem thought acts, then
one struggles to imagine any meaningful sense in which the mind can be said to persist after
death.
Now, as we have seen above in the second chapter, Alexander had also sought to establish the
mind’s dependence upon the body. And in his defense of this position, he’d begun by
postulating a weak subservience relation between the nutritive faculty and the perceptual
faculty (i.e., “nothing can perform a sensory act without being nourished”),219 before going on
to postulate a strong subservience relation between the perceptual faculty and the imaginative
faculty (i.e., “the imaginative faculty has as the object of its activity and function residual
impressions produced by sensible objects”).220 Given the trajectory of this argumentative
strategy, one might have expected Alexander to clinch his case for the dependence of the mind
upon the body by arguing that, just as each individual imaginative act is caused and informed by
a prior sensory stimulation, so too, each individual thought act is causally undergirded by a
previously imprinted phantasm (i.e. strong subservience).
Instead, he drops the language of subservience at this point, and pivots to another
argumentative strategy, which underscores conceptual difficulties with the notion that a given
soul might consist of separable parts. The theme of imagination subserving thought does re-
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i.e., He’s attempting to demonstrate that the intellect is no exception to the rule that souls are inseparable from
their corresponding bodies, by deploying his subservience hypothesis in order to satisfy the second antecedent of
passage (c)’s naturalistic conditional, which states that if thought is dependent upon the imagination, then it too
will require a body as a condition of its existence.
219
This qualifies as a weak subservience relation because Alexander is not suggesting that each discrete perceptual
act is causally undergirded by a discrete nutritive act. He’s simply saying that an organism must be at least
sophisticated enough to take nourishment (viz. it must be an organism in the first place) in order to also be an
organism that perceives.
220
This qualifies as a strong subservience-relation because Alexander is specifying a one-to-one causal relation
between each individual imaginative act and a prior sensory act.
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emerge in Alexander’s broader account of the origin of the material intellect221 as resulting
from the coalescence of the other, lower formal powers. However, while this theory does
satisfy the requirements of weak subservience,222 it falls short of the strong conception of
subservience, because it does not posit any sort of one-to-one causal relationship between
individual thought acts and previously acquired images; recall that Alexander had described the
material intellect as a disposition inhering in the soul or the human subject more broadly,
rather than specifically in the contents of the imaginative faculty (which would have entailed a
one-to-one causal relationship between images and individual thought acts). Recall also that—
largely as a result of this move—he’d struggled to square the functional incorporeality of the
human intellect with its dependence upon the body.
The question, then, is whether Wedin’s conception of the subservience relation between
imagination and thought fares any better than Alexander’s. The answer is: somewhat, but not
significantly. He does attest to the involvement of images in individual thought acts, and so his
conception of the subservience relation between imagination and thought does—unlike
Alexander’s—at least attempt to advance beyond the weak subservience hypothesis to the
strong one. However, his efforts are hampered by the following two problems:
Firstly, Wedin seems unable to assure us that the causal role that he assigns to images in
thought-acts applies to all kinds of thought-act. Recall that on Wedin’s view of the subservience
relation between imagination and thought (or at least the most charitable rendering of it),223
images pick out the particular referents of propositional complexes which make references to
particular substances (i.e., “this is drink”). And in so doing, they supposedly serve as a necessary
condition for the mind’s ability to affirm the pivotal premise in a chain of propositional
reasoning leading to the conclusion that one will perform the action of drinking. But even if we
accept this explanation as to why deliberative action relies on images, Wedin’s subservience
hypothesis still does not provide us with any insight as to why acts of propositional reasoning in
more theoretical domains require images, since many of these contain no references to any
concrete particulars. Nor does it strike me as a particularly helpful strategy for making sense of
the role that images play in simpler types of thought-act, such as the grasping of essences, since
these make no direct reference to concrete particulars, either. In short, then, Wedin’s
conception of the subservience relation between imagination and thought is simply too specific
to be applicable to all the various kinds of thought act.
Secondly, it is not at all clear that we should accept Wedin’s explanation as to why images
constitute a necessary condition, even for acts of propositional reasoning within the domain of
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Which, it bears repeating, is the only kind of intellect that is authentically human for Alexander.
In that the imaginative faculty contributes something to the coalescence from which the material intellect
arises, thereby warranting the claim that an organism must be at least sophisticated enough to possess
imagination (in addition to perception and nutrition) in order to be an organism that thinks.
223
i.e., Once having been corrected on his erroneous claim that there are no images of sensible substances, but
only of special and common sensibles.
222
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conduct. Granted, Wedin’s subservience hypothesis is an elegant way of avoiding passage (gg)’s
implausible prima facie suggestion that the imagination literally articulates propositional
judgments about particular objects, while still retaining a softened sense in which the
imagination can be credited with “saying” something to us about them. Moreover, passage (gg)
does indeed appear to indicate that this “saying” at least sometimes plays a decisive role in the
completion of propositional thought-acts within the domain of conduct.224 But the trouble is
that the role that passage (gg) assigns to the imagination’s “saying” is not an indispensable one,
but rather, an auxiliary one. The passage states that imagination or thought may affirm the
pivotal premise in a chain of propositional reasoning leading to the conclusion that one will
perform the action of drinking,225 and that when the imagination does this, it is serving as a
substitute for thought.226 This implies that, under ordinary circumstances, the mind is capable
of doing this on its own. Which, if Wedin is correct about the limited sense in which the
imagination “says” this is drink (when it does so), must mean that under ordinary
circumstances, the mind itself is capable of picking out the particular referent of such a
proposition.227
Much of this is corroborated by Mika Perälä, in “Aristotle on Singular Thought” (2015). Here,
Perälä argues that, on Aristotle’s view, the mind itself can “…[grasp] the singular item…in its
own right” (Perälä, 365) and that this direct intellectual awareness of individuals serves, “…to
determine the reference for composite thought” (Perälä, 373). Or, in other words, that the
mind itself is able to “pick out” the individual items228 about which it will make assertions and
denials.
That said, Perälä’s broader discussion of “singular thought” is hardly free of difficulties. He errs,
I think, in that he attempts to explain the necessity of this properly intellectual awareness of
particulars by arguing that phantasia alone, “…is insufficient to determine which item the
intellect picks out in making an assertion or a denial” (Perälä, 367). This is essentially the
inverse of the mistake that Wedin had made with respect to passage (gg), and it fails to capture
224

Recall, from the third chapter, that passages (hh) and (ii) also credited the imagination with picking out the
particular objects about which the mind will deliberate in the absence of direct sensory-experience.
225
Recall that passage (hh) had also allowed that “images or thoughts” are capable of picking out the particular
objects about which the autonomous mind deliberates. Passage (ii) omits the caveat about thought being able to
do so, but is otherwise making the same point as passage (hh). We can perhaps chalk the omission up to
carelessness on Aristotle’s part, given that passage (ii) is the outlier in this regard. In this case, passage (ii)’s claim
that “the soul never thinks without an image” would mean something a bit broader—that the soul never thinks
without a representation of the particular object about which it is deliberating, which can be provided either by
the imaginative faculty or the mind itself.
226
In the specific context of passage (gg), Aristotle seems to have in mind situations in which the mind fails, out of
simple hastiness, to really pause and consider the pivotal premise. But we might also include cases of akratic
action, in which the mind’s ability to do so has been impeded by a passion.
227
Perhaps, then, a part of Lowe’s mistake had been to identify both images and thoughts (of particulars) as direct
prerequisites for autonomous thought-forms. Perhaps he ought instead to have identified the disjunct of either
images or thoughts of particulars as the prerequisite for autonomous thought.
228
Perälä clarifies that this “picking out” is itself “non-descriptive, i.e. non-predicative,” but that it can be
incorporated into predicative statements.
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the nuance of the passage in just the same way. Whereas Wedin had overlooked passage (gg)’s
affirmation of the mind’s ability to pick out singular objects, Perälä overlooks its affirmation of
the imagination’s ability to do so. But passage (gg) plainly credits the imagination with “saying”
this is drink; and while we have seen that this cannot be interpreted as indicating that the
imagination itself literally articulates propositional judgements, it must, at the very least, be
interpreted as indicating that the imagination is capable of picking out a “this.” Otherwise,
numerous other passages that we’ve encountered already—including passages (hh) and (ii),
both of which suggest that the mind can make assertions and denials about images, as well as
passage (m), which explains memory of particulars as a function of the imagination—would be
rendered all but unintelligible. As would Aristotle’s numerous indications—in passages like (f),
(i), and (j)—that the imagination governs the actions of nonhuman animals by activating their
faculties of desire (imagination can hardly specify an object of desire if it specifies no object at
all).
Perälä also errs in that his conception of this “singular” thought is just a touch too similar to
Lowe’s conception of “apprehensive” thought. This manifests in a number of ways. For one
thing, Perälä concedes that the intellectual grasping of individual objects will (like perception of
individual objects) involve the grasping of universal formal qualities that those objects exhibit,
but he resists Wedin’s assertion that therefore, the mind would really only be grasping at the
universals.229 Instead, he argues that “…the ultimate causal power [i.e. the primary object of
apprehension] would be the individual insofar as it has form…not the form in its own right”
(Perälä, 363). The idea being that even if there is a sense in which our intellectual awareness of
particular objects involves universals, the universality in question will still be distinguishable
from the pure universality of essences, by virtue of its being to some extent individuated.
Which is an observation that I had made on Lowe’s behalf, while attempting to anticipate how
he might respond to Wedin’s assertion that apprehensive thought would really only be about
universals.
Granted, this alone is not sufficient to establish that Perälä’s “singular thought” refers to the
same phenomenon to which Lowe affixes the label “apprehensive thought." What really lends it
that impression is Perälä’s additional claim that “Aristotle does not assume that forming such a
thought [i.e. a singular thought] requires knowledge of the kind230 in question” (Perälä, 362). By
which he appears to mean that the mind’s apprehension of singular items does not presuppose
any familiarity with the corresponding essences—or, in other words, that it doesn’t entail any
genuine understanding of why the object in question is an exemplar of the kind of object that it
is. This is precisely the same observation that I had made concerning Lowe’s apprehensive
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Note that if Wedin’s assertion were correct, then this would support his contention that imagination is always
required to pick out the particular objects referenced in the pivotal premises of acts of reasoning in the domain of
conduct, since in this case there could be no properly intellectual awareness of particulars.
230
My italics.
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thought in Ch. 3.4.2, while drawing out the implications of his claim that apprehensive thought
precedes and enables the mind’s distillation of essences via abstraction.
But if Perälä does indeed conceptualize singular thought in the same way that Lowe
conceptualizes apprehensive thought, then he will inherit all of the difficulties that accrue to
Lowe’s conception of apprehensive thought, which I’d cited in the closing section of my third
chapter, as motivating my decision to recast apprehensive thought as being synonymous with
the distillation of essences directly from images of particulars. Of course, if we were to apply
this same solution to Perälä’s “singular thought,” it would undercut his central claim, that the
mind itself is capable of picking out the particular objects about which it will make assertions
and denials, as passage (gg)231 appear to indicate. It might therefore be wise to reconceptualize
“singular thought” slightly, as something which succeeds and is made possible by (my modified
conception of) apprehensive thought, and which therefore can be said to entail a prior
familiarity with the essence in question.
Such a reconceptualization of singular thought, when combined with my prior
reconceptualization of apprehensive thought, would make for a very clean narrative, which not
only accommodates passage (gg)’s232 claim that the mind itself can pick out individual objects
while carrying out acts of propositional reasoning within the domain of conduct, but which also
situates this claim coherently within the broader framework established by passage (r),
according to which apprehensive thought is a precondition for autonomous thought. The idea
would be that the imagination makes us privy to representations of particular objects and
enables us to retain them. From those retained representations, the mind is then able to distill
the essences exemplified by the represented objects (i.e., engage in apprehensive thought),
after which point the mind is then enabled to pick out and recognize a particular object as being
of the kind that it is, and with a genuine understanding of why it is an exemplar of the kind that
it is.233 This fully informed intellectual awareness of the particular object may then be
incorporated into a chain of propositional reasoning in the domain of conduct (which we know
to be a species of autonomous thought); though, of course, if the mind for whatever reason
fails to take this additional step, the imagination can fill in and approximate it, however
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And passage (hh)
And passage (hh)’s
233
The picture I am painting here is rather similar to the Thomistic notion of reflective apprehension of concrete
particulars. As James B South (1996) tell us, Aquinas—in works like the Commentary on the Sentences, Disputed
Questions on Truth, and the Summa Theologiae—argues that the intellect can only have direct knowledge of
universals. However, he does allow that the intellect might still come to know particulars, “Indirectly…by a kind of
reflection (reflexio)” (93). On South’s telling, this reflection involves the mind’s returning to that, “…from which the
intelligible species is abstracted.” However, on the Thomistic reading, this does not mean that direct knowledge of
universals is temporally prior to the indirect knowledge of particulars. Rather these are two terms to the same
cognitive act. The direct act terminates in the universal while the indirect act terminates in the singular” (96). I
might be inclined to differ in this regard.
232
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imperfectly.234 To summarize, then, we have found that Wedin’s particular conception of the
subservience relation between the imagination and thought is ill-equipped to explain why
thought acts falling outside of the subcategory of deliberative action should be reliant upon the
imagination, and that furthermore, even thought-acts falling within this subcategory needn’t
necessarily require images to fill the role that Wedin’s subservience hypothesis assigns to them,
since we have good textual evidence (backed by a slightly modified understanding of Perälä’s
“singular thought”) indicating that the mind is capable of filling this role itself—and that it
typically does. This being the case, Wedin’s subservience hypothesis just doesn’t provide us
with a sufficiently robust satisfaction of passage (c)’s second antecedent to warrant his desired
conclusion, that thought simpliciter requires a body as a condition of its existence.
How, then, would my moderate Thinking-Model based upon Avempace’s theory of the material
intellect constitute an improvement? Principally, in that the subservience relation that it
postulates between the imagination and the rational faculty does not rely on the notion that
images pick out the particular referents of propositional complexes.235 Recall that Wedin’s
reliance on this notion had undermined his ability to unpack the causal relation between the
imagination and various kinds of thought act which do not make any direct references to
particular objects. These included, most notably, the grasping of essences via abstraction (i.e.,
apprehensive thought). Avempace, by contrast, offers us a clear answer as to the causal
relation between images and acts of apprehensive thought: the formal content of images
serves as the “material” cause for the generation of learned thoughts, which themselves come
into being as a result of a noetic transformation236 undergone by those images. Moreover—
unlike Wedin’s account of the role played by images in acts of propositional reasoning within
the domain of conduct—Avempace’s view is equipped to explain why the contribution that the
imaginative faculty makes to apprehensive thought is a necessary one: since abstraction is a
generative process, it will naturally require a material cause, just like any other generative
process.
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This all coheres rather nicely with Aristotle’s account of akratic action in EN 7.3. Recall that Aristotle had
described akratic action as a sort of disruption of one’s propositional reasoning capabilities by a bout of passion,
which prevents one from ever reaching the correct conclusion about what ought to be done in a given situation,
specifically by inhibiting the mind’s ability to affirm the particular premise (i.e. “this food here is such and such”).
On my view, the passion exerts this effect, not by completely snuffing out the mind’s ability to articulate a
propositional judgement about a particular substance (otherwise, why should the mind be able to articulate the
other, universal propositions, whose combination with the particular premise results in the action?), but by
impeding its ability to pick out the referent of that proposition via singular thought. When this happens, the
imagination steps into its role as the auxiliary means by which the referent is picked out. But because imagination
is not informed by any prior awareness of the relevant essence (as singular thought is), it will be subject to a
degree of error, to which singular thought is not. Hence why we are prone to arriving at the wrong conclusion in
such circumstances.
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Though it doesn’t necessarily rule out the possibility that images can do this.
Initiated by the agent intellect.
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One potential objection that critics might raise at this point would be that although
Avempace’s position does offer us a good explanation as to why the imagination makes a
necessary contribution to our ability to grasp essences via apprehensive thought, this
explanation is not applicable to acts of propositional reasoning—either in the domain of
conduct or in the theoretical domain—since neither of these types of thought act can be said to
be causally undergirded by images in the same way that the learned thoughts of the
apprehensive mind are (otherwise, they’d be indistinguishable from acts of apprehensive
thought). This would seem to leave me with no explanation as to why either of these two types
of propositional reasoning is reliant upon the imagination, meaning that—just like Wedin’s
position—my Avempace-inspired moderate Thinking Model really only accounts for the reliance
of one kind of thought-act upon the imagination. So that, really, I am no better situated than
Wedin was to round out the strong subservience relation that would be required to give us a
truly robust affirmation of the second antecedent of passage (c)’s naturalistic conditional, that
thought is reliant upon the imagination.
My response to this objection is twofold: firstly, even were we to grant that my Avempaceinspired moderate Thinking Model is incapable of explaining why acts of propositional
reasoning within the domain of conduct and within the theoretical domain are reliant upon the
imagination, it would still have a slight advantage over Wedin’s position, at least in that it
establishes that the imagination makes a necessary contribution to apprehensive thought
(whereas Wedin had only been able to establish that the imagination makes an auxiliary
contribution to deliberative action). But secondly—and more importantly—while it may be true
that neither acts of propositional reasoning within the domain conduct nor within the
theoretical domain can be said to be causally undergirded by images in the same manner that
our apprehension of essences is according to Avempace, this does not mean that Avempace’s
position is totally powerless to account for the reliance of these types of thought act upon the
imagination. Both fall within the category of autonomous thought, which we know—based on
passage (r)—to be causally dependent upon apprehensive thought, which itself is (according to
Avempace) directly reliant upon the imaginative faculty for its “material” cause. Which means
that, on Avempace’s view, the imagination makes an indirect (but no less necessary) causal
contribution to the various forms of propositional reasoning. It is by virtue of his focused
exegesis of the dependence relation between the imagination and the most basic, foundational
form of thought, that Avempace (unlike Wedin) is able to guarantee the dependence of all
forms of thought upon the imagination.
Nor should the indirectness of the dependence relation that Avempace posits between the
imagination and autonomous thought forms be regarded as diminishing the strength of the
subservience relation that holds between them. While neither of these types of thought act
may make any direct use of images in the articulation and affirmation of any of their premises
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(at least not necessarily)237 it still remains possible to trace any universal terms that they do
make use of back to the imaginative representations of particulars, from which they were
derived. The Avempacean view therefore retains the notion of a causal correspondence
between discrete autonomous thought acts and discrete imaginative acts (albeit at one step
removed).238 This is still a much more finely-tuned conception of the subservience relation
between the imaginative and rational faculties than the one posited by Alexander (according to
which thought is a disposition inhering in the human subject more broadly, rather than
specifically in the contents of the imaginative faculty).
This should suffice to illustrate that my moderate Thinking-Model based upon Avempace’s
theory of the material intellect improves significantly upon Wedin’s position, as a means of
establishing the sort of strong subservience relation between imagination and thought, that
would be required to give us a truly robust satisfaction of the second antecedent of passage
(c)’s naturalistic conditional, that thought is dependent upon the imagination. And this alone
should be sufficient to illustrate that my moderate Thinking-Model succeeds where Wedin’s
position had failed in attempting to establish that, for Aristotle, human thought (simpliciter)
requires a body as a condition for its existence. However, for good measure, I will highlight one
additional sense in which a moderate Thinking-Model based upon Avempace would provide a
more robust fulfillment of passage (c)’s naturalistic conditional than Wedin’s position was able
to. Recall, from our discussion in Chapters 1 and 3, that the scenario we’ve just been discussing
(in which thought turns out to be dependent upon the imagination) is the second of two
possible scenarios entertained by passage (c)’s naturalistic conditional, under which thought
would require a body as a condition for its existence—the first being a scenario in which
thought turns out to be a form of imagination. Recall also that Wedin had dismissed the idea
that Aristotle had given any serious consideration to this first eventuality, arguing instead (via
the notion of subservience) that he had only affirmed the second.
But I would urge that the two antecedent scenarios entertained in passage (c) are not mutually
exclusive,239 and that, in addition to providing a robust satisfaction of Scenario 2 (for the
reasons I’ve just finished unpacking) the moderate Thinking-Model based upon Avempace’s
position would also provide us with at least a partial satisfaction of Scenario 1. As I had noted in
my first chapter, the claim that thought is a kind of imagination is effectively equivalent to the
claim that imagination is sometimes a kind of thought. And as I had noted at the beginning of
237

My Avempacean thinking model does not deny that images may affirm the pivotal premise of a chain of
propositional reasoning within the domain of conduct, when the mind fails to do so.
238
This holds even with instances of singular thought, in which the mind itself, rather than the imagination, picks
out the particular referent of the pivotal premise in a chain of propositional reasoning within the domain of
conduct. Recall that on our revised conception of singular thought, this properly intellectual awareness of the
individual qualifies as genuine understanding, because it is informed by a prior apprehension of the essence that
that object exemplifies. And this prior apprehension of the corresponding essence would have come about as the
result of a noetic transformation undergone by the forms of the imaginative faculty.
239

I’d mentioned this above, in the final section of my second chapter.
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this chapter, a moderate Thinking Model which treats the formal aspect of images as the
“material” cause for the generation of apprehended thoughts does specify a context in which
images are capable of becoming a kind of thought (namely, apprehensive thought). In other
words, apprehended thoughts can, on the Avempacean account, be coherently regarded as (in
a sense) a kind of imagination.
Granted, the same cannot be said of autonomous thought forms, since these cannot be said to
be directly undergirded by images in the same way that the learned thoughts of the
apprehensive mind are.240 Nevertheless, we still have—in apprehensive thought—one example
of a species of thought-act which, when conceptualized in accordance with Avempace’s theory
of the material intellect, satisfies both of the antecedent scenarios entertained by passage (c)’s
naturalistic conditional. And of course, as we have seen already, the dependence relation
between the imagination and apprehensive thought (i.e., Scenario 2) carries over to
autonomous thought-forms, by virtue of the principle of transitivity. The upshot is that on the
Avempacean account, one form of thought (i.e., apprehensive thought) satisfies both of the
antecedent scenarios entertained by passage (c)’s naturalistic conditional, and all forms of
thought (i.e., both apprehensive and autonomous thought forms) satisfy the second scenario.
Whereas on Wedin’s account, neither of the two scenarios entertained by passage (c)’s
naturalistic conditional is satisfied by any kind of thought.

4.4.3. A Correction on Averroes
As I discussed earlier in this chapter, Averroes, in his early writings, subscribed to Avempace’s
position that the material intellect is a disposition residing in the spiritual forms241 of the
activated imaginative faculty. However, he would grow suspicious of this position during his
middle period and would go on to reject it in his mature period, in favor of the position laid out
in his Long Commentary, that the material intellect is a single, independent substance to which
all human beings have shared but individuated access, by virtue of the connection forged
between the material intellect and each of their individual imaginative faculties.
This move constitutes a total abandonment of the project which Avempace (following
Alexander) had been engaged in, and which Caston and Wedin have attempted to revive—
namely, the project of advancing a naturalistic reading of the material intellect. Whereas all of
these commentators had been attempting to square Aristotle’s insistence upon the functional
incorporeality of the material intellect with the premise that it, like all the other psychic
faculties, is dependent upon the body, Averroes’ mature position treats the material intellect as
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an eternal non-composite substance, which, though it is involved in each individual human’s
acts of cogitation, is not, strictly speaking, a part of any human soul at all.242
Now, Davidson provides a critical appraisal of the development of Averroes’ thought, from his
earlier, Avempace-inspired period, through to his mature position. Of Averroes’ early position,
Davidson notes with approval that, “It plainly…captures Aristotle's spirit when it opts for the
naturalistic account of the human material intellect” (Davidson, 353). However, Davidson also
points out that the early position, “…adds to Aristotle when it affirms the possibility of
conjunction with the active intellect” (Davidson, 353). Clearly, then, Davidson regards the
notion that the material intellect is capable of becoming conjoined with the agent intellect as
something which cannot be found in Aristotle, and which is therefore an embellishment on
Averroes’ (or Avempace’s) part.
This embellishment would, according to Davidson, prove to be the impetus for Averroes’
gradual loss of faith in the project of interpreting the material intellect in a naturalistic way. The
idea here seems to be that, as Averroes became more and more committed to the idea that the
material intellect is capable of conjoining with the active intellect, he began to dwell more and
more on the question of whether, “…a generated-destructible material intellect
could…conceivably conjoin with an eternal active intellect” (Davidson, 355). His decision was
that it ultimately could not.243 Hence, Averroes “abandons the earlier naturalistic conception of
the human material intellect” (Davidson, 356), and, in its place, erects the aforementioned
conception of the material intellect as “a single transcendent entity serving all mankind.”
(Davidson, 356)
Davidson’s assessment of Averroes’ mature view is that it, “…transforms the material intellect
into something wholly un-Aristotelian,” (Davidson,356) and that, “Averroes should have
dropped the experimental position, [and] returned to his original naturalistic construction of
the material intellect” (Davidson, 355). The bottom line of Davidson’s analysis therefore
appears to be that Averroes’ abandonment of his earlier, Avempace-inspired position on the
material intellect was a mistake on his part.244 It is, however, a mistake which my Avempaceinspired moderate Thinking-Model is equipped to rectify. However, since the nature of
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Nor, therefore, is it dependent upon any bodily structure.
According to Davidson, the seed of this doubt was planted in Averroes’ mind early on, by his reading of Alfarabi:
“Whereas Averroes' earlier works devised stratagems to evade Alfarabi's challenge, the Long Commentary on the
De anima concedes that Alfarabi's reasoning was watertight after all: ‘Anyone who assumes the material intellect
to be generated-destructible can, it seems to me, discover no natural way for man to conjoin with the incorporeal
intelligences’” (Davidson, 331).
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Here, then, is our motivation for excluding from our moderate Thinking-Model Avempace’s claim about the
human intellect attaining immortality through its conjunction with the agent intellect. Firstly, this premise is not
supported by the primary texts. Secondly, it turns out to be incompatible with his conception of the material
intellect as a disposition. And to drop the dispositional view in favor of Averroes’ mature conception of the
material intellect leads to a transparently un-Aristotelian conclusion.
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Averroes’ mistake is quite different from that of Caston or Wedin, my moderate ThinkingModel will offer him a different sort of solution than it offered to either of them.
The difficulty with Caston’s Alexandrian reading had to do with his inability to square his view of
material intellect as a disposition inhering in the soul (broadly construed) with its functional
incorporeality, without appealing to any principle which, by virtue of its mutual applicability to
the other, more rudimentary psychic faculties, would require us to extend the functional
incorporeality of the intellect downward to all of those other psychic faculties as well. Or in
other words, it had to do with his inability to account for the material intellect’s supposed
uniqueness among the psychic faculties (as being functionally incorporeal), from within the
confines of his Alexandrian dispositional reading. My Avempace-inspired moderate ThinkingModel had succeeded in this regard, by recasting the material intellect as a disposition inhering
specifically within the intermediate “spiritual forms” of the activated imaginative faculty, rather
than in the human soul or subject more generally. As for Wedin’s linguistic subservience
hypothesis, it had proved incapable of establishing a sufficiently robust subservience
relationship between the imagination and the rational faculty to satisfy the second antecedent
of passage (c)’s naturalistic conditional, that thought is dependent upon the imagination. My
Avempace-inspired moderate Thinking Model had succeeded in this regard too, by designating
the spiritual forms of the imaginative faculty as the material cause for the generation of the
most basic kind of thought (i.e., apprehensive thought), thereby guaranteeing that all the other
kinds of thought (i.e., autonomous thought-forms) would be indirectly dependent upon the
imagination as well.
In contrast with the shortcomings of Caston and Wedin—which were internal (though not
inherent) to their project of advancing a naturalistic reading of the material intellect—Averroes’
mistake was to abandon that project entirely. Thus, by attempting to return him to his roots in
Avempace, my moderate Thinking Model of Imagination serves for Averroes less as a finetuning correction than as a course-correction. Moreover, by discarding Avempace’s claim about
the material intellect attaining immortality through its conjunction with the agent intellect, my
moderate Thinking-Model also removes the impetus for Averroes’ erroneous abandonment of
the view that the material intellect is a disposition.

4.4.4. A Correction on My Own Past Research
Another, more personal, benefit of my Avempace-inspired moderate Thinking-Model is that it
will serve as a correction on my own past research. In my master’s thesis Matter, Extension and
Intellect in Aristotle (2012), I had appealed to Aristotle’s treatment of human thought as an
explicable phenomenon,245 as well as his comparison of the mind’s operation to that of the
245
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perceptual faculty in DA 3.4, in order to motivate the premise that the first actualization of the
faculty of thought requires an internal material cause, just as the second actualization of the
perceptual faculty does. However, I had also pointed out that this analogy is upset by the fact
that, whereas Aristotle treats the perceptual faculty as a network of sensory powers embedded
in bodily organs,246 he argues vigorously in DA 3.4 that the intellectual power cannot be
regarded as being blended with the body. As a consequence of this asymmetry between the
two faculties, we are unable to designate any bodily organ as the material cause of thought as
we’d been able to do in the case of perception, because there simply is no bodily organ
associated with thought. And yet our explanation of the mechanics of thought still requires a
material substrate.
My answer to this problem was that we should designate the intellect itself as the material
substrate for its own actualization247—the upshot being that Aristotle believed in an
incorporeal248 species of matter; a conclusion which I took to be significant, in that it
contradicted the position held by such commentators as S. Cohen (1984) and Robert
Sokolowski (1970), that Aristotle was essentially a Cartesian with respect to his view of
matter.249 The main takeaway of my master’s thesis was therefore that Aristotle was not in fact
a Cartesian with respect to his view of matter.
The main criticism from my examiners was that although I had provided a compelling defense
of this position, I’d still made Aristotle into a Cartesian in another important respect: namely, in
that, by treating the intellect as an incorporeal subject, I seemed to have committed myself to
the view that Aristotle subscribed to a strong form of dualism, not unlike the one championed
by Descartes, with respect to the human intellect. And that although such a reading of Aristotle
is not totally indefensible, it is still fraught with difficulties.250
My Avempacean moderate Thinking-Model avoids this unintended consequence of my earlier
project, while still retaining the key elements of its overall contribution. Its key elements were,
again, (i) the idea that thought in its first actuality involves some sort of an alteration in a
material substrate, and (ii) the idea that this substrate is incorporeal.
The central assertion of my moderate Thinking-Model—i.e. that the “spiritual forms” of the
activated imaginative faculty serve as the substrate for the generation of learned thoughts—
fulfills both of these premises, and the two, taken together, preserve my earlier thesis’ point
materially composed things, “…call for an explanation of how they appear” (O’Hara, 56). On the basis of these
considerations, I’d inferred that if human thought is explicable at all on Aristotle’s view (which it appears to be),
then it must have a material cause of some sort.
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Recall his description of each sense as “a certain form or power in a magnitude,” in DA 2.12.
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Small, M. “Matter, Extension and Intellect in Aristotle” (2012): pg. 60-61.
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That is, unextended.
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Meaning that Aristotle regarded spatial extension as an essential attribute of matter.
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i.e. The bulk of evidence suggesting that Aristotle’s definition of soul was a naturalistic one, his claim that
thought depends upon images, the conditional from DA 1.1 stating that if thought is dependent upon images, then
it will be inseparable from the body…etc.
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about extension not being an essential attribute of matter for Aristotle.251 However, by treating
the intellect as a disposition inhering in the substrate whose alteration gives rise to learned
thoughts (rather than making it the substrate for its own actualization), my moderate ThinkingModel is able to avoid the implication of my earlier project, that the intellect is an incorporeal
subject. It therefore does not carry with it the unintended dualistic connotations that my
previous work did.
This not only absolves me of the awkward task of having to defend a strongly dualistic
interpretation of Aristotle in the face of all the textual evidence suggesting that he held a
naturalistic view of the human soul. But it also enables me to advance my earlier thesis with
much more consistency than I was able to in my master’s project. Aristotle was no Cartesian,
either with respect to his position on the intrinsic nature of matter, nor with respect to his
position on the human intellect.

4.5. Objections
4.5.1. What to do with GA 2.3 (736b26-28)?
There is another passage external to Aristotle’s DA discussion, which might potentially make
trouble for the entire naturalistic project, to which I am offering my moderate Thinking-Model
as a corrective contribution. I am referring here to Aristotle’s reference to an intellect “from
without” (thyrathen), in GA 2.3. The pertinent section of this book poses a “question of the
greatest difficulty, which we must strive to solve to the best of our ability and as far as possible”
(736b-4-6). The question is “When and how and whence is a share in reason acquired by those
animals that participate in this principle?” (736b6-7)
A great deal of what Aristotle has to say in the first half of this chapter might lead us to suspect
that he would want to answer that the rational power is already present (as a potentiality) in
the embryo from the moment of its conception, and that it makes its presence known
gradually, as the embryo develops into a fully-formed adult human being.252 For example, his
first observation, after posing the question of the intellect’s origin, is that embryos which have
been separated from their mother appear to live the life of a plant, and that from this, it follows
that the nutritive soul must have already been present (as a potentiality) prior to the embryo’s
separation from the mother. He then speculates that, “…we must be guided by this in speaking
of the sensitive and the rational soul” (736b12).
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Recall that on Avempace’s view, it is qua contents of the imaginative power that imaginative forms serve as the
substrate for learned thoughts, and the imaginative power is not a magnitude.
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In accordance with passage (q).
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It may come as something of a surprise, then, to find Aristotle apparently settling on the
following answer with respect to the origin of the rational power, midway through the chapter:

(zz) It remains, then, for the reason alone so to enter [i.e. from outside] and alone to be
divine, for no bodily activity has any connexion with the activity of reason (736b26-28).
Rather than confirming our expectations that Aristotle will endorse some sort of a bottom-up,
naturalistic entrance of the rational soul, this remark seems, prima facie at least, to mirror his
observation, from passage (ww), that the power of thought, “…seems to be a different kind of
soul, differing as what is eternal [differs] from what is perishable” (413b25-27). As such, it
seems to constitute evidence that Aristotle subscribed to a hard-dualistic view, at least with
respect to the human intellect. If left unanswered, this would seriously undermine the
naturalistic project endorsed by Wedin and Caston, which would also make trouble for my
moderate Thinking-Model of Imagination, since I am recommending it as a contribution to that
naturalistic project.
Wedin attempts to resolve the problem posed by passage (zz) by applying the same solution
that he applies to the reference to a separable and eternal nous poietikos, in DA 3.5. For Wedin,
the nous poietikos of DA 3.5 refers not to the divine intellect of the Metaphysics as Caston
would have it, but to a facet of each individual human soul. Given, then, that Wedin endorses a
naturalistic reading of Aristotle’s account of the human soul, he is unable to interpret the
alleged separability and eternality of nous poietikos in a literal sense, as Caston was able to do.
Instead, he explains these as properties which can be attributed to nous when considered in
abstraction from the hylomorphic body. We might say, in other words, that nous poietikos is,
for Wedin, “separable only in thought,” or merely “definitionally distinct” from the other
faculties. This is, at best, a kind of nominal or nonliteral separability.
Setting aside the question of whether this is a plausible solution to the tension in the DA
discussion, Wedin’s case for its applicability to the GA 2.3 discussion is rather weak. In support
of its supposed applicability, he points to the fact that a part of passage (zz) repeats the
sentiment, for which Aristotle had argued so vigorously in DA 3.4, that, “no bodily activity has
any connexion with the activity of reason” (736b28). The trouble with Wedin’s case is that he
mostly ignores the context in which this remark is repeated in the GA 2.3 discussion. Although
Aristotle does indeed repeat his point about the functional incorporeality of the intellectual
power in GA 2.3, his reasons for doing so in this context are completely different. Here, his
purpose is not to argue for the functional incorporeality of the rational power,253 but to draw
out the implications of its functional incorporeality, vis a vis the origin of the intellectual power.
His apparent answer is that because the intellectual power is functionally incorporeal, it must
253
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therefore enter “from outside,” as something divine. And it is difficult to imagine any sense in
which this “entering from without” can be plausibly interpreted as signifying that the
intellectual power is merely separable in abstraction.
Caston is more attentive to the context of the GA 2.3 discussion, and so he recognizes that the
dualistic challenge posed by passage (zz) requires a different solution from the one that he had
applied to the challenge posed by DA 3.5. To reiterate, Caston’s solution to DA 3.5’s nous
poietikos was that it referred not to any facet of the individual human mind,254 but rather to the
divine intellect of the Metaphysics. This solution is inapplicable to the tension in GA 2.3,
because in this chapter, Aristotle is clearly not engaged in the sort of taxonomical exercise255
that Caston attributes to him in the DA. His purpose in GA 2.3 is to account for the presence of
the rational power within a given human being. Moreover, this chapter, unlike the DA
discussion, does not distinguish between a passive, perishable nous and an eternal, active nous.
It refers to only one kind of nous, whose presence is supposed to account for a given human
being’s ability to cogitate. The upshot of all of this is that, unless Caston would be comfortable
committing himself to something akin to (the later) Averroes’ view that all human beings
acquire their share in rationality through a communal connection to a single, independent
intellectual substance—which he clearly wouldn’t be—he cannot interpret passage (zz)’s nous
thyrathen as referring to the divine intellect of the Metaphysics.
It must therefore refer to the intellect of each individual human being. Which means that, in
order to avoid passage (zz)’s apparent implication that each individual human intellect comes to
reside in its corresponding human compound through something akin to theological
implantation,256 Caston needs to find a way of construing the intellect’s supposed entrance
“from outside” as meaning something other than that it has an origin external to the biological
processes which give rise to the individual human organism. His alternative explanation is that
what “from outside” means in this context is having an origin external to the female’s
embryonic contribution. Which is to say that it comes from the male contribution (i.e. semen).
The complete picture is as follows: The human embryo is a hylomorphic compound just like any
other hylomorphic compound. As such, it has two components: a formal one and a material
one. The material one is provided by the mother at conception, and the formal one is provided
by the father, contained within his semen. Most of our psychic faculties, in their first-actuality,
result from the interaction between the material and formal components, since it is by means
of this interaction that the requisite organs come to be properly formed. However, as Aristotle
had argued so vigorously in DA 3.4, the activity of the intellectual power involves no bodily
organ, and so it does not depend (directly, at any rate) upon the interaction between the
formal component of the embryo and the material component. Rather, the embryo is endowed
254
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Devoted to enumerating the kinds of soul that exist throughout the Aristotelian cosmos.
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with the capacity for first-order thought, solely by virtue of the formal component, which is
provided by the father. Hence, “…it alone of all human abilities comes entirely from outside the
mother” (Caston, 1999, 215).
This solution provides a far more satisfying account than Wedin was able to give of what
Aristotle might have meant when he said that the rational power enters “from outside.” And
since this solution makes no appeal to theological principles, construing the “entrance” of the
rational power in biological terms instead, it seems to do the work that Caston’s naturalistic
project requires. It also strikes me as a very strong solution in terms of textual defensibility.
Immediately after posing the question of the rational principle’s origin (to which passage (zz)
provides the answer), Aristotle actually specifies that, if it does enter “from outside,” then what
this will mean is that it “com[es] into being in the male” (736b20). Which is to say, from outside
of the mother.257
The only remaining loose-end would be that Caston requires some naturalistic account of
Aristotle’s remark—in passage (zz)—that the rational power is alone among the psychic
faculties, in being “divine.” This might seem like a rather tall order, given the explicit nature of
Aristotle’s language (theion) in this passage. However, as Caston points out, there is some
precedent in the EN, for interpreting the human intellect’s supposed “divinity” in a non-literal
way. In EN 10.7, just after naming the life of contemplation as the “complete happiness of
man,” he addresses an objection which points out that, because man is by nature a composite
being, it seems inappropriate to designate the only non-composite activity in which he is
capable of engaging as his final end and happiness. This seems to lead to a contradiction:
namely, that the complete happiness of man is to live a life which is not really human at all, but
rather, divine.
Aristotle answers that our composite nature must not be used as an excuse for restricting our
scope of concern to “human” and “mortal” things. Rather, we must, “…so far as we can, make
ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for
even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything” (1178a1861).
The point here seems to be that, although we are indeed composite beings and although we
are therefore tethered to a bodily existence (and thus, not literally divine), we are nevertheless
able to approximate a divine life258 by living in accordance with the best thing in us, and
devoting ourselves, as much as we can, to the contemplation of the eternal things. In short,
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for his materialistic project, and that he needn’t have even bothered importing his abstractionist solution from his
analysis of the De Anima, which is of no use in any case.
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“divinity,” insofar as it applies to the individual human intellect, is just shorthand for “the best
thing in us.”
Having established that Aristotle’s EN 10.7 discussion is applying the term theion to the human
intellect in this non-literal way, Caston argues that it is also applied in this way during Aristotle’s
discussion in GA 2.3. And if we pause to consider the context in which Aristotle attributes
“divinity” to the human intellect in this chapter, we will find that this interpretation gives us a
much more coherent overall picture than a literal interpretation could. Given that the main
point of the chapter is to emphasize that the intellectual power is contributed by the male
parent, it makes far better sense to interpret the supposed “divinity” of the intellectual power
in the soft sense of meaning “the best thing in us,” than it would to interpret it as meaning that
the intellectual power is literally divine. The latter interpretation would almost seem to
generate a contradiction—namely, that something divine has biological origins. Whereas the
former interpretation makes the perfectly coherent (albeit sexist259) point that the “best thing
in us” is contributed by our male parent.
And so it turns out that the seemingly dualistic implications of passage (zz) can be dealt with
easily enough. GA 2.3 therefore does not pose a serious challenge to the naturalistic reading of
Aristotle’s theory of the human soul, nor, therefore, does it undermine my moderate ThinkingModel of Imagination.260

4.5.2. Are Imaginative Forms Really Unique in their Partial Independence?
Given, then, that the project of advancing a naturalistic reading of Aristotle’s theory of the
material intellect has turned out not to be undermined by the foregoing objection, we can now
move on to discuss objections which target specific aspects of my moderate Thinking-Model,
rather than seeking to undermine the naturalistic framework within which I am recommending
it.
The first such objection takes issue with my claim that the Avempacean roots of my moderate
Thinking-Model constitute a real improvement over the Alexandrian roots of Caston’s
emergentist reading. To reiterate, my position was that Caston’s emergentist reading inherits a
rather serious weakness from Alexander, to which Avempace had offered a solution—and that,
consequently, my moderate Thinking-Model, being heavily-influenced by Avempace, would
259
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of animal souls in general. And since he certainly wouldn’t be wanting to suggest that animal souls are in general
independent of bodily mechanisms, we probably shouldn’t make too much of this follow-up remark.
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inherit that solution. To be more specific, I had argued that Alexander’s positioning of the
material intellect as a disposition inhering in the soul or the human subject more broadly had
made it difficult for him to avoid the conclusion that the mind makes use of the body when it
apprehends intelligible objects, and that his attempt to work around this difficulty by appealing
to the notion of “common forms” had undermined his ability to account for the supposed
uniqueness of the intellect as a functionally incorporeal faculty, since all formal powers (save
those of the primary bodies) are “common forms,” for Alexander. And it seemed to me that
Avempace’s repositioning of the material intellect as a disposition inhering more precisely in
the “spiritual forms” of the activated imaginative faculty had enabled him to avoid both of
these difficulties. On the one hand, the “spiritual forms” of the activated imaginative faculty can
be said with much more plausibility than the soul or (certainly) the human subject more
broadly, to be endowed with the capacity to serve as purely formal subjects of change in their
own right. Moreover, since this capacity is (on Avempace’s view) unique to the spiritual forms
of the activated imaginative faculty, Avempace cannot be accused of attempting to explain the
material intellect’s functional incorporeality by appealing to a principle that would be broadly
applicable to all the other psychic faculties, as Alexander had done. Rather, he’s explaining it as
the fulfillment of an intermediary property which is localized to only one other faculty.
Now, as I had noted in the previous section of this chapter, Caston does not appear to have
appreciated the difficulty that I have noticed with Alexander’s dispositional reading. This being
the case, he would have no explicit motivation for challenging my claim that he has inherited
that difficulty, nor my claim that an Avempace-inspired Thinking-Model would constitute an
improvement. That said, it does appear that he would have independent reasons for disputing
the premise (upon which my case for the preferability of the Avempacean reading largely
pivots) that the spiritual forms of the activated imaginative faculty are unique in possessing the
requisite degree of independence from the body, to be able to serve as formal subjects of
change in their own right. Recall that I’d defended this premise by appealing to the observation
from the penultimate section of my third chapter, that the resonance of an imaginative form
within the body—upon which its resonance within the soul (i.e. the “spiritual form”)
supervenes—is capable of travelling between the peripheral organs and the heart by way of the
blood.261 But while Caston acknowledges that it is not uncommon for commentators to assume
that, “…any change that travels from the peripheral organs to the central organs is eo ipso
phantasia, sensation proper being something that occurs only in the peripheral organs”
(Caston, 1996, pg.46), he insists that this is a mistake.
On his view, perceptual stimulations themselves travel from the peripheral sensory organs to
the central sense, where they cause perceptual experiences. They also produce images as a
kind of residual side-effect, and these images travel in tandem with them from the peripheral
261
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sensory organs to the central organ, where they cause a second experience, in much the same
way that an echo follows behind the disturbance of air which causes our initial auditory
experience. The upshot of Caston’s echo-hypothesis would be that, not only are the spiritual
forms of the activated imaginative faculty not unique in possessing the requisite degree of
independence to enable them to serve as subjects of change in their own right, but that,
furthermore, their possession of this partial independence ought properly to be regarded as
incidental to262 the partial independence possessed by the spiritual forms contained within the
activated perceptual faculty.
If this is correct, then one might well argue that contrary to what I had suggested in the
previous section, Avempace’s account of the material intellect actually does fall prey to the
second of Alexander’s two shortcomings—namely, that it winds up appealing to features which
are common to multiple psychic faculties, in its attempt to account for the uniqueness of the
material intellect. And if this is right, then it would appear that my suggestion, that an
Avempace-inspired moderate Thinking-Model constitutes a significant improvement over
Caston’s Alexandrian reading, was greatly exaggerated.
My response to this objection is twofold. Firstly, even if the objection does go through, it still
will not generate as severe a problem for my Avempacean reading as the Alexandrian difficulty
does for Caston’s emergentist reading. The reason why Alexander’s attempt to explain the
uniqueness of the intellect’s functional incorporeality by appealing to the notion of “common
forms” had been so troublesome for him was because on his view, it was by virtue of being a
common form itself that the material intellect could be said to enjoy functional independence
from the matter of the bodily organs. But since all the other psychic faculties are common
forms as well, this forced him to fall back on the notion that functional independence is a
matter of gradation, which introduced an element of arbitrariness into his explanation as to
why the material intellect should stand alone in enjoying total functional independence.
Caston’s objection, by contrast, would not have a comparable effect on my Avempacean
reading. This is because, on my view, it is not by virtue of being an “intermediate spiritual form”
itself that the material intellect is endowed with functional incorporeality, but rather, by virtue
of being the product of a change undergone by intermediate spiritual forms whose partial
independence from the matter of the body enables them to serve as subjects of change in their
own right. And although I’d theorized this partial independence as belonging solely to the
spiritual forms of the imaginative faculty,263 it would only require a minor tweak to my position
to accommodate the view that that it also belongs to the spiritual forms of the perceptual
faculty.264 This would simply require me to take a slightly broader view of the kinds of spiritual
forms that are capable of serving as the substrata for the process of change by which thoughts
come about. But because the nutritive faculty would be in no way implicated in the relevant
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flavor of partial independence, the central move of the Avempacean position—i.e., construing
the material intellect’s functional incorporeality as the fulfillment of an intermediary property—
would still be salvageable.265
This is all beside the point, however, as Caston’s objection does not go through. In fact, the only
reason it has any surface-level plausibility at all is because it conflates two distinct kinds of
perceptions and two distinct kinds of images.
We have seen, during our reading of Wallace in the third chapter, that the special senses are
incapable of grasping anything other than special sensory-impressions, and that the central
sense is responsible for translating these into perceptual representations of concrete objects, in
part, by, “…grasping the common properties which are involved in the existence of the qualities
of the body” (Wallace, lxxx). Given that the central sense is located in the heart, this does seem
to require that the special sensory impressions (qua components of the body) are capable of
travelling between the peripheral sensory organs and the heart. As this occurs, a parallel
journey is undergone by images of the special sensory impressions. These particulate-images
also begin their existence in the peripheral organs as the direct causal byproducts of the special
sensory impressions, and piggyback on their causal antecedents as they travel to the central
organ. The result is that, as the special sensory impressions are assembled into perceptual
representations of objects by the synthesizing functions of the central sense, their imaginative
counterparts are also assembled into representations of objects, as an incidental byproduct of
this process.
And so it would appear that Caston is correct that both imaginative and perceptual forms (qua
components of the body) are mobile between the peripheral and sensory organs—that is, at
least, if we’re referring to perceptions and images of the special sensibles. The problem, for
Caston, is that, when Avempace says that the material intellect derives from the agent
intellect’s illumination of the intermediate spiritual forms contained within the activated
imaginative faculty, he’s not talking about particulate images of the special sensibles; he’s
talking about images of objects. And so in order to really undermine Avempace’s notion that
the spiritual forms of the activated imaginative faculty are unique in possessing the requisite
degree of independence from the body to enable them to serve as subjects for the generation
of learned thoughts, one would need to be able to show that both imaginative and perceptual
experiences of objects supervene on corresponding imaginative and perceptual objectrepresentations retained within the body, which are capable of travelling between the
peripheral and central organs.

265

In this case, we’d simply need to conceptualize the perceptual and imaginative faculties as a sort of packagedeal, which together embody the quasi-corporeality which bridges the gap between the thoroughgoing
corporeality of the nutritive faculty, and the functional incorporeality of the material intellect. And this does not
strike me as a particularly outlandish move, given the subtlety of Aristotle’s definitional distinction between the
two faculties at De Insomniis (459a15-459a22). Recall his remark that the perceptual and imaginative faculties are
identical, but different in their being.
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Unfortunately for Caston, this premise simply isn’t defensible; perceptions and images of
objects (qua components of the body) are decidedly asymmetrical with respect to bodily
mobility. Neither can be said to have travelled from the peripheral organs to the central organ
in the first place, as both are wrought from the synthesizing functions of the central sense. And
so the pertinent question is whether they both possess the ability to move about in the blood
after being assembled in the central organ. The answer is that while images of objects (qua
bodily) can certainly be said to possess this sort of longevity,266 perceptions of objects (qua
bodily) cannot. Images of objects remain imprinted in our system long after the perceptible
objects which caused them are removed from contact with us, whereas properly perceptual
representations of objects vanish as soon as this contact is interrupted.
Caston’s claim about mobility between the peripheral and central organs being a common
feature of perceptible and imaginative forms (qua bodily) therefore does not have the impact
on the Avempacean account of the material intellect that it might initially appear to. Again, its
initial veneer of plausibility results from the conflation of perceptions and images of the special
sensibles,267 to which Caston’s symmetry-claim is applicable, with perceptions and images of
objects,268 to which it is not applicable.
This conflation is evident in the following passage, wherein Caston expands on his comparison
of images to perceptual echoes, by explaining that these echoes don’t necessarily retain their
resemblance to the perceptions which cause them, during their journey to the central sense:
My observations of a salamander, for example, might produce echoes which remain in
my system unnoticed for many hours. But when they finally reactivate later in the
evening, the effects of a half-bottle of whiskey have so altered them that I dream, not of
a salamander, but an immense fire-breathing dragon. A dragon could not have been a
causal ancestor of my dream, of course—dragons don’t exist. But my phantasmata have
the ability to affect my central organ the way it would be affected were I to see such a
dragon (Caston 1996, 49).
This passage glosses over the distinction between images of the special sensibles and images of
objects—as well as the process by which the latter are constructed out of the former—and
casually assumes that images of objects come pre-assembled, prior to their arrival at the central
organ. This is clear from Caston’s choice of examples; the image of a salamander couldn’t
transform into an image of a dragon on its way to the central organ unless it had already been
assembled as an image of a salamander prior to reaching the central organ. And if the original
image of a salamander is indeed the echo of a perception which preceded it causally, as
266

Otherwise we’d have no memory of them.
Qua bodily.
268
Qua bodily.
267

122

Caston’s echo-theory would have it, then it stands to reason that the perception of a
salamander was also already assembled prior to its arrival at the central sense. Caston’s
expanded echo-theory therefore presents us with the following overall sequence of events:
firstly, a perception of an object travels from one of the peripheral organs to the central organ,
where it causes an experience of that object. Then, after some delay, the echo-image of that
perception (or possibly some distorted version of it) reaches the central sense and stimulates it
again, causing a second experience.
Were this the correct sequence of events, Caston’s claim that perceptual and imaginative forms
(qua components of the body) are symmetrical with regard to their mobility between the
organs would be applicable to perceptions and images of objects. In which case, Caston’s echotheory really would pose somewhat of a problem for my suggestion that Avempace’s account
of the material intellect has an advantage over his preferred Alexandrian account, since in this
case, the kind of corresponding soul-forms which supposedly serve as the “material” cause for
the generation of learned-thoughts (i.e. imaginative soul-forms) would not be unique in their
partial-independence from the matter of the bodily organs.269
But it should be clear, given what we know about the role that the central sense plays in the
construction of perceptions and images of objects, that this is not the correct sequence of
events. As we have seen several times now, the central sense is supposed to play an integral
role in synthesizing perceptions and images of the special sensibles into perceptions and images
of objects. But by glossing over the distinction between these two categories and effectively
treating all perceptions and images as representations of objects from the outset, Caston’s
expanded echo-theory erases the central sense’s synthesizing functions, leaving it with no
significant role to play, other than as a passive receptacle for perceptions and images of
objects. A more plausible exegesis of the salamander example would be that particulate
sensations caused by the salamander’s contact with our peripheral sensory organs travel to the
central organ, where they are assembled into a coherent perceptual representation of a
salamander. As this happens, the residual impressions of those particulate sensations travel in
tandem with them to the central sense where they are assembled into coherent imaginative
representations of a salamander. Once the salamander has ceased to make contact with our
peripheral organs, the perceptual representation of the salamander vanishes, leaving behind its
residual salamander phantasm, which can then reenter the blood and lay dormant in our
system, possibly becoming distorted by the effects of a half-bottle of whiskey, and
subsequently affecting our central organ again in the likeness of a fire-breathing dragon.
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Though, again, it should be noted that I could work around this problem easily enough by reconceptualizing
perception and imagination as a package-deal, as I have established above.

123

4.5.3. Illumination by the Productive Intellect.
Another objection to the plausibility of my moderate Thinking-Model of Imagination might take
aim at the idea—which is central to the Avempacean view, after which I’ve modelled it—that
the productive intellect literally triggers the generation of learned thoughts by illuminating the
images contained within the activated imaginative faculty.
For example, Caston argues that, if the productive intellect is to be identified with the
Aristotelian God (a belief that he shares with Avempace, as we have seen), then it cannot enter
directly into the causal mechanisms of human thought, in the manner in which Avempace’s
theory would require it to. In defense of this claim, Caston points to Aristotle’s account of the
divine intellect’s role in bringing about the eternal motion of the universe, in MA 6-7. Recall
that Aristotle had explained the motion of the universe as being “for the sake of” the prime
mover, whose unqualified and eternal goodness guarantees that the motion of the universe is
without beginning or end. According to this account, the prime mover serves as the final cause
for the motion of the universe, and Caston is careful to underscore that a cause of this sort
“does not make direct physical contact” with the things it moves (Caston, 1999, 219).
Moreover, on Caston’s view, what is true of the relationship between the prime mover and the
universe in general must also be true of the relation between the prime mover and the human
intellect. Which is to say that, to the extent the prime mover can be credited with playing any
role in the generation of human thought, it must be as a final cause, which he claims does not
involve any direct contact. Thus, “…while God is a productive cause, he does not literally trigger
our first thought any more than he gives the outermost sphere a first spin. God directs us, as he
does the universe, by being the point towards which we all tend” (Caston, 1999, 222). If correct,
this would seem to topple Avempace’s theory of the material intellect, and my moderate
Thinking-Model of the Imagination, along with it.
We might reasonably wonder, though, how Caston makes sense of Aristotle’s deployment of
the light-analogy, during his explanation of the productive intellect’s contribution to human
thought, in DA 3.5. Aristotle does say that the productive intellect actualizes potential
intelligibles in a manner analogous to the sense in which light “makes potential colours into
actual colours” (430a16). And this seems, prima facie, anyway, to favor Avempace’s notion that
the productive intellect (here identified as God) plays a direct causal role in the generation of
learned thoughts. Thus, Caston must answer the following two questions, in order to
convincingly incorporate the light-analogy into his vision of the productive intellect as playing
only a teleological role in human thought. Firstly, he needs to explain why the light-analogy
does not in fact favor Avempace’s notion that the productive intellect plays a direct causal role
in the generation of learned thoughts. Secondly, he needs to explain how it functions as an
illustration of his alternative view, that the productive intellect only plays a teleological role in
the generation of learned thoughts.
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Caston’s response to the first question is that the apparent harmony between the light-analogy
and the idea that the productive intellect (i.e. God) plays a direct causal role in human thought
is the result of a faulty understanding of Aristotle’s conception of light. He concedes that, if
we’re assuming that it is by virtue of “its reflection and absorption by the surfaces of bodies”
that light produces actual colours, then the analogy between light and the productive intellect
would imply that the productive intellect plays a direct causal role in human thought. However,
Caston cautions, this is not how Aristotle understood the role of light in actualizing colors.
Rather, “…light is [for Aristotle] a static condition, the actuality of the transparent medium; it is
what allows colors to produce sensation and so make themselves actual colors, by being seen
as they actually are” (Caston, 1999, 223). Caston therefore concludes that if Aristotle conceived
of the productive intellect as playing a direct causal role in human thought, then he, “has not
chosen apt analogies” (Caston, 1999, 223).
How, then, does the light-analogy better illustrate Caston’s view of the productive intellect as
the final cause of human thought? Caston doesn’t have very much to say about this,270 except
to argue that Aristotle’s use of the light-analogy is an allusion to Plato’s use of the sun-analogy
in Republic VI, and that in this context what is salient about the sun-analogy, “…is precisely its
teleological character: it is the Form of the Good that is compared to the Sun and said to be the
explanans of intelligibles being what they are and being known” (Caston, 1999, 224).
Of course, even if we accept Caston’s claim that Aristotle’s invocation of the light-analogy is an
allusion to Plato’s sun-analogy, there are a number of stark dissimilarities between Aristotle’s
productive intellect and Plato’s Form of the Good, which seem to undermine the notion that
the analogy functions the same way in Aristotle’s hands as it does in Plato’s. Firstly, it needs to
be acknowledged that the teleological salience of Plato’s Form of the Good is—at least on
Aristotle’s view—far narrower than that of the productive intellect. As Gail Fine (2003) points
out, a part of the reason why Aristotle rejected the existence of Platonic Forms is that he didn’t
think that they were capable of serving either as the material, formal, efficient, or final aitiai of
sensible particulars.271 Which is to say that he didn’t think they had any real explanatory power,
“…at least…as far as the sensible world goes” (Fine, 350). And so it would seem that the
teleological role that Plato assigns to the Form of the Good in relation to human cognition
cannot, unlike that which Aristotle assigns to his productive intellect, be expressed as a function
of any broader teleological role that it plays in relation to the motion of the universe.
Secondly, there is a strong case to be made that the teleological role that Plato assigns to the
Form of the Good in relation to human cognition is really only applicable to the cognitive acts of
a small subset of human beings. Although Fine questions whether Plato really subscribes to the
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In fact, he seems downright disinterested in unpacking the light metaphor. He suggests a number of times that
the metaphor is too vague and interpretively malleable to be of much help in clarifying Aristotle’s intentions.
271
She adds that, with the possible exception of formal aitiai, Aristotle would have expected Plato to agree with
this assessment.
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Two-Worlds hypothesis which is commonly attributed to him,272 she acknowledges that
cognizance of the Forms is a necessary condition for knowledge on Plato’s view, and that the
overall aim of the Republic is, “…to persuade us that philosophers should rule, since only they
have knowledge” (Fine, 86). If cognizance of the Forms is a necessary condition for knowledge,
and if only philosophers can attain knowledge, then the implication appears to be that only
philosophers are capable of grasping the Forms. And if the Form of the Good is what accounts
for the rest of the Forms being what they are and being knowable to those who are capable of
knowing them, it seems to follow that the Form of the Good is only epistemically relevant to
would-be philosopher kings. By contrast, the third book of Aristotle’s DA purports to offer a
generalized account of human cognition.273 Thus, if Aristotle does indeed identify the
productive intellect as a final cause of human thought in DA 3.5, he means everyone’s thought,
not just that of philosophers.
Thirdly, the Republic describes the Form of the Good as the conscious end of philosophical
thought; philosophers are said to require knowledge of the Good before they can be qualified
to govern the state, and so they must seek out this knowledge explicitly, as the crowning jewel
of their philosophical training. The Form of the Good is therefore, quite explicitly, that for the
sake of which philosophers think. By contrast, Aristotle’s productive intellect is not (at least on
Caston’s reading) consciously pursued as an object of thought at all. Of course, there must still
be some sense in which it can be described as “that for the sake of which” we think;274 it just
needs to be expressible in terms which do not imply that all acts of human thought are
conscious attempts to get to know the productive intellect. What they are, on Caston’s view,
are “emulations” of the productive intellect. The idea here is that, when we engage in acts of
thought, our potential intellects become actualized in a manner which—however imperfectly
and temporarily—resembles the perfect and eternal actuality of the productive intellect, which
is forever engaged in thought. In short, the productive intellect serves as the final cause of our
thought, simply by being the paradigm of intellectual activity, toward which we all tend, by
resemblance, when we actualize our own intellectual natures.
This brings us to the final—and perhaps the most significant—dissimilarity between Plato’s
Form of the Good, and Aristotle’s productive intellect. Our coming to know the Form of the
Good cannot be described as an act of emulation on Platonic terms, because this would require
the Form of the Good to be the paradigm of intellectual activity. And there is no serious
indication that Plato regarded the Form of the Good as being an intellect at all, let alone the
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And which precludes any knowledge of particulars, relegating them to the domain of mere belief.
Though he does state in the EN that only certain people are suited to a life of sustained philosophical reflection,
this doesn’t mean he agrees with Plato that only philosophers are capable of knowing anything at all.
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After all, the productive intellect is said by Aristotle to be that “for the sake of” which the entire universe
moves.
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paradigm of intellectual activity.275 Throughout the discussion in the Republic, Plato treats the
Form of the Good as something mysterious, whose nature can only be approached indirectly
(hence Plato’s reliance on metaphor). Aristotle’s description of human thought as an emulation
of the productive intellect therefore cannot have been carried over from Plato.
Given all these points of dissimilarity, it seems to me that Caston’s appeal to Plato can only be
of very limited use in helping us to understand what Aristotle was up to, when he compared the
productive intellect to light. Although Plato may also have been using the analogy to illustrate a
point about the teleological salience of his first principle, the teleological salience of his first
principle just isn’t similar enough to Aristotle’s for the analogy to function the same way in
Aristotle’s hands. We may therefore need to look elsewhere for elucidation.
On that note, we should recall that, in addition to praising Alexander for his receptivity to the
naturalistic leanings of Aristotle’s definition of the soul,276 Caston had also credited Alexander
with fleshing out the “rich metaphysics” of the emergentist picture of the material intellect,
which Aristotle had only begun to sketch in broad strokes. And so, given that Caston seems to
regard Alexander’s commentary as a fulfillment of what is contained prototypically in Aristotle’s
writings,277 one might reasonably expect that—if pressed—he would want to appeal to
Alexander once again for a more enriched explanation of how Aristotle’s use of the lightanalogy is supposed to illustrate the teleological role that the productive intellect plays in
actualizing human thought.
In order to suit Caston’s purposes, Alexander’s exegesis of the light-analogy would need to
encapsulate each of the aforementioned features which distinguish the productive intellect
from the Platonic Good. Which is to say that it would need to illustrate (1) the idea that the
productive intellect is the final cause of the motion of the entire universe and only derivatively
the final cause of human thought, (2) the idea that the productive intellect is epistemically
relevant to everyone’s thought acts,278 (3) the idea that the productive intellect is not
consciously pursued as the object of every thought act, and (4) the idea that the productive
intellect is the paradigm of intellectual activity in the Aristotelian framework, which we emulate
when we think. It would, moreover, need to do all of this without losing sight of (5) the peculiar
Aristotelian conception of light as the actuality of the visual medium.
And there is a text in which Alexander appears to unpack the light-analogy in a manner which
(more or less) satisfies these criteria. I am referring here to the De Intellectu. According to
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There is a passage in Republic book X, in which Plato seems to suggest that the Forms are created by a god.
However, as Christopher Janeway (2006) points out, this passage is anomalous, and really doesn’t align with the
theory of Forms as it is usually articulated (including in the foregoing books of the Republic).
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As evidenced by his framing of the productive intellect as something divine and independent of each individual
human soul.
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It was presumably for this reason that he opted to model his own interpretation of Aristotle after Alexander’s.
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Frederic M. Schroeder and Robert B. Todd (1990),279 the De Intellectu treats light as something
which is “seen along with its concomitants.” By which they mean that, “when we see visible
objects, we see at the same time the light by which they are illuminated” (Schroeder & Todd,
72). The idea here seems to be that, although light is certainly a necessary condition for our
perception of visible objects, and although its visibility must therefore in some sense be
considered to have primacy, it is not itself the primary—viz. most direct—object of our vision.
What we see most directly is the illuminated object, and our vision of the light itself is
incidental to or implicit in our vision of the illuminated object.
One might paraphrase this by saying that it is within (or against the backdrop of) the light’s
visibility that we see the illuminated object. And so the De Intellectu’s conception of light does
seem to harmonize rather well with Caston’s emphasis on (5) light’s status as the actuality of
the visual medium. Moreover, once the light-analogy is carried over to the productive intellect,
the incidental nature of our perception of light does seem to capture the idea that the
productive intellect, while certainly playing a necessary role in our cognition of intelligible
objects, is (3) not itself a conscious object of every thought-act. Rather, what we think most
directly is the intelligible object which the productive intellect illuminates, and our cognitive
awareness of the productive intellect itself is incidental to or implicit in our cognition of the
illuminated intelligible object. Or, one might say, it is within (or against the backdrop of) the
productive intellect’s intelligibility that we think the illuminated intelligible object.
This backdrop of illuminating intelligibility is also said to be an abiding presence throughout the
course of the human intellect’s development, serving as an indirect object in all of its individual
thought-acts, “…while it is being completed and increased and is in that way the [final] cause of
its development” (Schroeder & Todd, 72). This seems at once to capture (2) the idea that the
productive intellect plays a role in every person’s thought-acts, at every level of their
intellectual development,280 and also the idea that the productive intellect is (4) the paradigm
of intellectual activity, which we come more and more to resemble, as we actualize our own
natures as intelligent beings.281
Really, the only thing that doesn’t appear to be explicitly confirmed by the De Intellectu’s
exegesis is the idea that (1) the productive intellect’s role as the final cause of human thought is
just one facet of a broader role that it plays as the final cause of the motion of the universe. But
the De Intellectu is a focused treatise on the ins-and-outs of human cognition—not of the
motion of the entire universe—and so it probably isn’t fair to expect this point to come out in
its treatment of the light-analogy. On the whole then, it would seem that the De Intellectu’s
treatment of the light-analogy is quite consistent with Caston’s understanding of the
productive-intellect’s teleological function, in relation to human thought.
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The problem, for Caston, is that the authenticity of the De Intellectu has been seriously
contested. This began with Moraux (1942), who is reported to have, “...detected such a
divergence of doctrine between [the De Intellectu and Alexander’s De Anima] that he concluded
that they could not both be by the same author, even if we made allowance for intellectual
development” (Schroeder & Todd, 6). And since the De Anima is certainly authentic, this led
Moraux to the conclusion that the De Intellectu could not have been written by Alexander.
Some282 have attempted to salvage the Alexandrian authorship of the De Intellectu by
relegating it to Alexander’s early period (the upshot being that in this case, the divergence
between the De Intellectu and the De Anima could in fact be accounted for by intellectual
development). However, Schroeder and Todd find this approach to be unpersuasive. The De
Intellectu reads to them like a paraphrase of some other work, and so they argue that if we
were to place it on the same developmental continuum as the De Anima, the natural place for it
would be after the De Anima, rather than before it. But, given the severity of the doctrinal
disagreement between the two texts, it is difficult to imagine how the De Intellectu could be
construed as a paraphrase of the De Anima. Hence, Schroeder and Todd concur with Moraux
that, in the absence of some supplemental text which is capable of explaining how the contents
of the De Intellectu are derivable from those of the De Anima (which we do not have), “…we
must seriously doubt whether the De Intellectu is an authentic part of the Alexandrian corpus”
(Schroeder & Todd, 20).283
Schroeder and Todd also stress that one of the key areas in which the De Intellectu and the De
Anima diverge is in their handling of the light-analogy. The De Anima—whose authorship, again,
is not disputed—tells a very different story than the De Intellectu does, about how the lightanalogy is supposed to illustrate the productive intellect’s role in generating human thought.
Here, the source of light is not said to merely provide a luminescent backdrop (i.e. medium)
within which we come to see visible objects. Rather, the illumination is described as, “…a joint
effect produced both by the source of light and by the illumined object” (Schroeder & Todd,
16). This entails that the luminescent field is not itself sufficient to produce visibility; the
illuminated object must also, “…be regarded as making its own [necessary] contribution to the
production of visibility when the illumined object and the source of light are juxtaposed”
(Schroeder & Todd, 16). This seems to imply some sort of a direct causal interaction between
the luminescent field and the illuminated object.
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Carrying the analogy over to the productive intellect, the upshot would be that, rather than
merely providing a noetic field populated by intelligible objects for our minds to grasp at—and
serving as the telos toward which we tend, but with which we never actually make contact—
the productive intellect of Alexander’s De Anima actually makes some sort of direct contact
with individual human knowers, when they think. Such, at least, appears to be the inference
drawn by Schroeder and Todd: “…the natural and metaphysical orders meet when the human
mind advances to the omega point of noetic illumination” (Schroeder & Todd, 19). They specify,
moreover, that the human intelligence is the “locus” for this contact between the natural and
intelligible orders, and they even go so far as to characterize the contact as a juxtaposition of
two distinct kinds of forms: “immanent forms” (that is, forms which are enmattered,
presumably in the human subject) and “transcendent forms” (that is, eternal and immaterial
intelligibles).
This all seems to align much more closely with Avempace’s understanding of the productive
intellect’s noetic luminescence as effecting a sort of formal alteration in the contents of the
imaginative faculty, than with Caston’s notion that the productive intellect only makes an
indirect contribution to human thought, by serving as its final cause. This should probably not
surprise us much. We have seen already that Avempace’s account of the material intellect was
intended as a minor correction on Alexander’s position, to which Avempace was generally
sympathetic; and so it is to be expected that Avempace’s understanding of the role of the
productive intellect should bear a close resemblance to Alexander’s.
Given, then, that the De Anima is the canonical Alexandrian account of the human intellect, this
seems to put Caston in a rather awkward position. He has (as we have seen) credited Alexander
not only with being generally loyal to the primary Aristotelian texts on the soul, but also, with
having fleshed out their true implications, in those areas in which they are found to be
underdeveloped. And, on the basis of this glowing appraisal of Alexander’s “Aristotelianism,” he
has generally been quite happy to model his own interpretation of Aristotle after Alexander’s.
And yet, when it comes to his explanation of the role of the productive intellect in bringing
about human thought, Caston is forced to accuse Alexander of having lapsed into flagrantly unAristotelian territory.
Of course, up to this point, we’ve been granting Caston’s claim that the
Alexandrian/Avempacean perspective on the role of the productive intellect is un-Aristotelian.
But we may want to take a closer look at his motivation for making this assertion. The first thing
to notice is that he is not, as we might expect, motivated by a sense that the productive
intellect’s status as a final cause precludes it from also being an efficient cause. In fact, Caston
acknowledges numerous times that, “Aristotle regards such final causation as an efficient
cause” (Caston, 1999, 200), and that he regards the productive intellect as being genuinely
productive of human thought, at least in the broad sense of “mak[ing] what undergoes the
change similar to itself” (Caston, 1999, 220). This is reflected in Caston’s aforementioned
emphasis on the principle that we emulate the productive intellect when we think, and his

130

acknowledgement that “our [intellectual] actualizations are truly like God’s” (Caston, 1999,
223).
That said, Caston does not think that the productive intellect can be productive of human
thought in a direct mechanistic sense, as this sort of causation, “…can take place only if the
[productive] agent belongs to the same genus as what it affects.” On Caston’s reading, this
requires that the agent have the same matter as that which it affects—a condition that the
productive intellect cannot satisfy, since it is, “without matter entirely” (Caston, 1999, 220).
But while this line of reasoning does give us compelling reasons for thinking that the productive
intellect couldn’t make direct mechanistic contact with physical objects, it is far less clear that it
precludes the productive intellect from making such contact with the human intellect. For one
thing, the productive intellect does, by Caston’s own admission, belong to the same genus as
the human intellect. As we’ve seen above, Caston reads the overall program of Aristotle’s DA as
a taxonomical one, meaning that Aristotle’s intent isn’t to enumerate the various faculties
which manifest in an individual human soul, but rather, to catalogue the various kinds of soul
which can be found throughout the universe.284 In accordance with this interpretation of the
DA’s overall program, Caston reads Aristotle’s distinction between the receptive and productive
intellects not as concerning two intellectual components of an individual human soul, but as,
“…concern[ing] two separate species of mind,” i.e. human and divine (Caston, 1999, 224).
Moreover, direct contact between the productive intellect and the human intellect needn’t
require the productive intellect to traverse the sort of dualistic barrier that Caston worries
about, because the human intellect is also incorporeal.
A likely response from Caston would be that although the human intellect is not itself a
corporeal entity, it is nevertheless ultimately derived from a material substrate, which still
implies that if the productive intellect were to play a direct causal role in the production of
human thought, it would have to do so by effecting changes in the body, which, again, it cannot
do, because it has no matter.
And it is difficult to dispute the power of this response, at least insofar as it applies to the
Alexandrian account of the human intellect. Recall that although Alexander treats the human
intellect as a disposition (which itself is not anything corporeal), he’d struggled, on account of
his overbroad conception of the subject of that disposition, to avoid the implication that the
intellect’s actualization results from a change undergone by the body. It follows that, in order
for the productive intellect to play a direct mechanistic role in the actualization of human
thought on the Alexandrian view, it would have to do so by stimulating change in some part of
the body. Hence, the notion that the productive intellect plays a direct causal role in the
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Including both the physical and the metaphysical realms.
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actualization of human thought does indeed appear to be incompatible with the Alexandrian
account of the emergence of the human intellect.285
But what about the Avempacean variant on the Alexandrian account? Recall that Avempace
had managed to avoid Alexander’s difficulty by construing the material intellect as a disposition
inhering not in the soul or the human subject broadly construed, but more specifically in the
“spiritual forms” of the activated imaginative faculty,286 which are capable of serving as a
subject of change in their own right. This also enables Avempace to square his account of the
human intellect with the idea that the productive intellect makes a direct mechanistic
contribution to its emergence. Since the substrate for this alteration is itself purely formal, it
follows that the productive intellect—which is also without matter—wouldn’t need to traverse
an impossible dualistic barrier in order to make the necessary contact with it.
Thus, the notion that the productive intellect makes a direct mechanistic contribution to human
thought is compatible at least with Avempace’s account of the emergence of the material
intellect. And since we have independent reasons for preferring Avempace’s account anyway,
we can conclude that, contra Caston, the notion that the productive intellect makes a direct
mechanistic contribution to human thought is not flatly un-Aristotelian, though it certainly
seems to be incompatible with Caston’s preferred interpretation of Aristotle.
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Since Alexander seems to intend to construe the divine intellect as playing a direct causal role in the
actualization of human thought, we’ll have to count this as a further inconsistency on his part, connected with his
inability to square the human mind’s dependence upon the body with its functional incorporeality.
286
That is, with imaginative forms qua contents of the soul.
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Conclusion
I began by noting a curious tension in Aristotle’s account of the imagination in DA 3.3. On the
one hand, he seems to describe imagination as a motion in the soul which is initiated by
sensation, and which is similar in character to it. But on the other hand, he also seems to flirt
with the idea that imagination is a kind of thinking. My first chapter posed the question of
whether the imagination might be said to answer to both descriptions, and if so, what this
might mean. In order to attack the question in a systematic way, I’d specified three possible
variants of a “Thinking-Model” of imagination and proposed to examine each one in turn. These
were: (1) the strong Thinking-Model, which holds that images are intrinsically noetic, (2) the
moderate Thinking-Model, which holds that images can sometimes be noetic, and (3) the
superficial Thinking-Model, which holds that Aristotle only applied noetic terminology to the
imagination in a loose, non-literal sense. The strong and moderate Thinking Models initially
struck me as enjoying equal textual support, with passages (d) and (f) supporting the strong
Thinking-Model, and passages (c) and (e) supporting the moderate Thinking-model. The
superficial Thinking-Model did not seem to me to enjoy any direct textual support.
In an effort to dispose of the least interesting variant first, my second chapter focused on the
superficial Thinking-Model. Here, I examined two claims. The first was that there is in fact direct
textual support for the superficial Thinking-Model in DA 3.5. The second was that EN 6.11
contains a broader precedent for superficial applications of noetic terminology, which ought to
inform our interpretations of passages (c) through (f). With regard to DA 3.5, the suggestion—
advanced by numerous historical commentators—was that its mention of a perishable nous
pathetikos in passage (g) can only have been referring (superficially) to the imagination, since
the material intellect is imperishable on Aristotle’s view. In response to this claim, I’d cited
Alexander’s emergentist reading, in order to cast doubt on the supposition that Aristotle
regarded the material intellect as imperishable. I’d also noted that, while Alexander’s reading is
not without its flaws, his overall project of advancing a naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle’s
account of the material intellect has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years. This being the case, I
argued that there is no particular need to interpret passage (g)’s nous pathetikos as a reference
to the imagination.
As for EN 6.11, the suggestion here was that its application of the term nous to the perceptual
faculty provides us with a clear precedent for the non-literal use of noetic terminology in the
Aristotelian corpus, and that because Aristotle’s distinction between the perceptual and
imaginative faculties is so subtle, our natural assumption ought to be that Aristotle was doing
something similar when he applied noetic terminology to the imaginative faculty in passages (c)
through (f). In response to this claim, I’d argued that even if EN 6.11 contained a superficial
application of the term nous to the perceptual faculty (which I am somewhat skeptical about), it
would still require a careful case-by-case analysis to determine whether Aristotle is making a
similar move in passages (c) through (f). And the contextual markers in and around these
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passages simply don’t bear it out. I’d closed this chapter by making one small concession:
namely, that on closer inspection, passage (f)’s apparent support for the strong Thinking Model
does appear to be downgraded, by the end of DA 3.10, into support for the moderate ThinkingModel. This leaves only one of the four key passages—i.e. passage (d)—in support of the strong
Thinking-Model.
That said, the ramifications of the strong Thinking-Model are the most interesting of the three
models, and so I’d endeavored, in my third chapter, to make the strongest possible case that
could be made for it. Focussing in on the strong Thinking-Model’s implication that non-human
animals can be credited with possessing some capacity for thought, I’d acknowledged that, to
many, this might seem so radical as to constitute a self-refutation, given the many passages in
the corpus—(i) through (n)—which indicate that it was precisely by reference to the intellectual
capacities that Aristotle had distinguished humans from the lower animals. However, I
maintained that the notion of non-human animal thought in Aristotle isn’t as far-fetched as it
might initially sound. In defense of this claim, I’d pointed to a thread from HA 8.1, in which
Aristotle suggests that the animal world exists on a continuum, with the lower animals
possessing faint traces of psychic capacities which find their fullest expression in humans. I’d
then observed that this gradational picture seems perfectly capable of accommodating the
notion that non-human animals might possess a form of thought, provided that thought itself
admits of gradations, with the more paradigmatic forms (i.e. practical and theoretical
reasoning) being undergirded by a more rudimentary form of intellectual awareness. And I’d
noted that Malcolm Lowe’s distinction between apprehensive and autonomous thought seems
to satisfy this condition, since, on his reading, the more paradigmatic thought-forms belong to
the category of autonomous thought, which itself is predicated on apprehensive thought.
Finally, I’d argued that this gradational picture can be harmonized with passages (i) through (n),
insofar as these passages all refer specifically to autonomous thought-forms as the
distinguishing mark of the human animal.
Having established that the non-human thought implication can be viewed as a genuinely
interesting ramification of the strong Thinking Model rather than as a self-refutation, I’d then
turned my attention to three a priori objections raised by Michael Wedin, against the strong
Thinking-Model’s central assertion. These were (1) that imagination (unlike thought) is
functionally incomplete, (2) that thought (unlike imagination) is always propositional, and (3)
that thoughts (unlike images) always denote universals. In response to the first objection, I’d
noted that the imagination seems to parallel Aristotle’s paradigmatic example of functional
completeness (i.e. thought) even more closely than the perceptual faculty does. I’d then
addressed Wedin’s other two objections, by elaborating on the nature of Lowe’s apprehensive
thought. On Lowe’s telling, apprehensive thought denotes particular objects and is arguably
non-propositional; and so as long as Lowe’s apprehensive vs autonomous thought dichotomy
(or something like it) remains on the table, the category of apprehensive thought can be
invoked as a plausible-counter example against Wedin’s claims that Aristotelian thought is
necessarily propositional, and that it necessarily denotes universals.
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With Wedin’s three objections addressed, I’d then gone on to unpack what I take to be the real
problem with the strong Thinking-Model: namely, that images are registered in the bodily
organs, whereas there is no organ associated with thought. But rather than attempting to
challenge the textual evidence indicating that images are registered in the bodily organs, I’d
attempted to work around it, by introducing the notion that images might be capable of
becoming disengaged from the matter of the bodily organs, and that this de-corporealizing
process might serve as the basis for an account of the generation of learned thoughts, which
retains the strong Thinking-Model’s notion of a one-to-one intentional correspondence
between images and thoughts.
I began this line of inquiry by establishing that the faculty of imagination—like that of
perception—is not itself a magnitude, but rather a power housed within a magnitude (i.e. the
sensory organ), and that its activation involves the retention of formal qualities into both the
power and the magnitude. The upshot being that the formal content of a retained image has a
resonance within the soul which is, at least theoretically, distinguishable from its resonance
within the sensory organ. The next step was to determine whether that form’s resonance
within the soul might be capable of persisting independently of its resonance within any bodily
organ. Initially the prospects had looked quite promising, for two reasons: Firstly, Aristotle
states in DA 1.4 that a blind man would regain the ability to see, were he to be fitted with new
eyes; and if he’d regain the ability to see, then it seems reasonable to suppose that he’d also
regain the ability to acquire new visual images. This suggests that the imaginative power at any
rate is, along with the perceptual power, separable from the corresponding sensory organ.
Secondly, the blind man must surely be able to recollect the objects he’d perceived prior to
going blind, and since the imagination is central to Aristotle’s account of memory, it seemed to
follow that the formal content of those previously acquired images must continue to resonate
within the soul independently of any resonance it might have had in the eyes. However, this
proved insufficient to establish the desired conclusion that the resonance of images within the
soul needn’t supervene on any bodily process, as Aristotle does allow that images can travel
between the peripheral sensory organs and the heart by way of the blood. The upshot of this is
that although an image’s resonance within the soul needn’t necessarily supervene on its
continued resonance within the sensory organ through which it originally entered, it may still
supervene on its resonance within the blood or the heart.
I’d therefore concluded that the strong Thinking-Model is implausible, not necessarily because
of its implications concerning the cognitive capacities of non-human animals, nor for any of the
reasons that Wedin gives, but rather, because images cannot be said to possess or to be
capable of acquiring the same functional independence from the bodily organs that thoughts
enjoy. Whereas the mind’s apprehension of an intelligible form does not supervene directly on
any alteration in a bodily organ, it seems necessary that the imaginative faculty’s retention of
an image must supervene directly on some sort of a bodily alteration, if not in the specific
sensory organ which was initially stimulated, then in some other bodily substrate, such as the
blood or the heart. That said, although my third chapter was unable to successfully defend the
135

strong Thinking-Model, its explorations were still fruitful in that they provided a more accurate
diagnosis of the strong Thinking-Model’s deficiencies than had been previously advanced, and
in that they yielded the following provocative insight: although images are not wholly disengageable from the substrate of the bodily organs, they are at least partially dis-engageable,
in that they are not restricted to any one organ, but can travel between various organs by way
of the blood.
With the superficial and strong Thinking-Models ruled out, I’d turned my attention to the
moderate Thinking-Model in my fourth and final chapter. As previously stated, this was the
variant that had enjoyed the greatest amount of textual support, with passages (c) and (f)’
indicating that images are sometimes a kind of thought, and passage (e) indicating that images
are in some sense components of thoughts. I’d conjectured that these two seemingly distinct
suggestions can be harmonized, if we interpret the former as meaning that images are capable
of becoming thoughts as the result of some sort of alteration process; in which case images
would constitute components of thoughts in the sense of serving as a kind of “material”
substrate for their coming into being. I’d then pointed to the interpretive commentaries of
Avempace and the early Averroes, as historical precedents for this sort of reading. On their
view, the images of the activated imaginative faculty—or to be more precise, the “intermediate
spiritual forms” contained therein—actually do become intelligible thoughts through a process
of illumination by the agent intellect. Moreover, Avempace and the early Averroes
conceptualized this illuminative process as a formal change undergone by the intermediate
spiritual forms of the imagination, for which they serve as a kind of material substrate.
As to the benefits of the moderate Thinking-Model, my primary assertion had been that
because Avempace offers a constructive critique of Alexander’s naturalistic reading of Aristotle,
while retaining most of its key features and overall trajectory, a moderate Thinking-Model
patterned after Avempace might serve as a helpful contribution to the recent efforts to revive
Alexander’s naturalistic reading. Like Alexander, Avempace had identified the agent intellect
with the divine intellect of the Metaphysics, and had sought to advance a naturalistic account of
the material intellect, by conceptualizing it as a disposition inhering in the lower, embodied
psychic faculties, and which is actualized by the illuminating influence of the divine intellect.
However, he’d noticed (as had I) that Alexander had been unsuccessful in squaring the
functional incorporeality of the human intellect with its corporeal origins, owing in part to his
overbroad conception of the subject for the actualization process, as well as his reliance on the
notion of “common forms,” which would be equally applicable to all the other psychic faculties.
Avempace had sought to resolve this difficulty by specifying the “intermediate spiritual forms”
of the imagination as the proximate substrata for the generation of learned thoughts, and I’d
found this to be a compelling solution, as it seemed to offer a cleaner account of how a
functionally incorporeal material intellect might emerge from the lower, embodied psychic
faculties, by expressing it as the fulfillment of a sort of partial independence possessed only by
the “spiritual forms” of the activated imaginative faculty. Moreover, the uniqueness of this
partial independence to the “spiritual forms” of the activated imaginative faculty seemed to me
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to be supported by the closing observation of my third chapter, that imaginative impressions
contained within the body (upon which the “spiritual forms” supervene) are themselves mobile
between—and hence, partially separable from—the bodily organs. In light of all of this, I’d
reasoned that Alexandrian revivalists like Caston would inherit a problem from Alexander, to
which supporters of an Avempacean moderate Thinking-Model, like myself, would inherit a
solution.
As secondary and tertiary benefits, I’d noted that the moderate Thinking-Model would also
assist Wedin in his efforts to establish the mind’s dependence upon the body (since it accounts
for the dependence of a broader range of thought-acts upon the imagination than Wedin’s
reading was able to) and that it would serve as a badly needed course-correction for the later
Averroes, who’d abandoned the project of advancing a naturalistic reading of the material
intellect altogether. Finally, I’d noted that the moderate Thinking-Model serves as a correction
on my own past research, in that it enables me to maintain my earlier view that Aristotelian
thought requires some sort of a “material” cause, but without requiring me to commit myself
to the dualistic position that the mind itself is the subject for this process of change.
Coupled with the efficiency with which it enables us to make sense of passages (c), (e) and (f)’
without requiring us to posit that Aristotle changed his mind multiple times mid-text, the
various contributions that the moderate Thinking-Model seems capable of making to the
project of advancing a naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle renders it very attractive.
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Appendix: List of Passages Cited
(a) ”But since when one thing has been set in motion another thing may be moved by it,
and imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, i.e.
to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its content what can be perceived,
and since movement may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is
necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this movement cannot exist apart
from sensation or in creatures that do not perceive, and its possessor does and
undergoes many things in virtue of it, and it is true and false” (DA 3.3, 428b10-17).
(b) “If then imagination presents no other features than those enumerated and is what we
have described, then imagination must be a movement resulting from an actual exercise
of a power of sense” (DA 3.3, 429a-3).
(c) Thinking seems to be the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of
imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a
condition of its existence” (DA 1.1, 403a8-10).
(d) That this activity is not the same kind of thinking as judgment is obvious. For imagination
lies within our power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture, as in the practice
of mnemonics by the use of mental images), but in forming opinions we are not free: we
cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth” (DA 3.3, 427b14-20).
(e) ”Thinking is different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part
judgment” (DA 3.3, 427b28).
(f) ”These two at all events appear to be sources of movement: appetite and thought (if
one may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking; for many men follow their
imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in all animals other than man there is no
thinking or calculation but only imagination)” (DA 3.10, 433a9-12).
(g) “When separated it is alone just what it is, and this above is immortal and eternal (we
do not remember because, while this is impossible, passive thought is perishable); and
without this nothing thinks” (DA 3.5, 430a20-26).
(h) “If actual imagination and actual sensation were the same, imagination would be found
in all the brutes: this is held not to be the case; e.g. it is not found in ants or bees or
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grubs” (DA 3.3, 428a8-10).
(i) “Lastly, certain living beings—a small minority—possess calculation and thought, for
(among mortal beings) those which possess calculation have all the other powers above
mentioned, while the converse does not hold—indeed some live by imagination alone,
while others have not even imagination” (DA 2.3, 415a8-12).
(j) “And because imaginations remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations,
animals in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the
non-existence in them of thought, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in
them of thought by feeling or disease or sleep” (DA 3.3, 429a5-8).
(k) “But perhaps it is not the whole soul, nor all its parts collectively, that constitutes the
source of motion; but there may be one part, identical with that in plants, which is the
source of growth, another, namely the sensory part, which is the source of change of
quality, while still another, and this not the intellectual part, is the source of locomotion.
For other animals than man have the power of locomotion, but in none but him is there
intellect” (Parts of Animals 1.1, 641a41-45).
(l) “Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man.
Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of
perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every
animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle”
(Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1097b32-36).
(m) “It also follows that this is the reason why the lower animals are not incontinent, viz.
because they have no universal beliefs but only imagination and memory of particulars”
(NE. 7.3, 1147b3-5).
(n) “And what we said before will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by nature
best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to intellect
is best and pleasantest, since intellect more than anything else is man. This life therefore
is also the happiest” (NE 10.7, 1178b2-6).

(o) “In the great majority of animals there are traces of psychical qualities which are more
markedly differentiated in the case of human beings” (History of Animals 8, 588a16-17).
(p) “Some of these qualities in man, as compared with the corresponding qualities in
animals, differ only quantitatively: that is to say, a man has more of this quality…”
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(History of Animals 8, 588a21-23).
(q) “The truth of this statement will be the more clearly apprehended if we have regard to
the phenomena of childhood; for in children may be observed the traces and seeds of
what will one day be settled habits, though psychologically a child hardly differs for the
time being from an animal…” (History of Animals 8, 588a26-b1).
(r) “When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows is
said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own
initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the
potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; and
thought is then able to think of itself” (DA 3.4, 429b6-429b9).
(s) “Now life is deﬁned in the case of animals by the power of perception, in that of man by
the power of perception or thought” (NE 9.9, 1170a15-17).
(t) “There [i.e. in the case of thinking and inferring about the immovable objects] the end is
the truth seen (for, when one thinks the two propositions, one thinks and puts together
the conclusion), but here [i.e. in the case of thinking in the domain of conduct] the two
propositions result in a conclusion which is an action—for example, whenever one
thinks that every man ought to walk, and that one is a man oneself, straightaway one
walks; or that, in this case, no man should walk, one is a man: straightaway one remains
at rest” (De Motu Animalium 7, 701a8-13).
(u) “Now about eternal things no one deliberates, e.g. about the universe or the
incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square…We deliberate about
things that are in our power and can be done” (NE 3.3, 1112a21-31).
(v) “The same man is thought to be continent and ready to abide by the result of his
calculations, or incontinent and ready to abandon them” (NE 7.1, 1145b10-11).
(w) “…the last proposition both being an opinion about a perceptible object, and being what
determines our actions, this a man either has not when he is in the state of passion, or
has it in the sense in which having knowledge did not mean knowing but only talking, as
a drunken man may utter the verses of Empedocles” (NE 7.3, 1147b9-12).
(x) “…it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we
can do anything” (NE 10.7, 1177b29-30).
(y) “For while a wise man, as well as a just man and the rest, needs the necessaries of life,
when they are sufﬁciently equipped with things of that sort the just man needs people
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towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave
man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the wise man, even when by
himself, can contemplate truth” (NE 10.7, 1177b35-40).
(z) “…he can reﬂect when he wants to, if nothing external prevents him” (DA 2.5, 417a2829).
(aa)
“For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up
a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images)” (DA 3.3,
427b19-20).
(bb)
“…a man can think when he wants to but his sensation does not depend upon
himself—a sensible object must be there” (DA 2.5, 417b25-26).
(cc) “In the case of what is to possess sense, the ﬁrst transition is due to the action of the
male parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect of
sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge” (DA 2.5,
417b17-20).
(dd)
“…as to knowledge of the immediates, one might puzzle…whether the states are
not present in us but come about in us, or whether they are present in us but escape
notice. Well, if we have them, it is absurd; for it results that we have pieces of
knowledge more precise than demonstration and yet this escapes notice” (Posterior
Analytics 2.19, 99b26-27).
(ee)
“…there is a primitive universal in the mind (for though one perceives the
particular, perception is of the universal—e.g. of man but not of Callias the man); again,
a stand is made in these, until what has no parts and is universal stands—e.g. such and
such an animal stands, until animal does” (Posterior Analytics 2.19, 100a15-100b1).
(ff) “…for those [animals] in which it [retention] does not come about, there is no
knowledge outside perceiving (either none at all, or none with regard to that of which
there is no retention); but for some perceivers [i.e. those with imagination], it is possible
to grasp it in their minds” (Posterior Analytics 2.19, 99b38-40).

(gg)
“For the actualizing of desire is a substitute for inquiry or thinking. I want to
drink, says appetite; this is drink, says sense or imagination or thought: straightaway I
drink” (De Motu Animalium 7, 701a31-32).
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(hh)
“The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images and…sometimes by
means of images or thoughts which are within the soul, just as if it were seeing, it
calculates what is to come by reference to what is present” (DA 3.7, 431b2-7).
(ii) “To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it
asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the
soul never thinks without an image” (DA 3.7, 431a15-17).
(jj) “…because imaginations remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations,
animals in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the
non-existence in them of thought, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in
them of thought by feeling or disease or sleep” (DA 3.3, 429a5-429a8).
(kk)
“That the affection is corporeal, i.e. that recollection is a searching for an image
in a corporeal substrate, is proved by the fact that some persons, when, despite the
most strenuous application of thought, they have been unable to recollect, feel
discomfort, which even though they abandon the effort at recollection, persists in them
none the less…the reason why the effort of recollection is not under the control of their
will is that…he who tries to recollect and hunts sets up a process in a material part, in
which resides the affection” (De Memoria et Reminiscentia, 453a14-453a31).
(ll) “But since we have, in our work on the soul, treated of imagination, and the faculty of
imagination is identical with that of sense-perception, though the being of a faculty of
imagination is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception” (De Insomniis,
459a15-459a22).
(mm)
“…cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would
acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive
faculty: as it is, it has none” (DA 3.4, 429a22-26).
(nn)
“When the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along
with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no
matter” (DA 3.8, 432a7-9).
(oo)
“The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same.
What perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not admit that either the
having the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude; what they are is a
certain form or power in a magnitude” (DA 2.12, 424a24-424b19).
(pp)
“…what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things
without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet142

ring without the iron or gold” (DA 2.12, 424a18-21).
(qq)
“…if the old man could recover the proper kind of eye, he would see just as well
as the young man. The incapacity of old age is due to an affection not of the soul but of
its vehicle, as occurs in drunkenness or disease” (DA 1.4, 408b21-24).
(rr) “…they are within the soul potentially, but actualize themselves only when the
impediment to their doing so has been relaxed; and according as they are thus set free,
they begin to move in the blood which remains in the sensory organs, and which is now
but scanty, and take on likenesses after the manner of cloud-shapes, which in their
rapid metamorphoses one compares now to human beings and a moment afterwards to
centaurs. Each of them is however, as has been said, the remnant of a sensory
impression taken when sense was actualizing itself; and when this, the true impression,
has departed, its remnant is still there…” (De Insomniis, 460b28-462a7).
(ss) “…the veins are the place of the blood, while the origin of these is the heart—" (De
Somno et Vigilia, 456b1-2).
(tt) “…the image is an affection of the common sense” (De Memoria et Reminiscentia,
450a11-12).
(uu)
“Certainly, however, all sanguineous animals have the supreme organ of the
sense-faculties in the heart, for it is here that we must look for the common sensorium
belonging to all the sense-organs” (De Juventute et Senectute, De Vita et Morte, De
Respiratione. 469a10-12).

(vv)
“If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be
capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible” (DA
1.1, 403a10-11).
(ww)
“…it [i.e. thought or the power of reflection] seems to be a different kind of soul,
differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of being
separated” (DA 2.2, 413b25-27).
(xx) “…whether each of these [i.e. the psychic faculties] is an attribute of the soul as a whole,
i.e. whether it is with the whole soul we think, perceive, move ourselves, act or are
acted upon, or whether each of them requires a different part of the soul?” (DA 1.5,
411a29-b2).
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(yy)
“When separated it is alone just what it is, and this above is immortal and
eternal (we do not remember because, while this is impossible, passive thought is
perishable)” (DA 3.5, 430a20-26).
(zz) “It remains, then, for the reason alone so to enter [i.e. from outside] and alone to be
divine, for no bodily activity has any connexion with the activity of reason” (Gen An 2.3,
736b26-28).
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